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Abstract 
 
The electoral success and increased media presence of the Far-Right ideology known as 
the Alternative Right has catapulted the once marginal fringe movement into popular political 
discourse. The term Alternative Right is used in contrast to Alt-Right, which is a specific 
subsection of the broader Alt-Right who are associated with Richard Spencer. This dissertation 
examines the theories that make up the Alternative Right by addressing the question: “How have 
the divergent political theory traditions of the Alternative Right coalesced into a new reactionary 
political ideology?”The first half of the dissertation defines the Alternative Right and the historical 
context for the movement. The dissertation defines the Alternative Right by its axioms of the right 
to difference, the primacy of cultural metapolitics and hierarchical individualism.  The second half 
examines the four major intellectual influences of the Alternative Right: The Techno-libertarians 
know as the Grey Tribe, NeoReactionary Thought, the European New Right and the American 
White Nationalists. The dissertation concludes that the divergent political theory of the Alternative 
Right is unified based on its shared reactionary values, its break from American liberal-
conservativism and a consistent focus on the literature of radicalization and critique. The goal of 
the Alternative Right is a rebirth of racial/gendered consciousness and a new American/European 
renaissance. 
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Dedication 
For those who wish to see with eyes unclouded by hate.  
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Part 1: Historical Context 
The contemporary reactionary phenomenon of the Alternative Right did not appear out 
of the ether fully formed to scare the public. Nor is it the only reason that Donald Trump won 
the 2016 presidential race. Nor is it the main cause of Brexit. Nor is it the second coming of 
Adolf Hitler and a fourth Reich.  The Alternative Right is the result of a synthesis of a collection 
of existing reactionary and Far-Right ideological traditions. For this text, the Alternative Right 
is defined as an emergent political ideology of reactionary thought (and those who embrace it) 
rather than a discrete social movement or online community. The Alt-Right is a subgroup of the 
broader Alternative Right, which represents one of the radical cores of the movement. The 
Alternative Right should be understood as that collective group which Hillary Clinton invoked 
in her August 2016 Deplorables speech and the one that Steve Bannon made manifest through 
his time at Breitbart and on the Donald Trump presidential campaign.1  
The following chapters address the different political theory influences on the Alternative 
Right, which groups and traditions the public has misidentified as an influence on the Alternative 
Right, and how the Alternative Right has coalesced into a semi-unified movement. The first 
chapter addresses what the Alternative Right is and provides an outline of what are the shared 
values within the ideological positions of the Alternative Right. The second chapter covers how 
Trump, the Tea Party, and Nazis have been mislabeled as members of the Alternative Right, rather 
than as fellow travellers or groups with superficial similarities. The third chapter covers how the 
Alternative Right and the Alt-Right has emerged as a historical event, covering the movement’s 
three distinct periods: 1968-2007, 2008-2014 and 2014 to the present. The fourth chapter focuses 
 
1 Joshua Green, Devil’s Bargain: Steve Bannon, Donald Trump, and the Storming of the Presidency, Kindle (New 
York: Penguin Press, 2017), 417. 
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on how the Grey Tribe of apolitical American libertarians adopted increasingly right-wing cultural 
values and radicalized into the Alternative Right. The fifth chapter addresses the emergence of the 
NeoReactionaries Curtis Yarvin and Nick Land as the intellectual vanguards that established the 
ideology of the digital Alternative Right. The sixth chapter covers the European New Right’s 
contributions to the American Alt-Right and Alternative Right despite its fervent anti-American 
politics. The seventh chapter covers the American White Nationalist development from a series of 
marginal think tanks and journals to an internationally recognized movement. The final chapter 
connects the various threads of intellectual thought and explains how these divergent ideologies 
are tied together forming the Alternative Right. 
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Chapter 1: What is the Alternative Right? 
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they 
are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little 
else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are 
usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, 
are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that 
the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of 
ideas.  – John Maynard Keynes2 
What is the Alternative Right? 
To paraphrase Abbé Sieyès in 1789 on the verge of the French Revolution3: 
What is the Alt-Right? Something. 
What has it been until now in the political order? Nothing. 
What does it want to be? Everything 
This text attempts to answer one specific question: how have the divergent political theory 
traditions of the Alternative Right coalesced into a new reactionary political ideology? This chapter 
focuses on what the Alternative Right is, defining the scope and contents of the movement 
intellectually. For this text, the Alternative Right will be a loose label describing the broader 
Anglosphere ideology of the movement,4 rather than the specific subgroup of White Nationalists 
 
2 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
1936). 
3 Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, What Is the Third Estate? (London: Pall Mall, 1963). 
4 The term Anglosphere is used to describe the English language political community, while this book focuses on 
American politics and political theory, it incorporates international voices speaking on American politics. 
Alternative Right figures in Canada speak to American audiences just as the many Canadians and British citizens are 
influenced by American thinkers. The walls between these nations are fundamentally porous and completely non-
existent within online debates where the Alternative Right’s ideology was incubated. 
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that have supported Richard Spencer since the late 2000’s, known as the Alt-Right, or the much 
larger group of right-wing populists found across the globe which cannot be defined by the 
American political theory.5 This chapter defines the Alternative Right by answering the following 
questions: first, what are the different political theory traditions of the Alternative Right? Second, 
what do we need to understand to examine the Alternative Right as a political theory? Third, what 
makes the ideology new? Fourth, what are the movement’s axioms and traits? 
While one is unlikely to find a university course on Alternative Right political theory, one 
can construct a likely syllabus of what one would look like based on the public statements of 
Alternative Right politicians and various internet forums explaining the ideology for the 
uninitiated. The authors and texts discussed within this text do not represent the entirety of 
Alternative Right political theory. Instead, it is a survey of the various contributors to the political 
theory of the Alternative Right. The authors and texts have been selected based on their 
prominence within public statements by Alternative Right politicians, internal citations and 
references within Alternative Right texts, authors in attendance at Alternative Right conferences, 
and the works published by Alternative Right publishers and media outlets. 
The Alternative Right, despite populist traditions and a predilection for anti-academic 
rhetoric, is influenced by political theories and philosophical positions first and immediate policy 
choices second. The Alternative Right sees meaningful policy change as a long-term goal, favoring 
immediate cultural change, which is due to their fixation on cultural metapolitics, which focuses 
on shifting the Overton Window (which will be discussed in greater detail later this chapter).  As 
this work will cover the intellectual traditions and philosophical logic that supports this movement, 
 
5 Daniel Lombroso, Rebranding White Nationalism: Inside Richard Spencer’s Alt-Right (USA: The Atlantic, 2016). 
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it will not focus too deeply on the broader social movement, the tactics, “ground game,” use of 
social media or Trump’s electoral success. Additionally, this work will not cover the specific 
contemporary bloggers and activists of the Alternative Right who have propagated the ideology 
since 2016. Figures such as Milo Yiannopolous or Ben Shapiro are not titans of political theory, 
and while influential to some, are not recognized for their unique or significant contributions to 
the ideology. They are recognized as media figures and entertainers producing content for the 
purpose of political organization or financial gain. Instead, the purpose of this text is to explain the 
web of connections between the political theory traditions espoused by the Alternative Right, and 
how they are constructing a broader coalition under the banner of a new reactionary ideology. 
While having a substantial presence online between 2008 and 2014, the Alternative Right’s 
presence in electoral politics began during the summer of 2015 with Trump’s entrance into the 
Republican primaries. Before the summer of 2016, the term was only used to describe a group of 
white nationalists connected to Richard Spencer.6 Its first mainstream liberal media appearance 
with the name Alt-Right was in a Mother Jones article during the summer of 2016,7 but it was 
subsequently popularized during a speech by Hillary Clinton less than a month later, where she 
used the term to label Trump’s right-wing supporters as White supremacists.8 The intention of 
Hillary Clinton and pro-Democrat media figures in labelling the Alt-Right as merely a group of 
neo-Nazi extremists was a strategic attempt to push away moderate Republicans from the populist 
insurgency lead by Donald Trump and into the Democratic camp.9 While partially successful at 
moving moderate Republicans towards the Libertarian and Democratic candidates, the choice also 
 
6 Paul Gottfried, “The Decline and Rise of the Alternative Right,” Taki’s Magazine, December 2008. 
7 Sarah Posner, “How Donald Trump’s New Campaign Chief Created an Online Haven for White Nationalists,” 
Mother Jones, August 2016. 
8 Green, Devil’s Bargain: Steve Bannon, Donald Trump, and the Storming of the Presidency, 350. 
9 Ibid., 352. 
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polarized Trump supporters, arguably reducing some of Clinton’s support during the close 
election.10 Since the 2016 election, the American media has both condemned the actions of the 
Alt-Right while also normalizing their existence and political stances through extensive media 
coverage. Those who adopt the moniker of “Alt-Lite” are given ample airtime on mainstream 
media outlets despite their connection to the more radical elements of the movement.11 In the 
aftermath of the 2016 presidential election, the term Alt-Right has become the cultural shorthand 
for the loose connection of Far-Right populist groups within North America. While not all groups 
or authors labelled as Alt-Right by the media are followers of the Alt-Right ideology, the less 
specific use of the label to anyone within the (Far)-Right has made the term much more ubiquitous 
than it was before 2016. 12 
Before listing the four-main political intellectual traditions of the Alternative Right, it is 
necessary to quickly clarify some misconceptions about which traditions are part of the Alternative 
Right.13 The Alternative Right are not classical fascists, nor are they literal goose-stepping, 
Browncoat wearing Nazis from the 1930s.14 The small subsection of the Alternative Right that are 
neo-Nazis represents a small community within the movement, one that is isolated and ostracized 
from the moderate members of the Alternative Right. These “moderates” use the moniker Alt-Lite 
to separate themselves from the radical core as they typically support White Supremacy but not 
outright White Nationalism, but these followers are still on the far-right of the Anglosphere 
political consensus and implicitly support radical extremists. 
 
10 Ibid., 376. 
11 George Hawley, Making Sense of the Alt-Right (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 141. 
12 Ibid., 139. 
13 The differences between these groups and the Alt-Right will be examined in detail in the subsequent chapter. 
14 Roger Griffin, A Fascist Century: Essays by Roger Griffin, ed. Matthew Feldman (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 
190. 
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The spectrum of the Alternative Right can be understood as a quasi-solar system. In the 
centre, there are core ideas that comprise the most radical ideas of the Alt-Right, which grow and 
contract in size, pulling outside ideas in toward the centre and losing followers as they fade. Like 
stars, these thinkers and ideas pull the different subgroups into uneasy orbits around the radical 
core ideas of white supremacy, misogyny and anti-democratic politics.  Some subgroups and 
individuals will maintain stable orbits of their own, with little satellite moons of followers, such 
as the NeoReactionaries who reject the populist impulse of the Alt-Right15 or the American 
Renaissance White Nationalists who tend to oppose the Alt-Right’s anti-Semitism.16  Occasionally 
a rogue planet may enter the system before being banished, such as Milo Yiannopolous who was 
at best described as Alt-Lite. Rather than a static system that remains constant over time, elements 
are always moving in relation to each other, growing and fading over time, with irregular orbits 
temporarily bringing ideas closer to the core. The entire system is the Alternative Right, though 
the magnitude of the core ideas and their role in defining the movement provide significantly more 
attraction and pull than those ideas on the fringe with less mass, possessing minor ideological 
satellites in turn. The ideological pull of other systems can pull some theories away from their 
original systems or sit in an uneasy middle ground between the two systems, such as the American 
conservative and Alternative Right’s shared rejection of socialism. The system is a spectrum from 
those core ideas to those on the fringe that could be peeled off to another ideological movement or 
abandoned if they are at odds with the Alternative Right’s radical cores. 
 
15 Nick Land, “The Alt-Right Is Dead,” Outside In, 2016, http://www.xenosystems.net/the-alt-right-is-dead/; 
Michael Anissimov, “Why the Replacement of Neoreaction with the Alt Right Was a Good Thing,” Medium, June 
2016. 
16 Leonard Zeskind, Blood and Politics: The History of the White Nationalist Movement from the Margins to the 
Mainstream, Kindle (California: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017), 367. 
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If one understands the radical core of the Alternative Right as a self-described Leninist 
vanguard party,17 which influences and radicalizes a broader population, which is receptive to the 
ideas of the Alternative Right’s ideological core, this allows the broader Alternative Right populist 
movement in the Anglosphere to be examined in conjunction. Otherwise excusing their supporters 
who are only “mostly in favour of radical right-wing extremism” because they reject the terrorism 
and hate crimes of the movement’s radical core, allows the racism to become normalized. Without 
this conception of the movement as a spectrum from radicalized core to complacent conservative 
moderates, any analysis of the movement would fall into a naval gazing quest for perfect taxonomy 
rather than qualitative examination. Also,  this spectrum allows us to understand how to examine 
the many significant contributors to the political theory and intellectual justifications of the 
Alternative Right who would reject the Alt-Right label, such as Jordan Peterson or Nick Land18 
who do so for either political or philosophical reasons.19 As the Alt-Right label is explicitly used 
to denote the radical sect which is responsible for hate crimes and terrorist attacks, it is 
simultaneously understood as a rallying cry and a slur.20 
By using this spectrum, we can also make sense of figures like Donald Trump who have a 
reciprocal and amicable relationship with the Alt-Right’s goals.  We know that the ideological 
cores of the Alternative Right overwhelmingly endorsed Trump, but Trump did not read the 
 
17 Errol Morris, American Dharma, 2018. 
18 Land, “The Alt-Right Is Dead”; Greg Callaghan, “Right-Winger? Not Me, Says Alt-Right Darling Jordan 
Peterson,” The Sydney Morning Herald, April 19, 2018. 
19 This separation between the use of a philosopher’s ideas and the personal values of the philosopher themselves is 
like how Gramsci is appropriated by the European New Right, in particular Alain de Benoist, despite himself being 
an Italian Marxist locked up by a Fascist government, or Nietzsche’s philosophy being used to justify anti-Semitism 
that he despised. 
20 Julia Alexander, “YouTube Creators Are Trying to Move on from ‘Subscribe to PewDiePie,’” The Verge (New 
York, March 19, 2019). 
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literature of the Alternative Right such as Nick Land’s Dark Enlightenment21 or Julius Evola’s 
Ride the Tiger22 before launching his campaign. To suggest that Trump read any of the theorists 
examined in this text is laughable, but he has indeed been influenced by these thinkers indirectly 
through social media and his political staffers.  Members of Trump’s cabinet have been vocal 
members of the Alt-Right,23 but Trump is somewhere between a useful idiot for the Alt-Right and 
a political entrepreneur exploiting the growing popularity of the Alternative Right narrative for 
personal gain.  
It is also essential to make crystal clear that the Alt-Right is barely connected intellectually 
to the Republican Christian-libertarian movement in the United States which has been bankrolled 
by the dark money of the Koch brothers.24 The broader Alternative Right rarely supports these 
libertarian figures, as they are typically labeled “Cuckservatives.”25 The libertarian think-tanks 
despite being right-wing are a primary source of ire for the majority of the Alt-Right. The 
Alternative Right movement is a revolt against mainstream American conservativism,26 whose 
fixation on capitalism, profit and electoral success, comes at the cost of defending “Western 
Civilization” from waves of immigrants, globalist financial elites and perhaps worst of all, the 
spectre haunting the west, Feminism.27 It is necessary to abandon a pure binary spectrum between 
left and right when examining the Alternative Right. This simplistic binary is why the term 
 
21 “The Dark Enlightenment,” The Dark Enlightenment, 2013, http://www.thedarkenlightenment.com/the-dark-
enlightenment-by-nick-land/. 
22 Ride the Tiger: A Survival Manual for the Aristocrats of the Soul (Inner Traditions, 2003). 
23 Green, Devil’s Bargain: Steve Bannon, Donald Trump, and the Storming of the Presidency, 374. 
24 Jane Meyer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right (New 
York: Doubleday, 2016). 
25 David Weigel, “Cuckservative - the Conservative Insult of the Month, Explained,” The Washington Post, July 29, 
2015. 
26 For non-American members of the Alt-Right the revolt is against pro-globalization parties, ranging from third-
way social democrats to right-wing conservatives. 
27 Richard Spencer, “What It Means to Be Alt-Right,” Altright.com, 2017, https://altright.com/2017/08/11/what-it-
means-to-be-alt-right/; Allum Bokhari and Milo Yiannopoulos, “An Establishment Conservative’s Guide to the Alt-
Right,” Breitbart, March 29, 2016. 
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Alternative Right is more effective at explaining the ideology of the movement, which is not 
necessarily “more Right-wing” but rather a different type of right-wing politics.28 
The political theory of the Alternative Right is composed of four broad factions: the 
gateway ideology of the techno-libertarian community, known as the Grey Tribe throughout this 
text, the NeoReactionaries of the Dark Enlightenment, the European New Right ideologues and 
the White Nationalist community within the United States. Other than the Dark Enlightenment, 
these intellectual traditions are far from homogenous. Disagreements within the respective 
traditions over who counts as a member and what would be considered canonical within the 
traditions are persistent. As with any intellectual community, disagreements exist and can be 
violently hostile, but these communities tend to coalesce into a mostly coherent worldview.  
The Grey Tribe has the least cohesive body of literature within the Alternative Right, as it 
is less a tradition of thought and more a shared digital culture. Its fungible quality comes from its 
mixture of libertarianism, California ideology and accelerationist theories of politics, centred on 
technological progress within the information age. In his 2014 article, Scott Alexander coined the 
term “Grey Tribe” 29 to describe the broader techno-libertarian population as the mostly apolitical 
pre-Gamergate technophile communities which existed outside of the traditional 
Republican/Democratic dichotomy of American politics. While much of the literature within the 
Grey Tribe is premised on the disruption of existing modern institutions and markets due to 
technology, the movement is known for a politics of tribalism which goes hand in hand with 
misogynistic and anti-identity politics. It is this tribalism that has attracted a substantial young 
 
28 Gottfried, “The Decline and Rise of the Alternative Right.” 
29 Scott Alexander, “I Can Tolerate Anything Except the Outgroup,” Slate Star Codex, 2014, 
http://slatestarcodex.com/2014/09/30/i-can-tolerate-anything-except-the-outgroup/. 
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male NEET (Not in education, employment or training) population which feels alienated and 
disenfranchised by western society and progressive culture. It is also this mixture of alienation and 
physical isolation which has resulted in this group fostering many of the movement’s lone-wolf 
terrorist attacks. 
The second group are the NeoReactionaries of the Dark Enlightenment, specifically Nick 
Land30 and Curtis Yarvin.31 The NeoReactionary ideology is premised on a rejection of the liberal 
enlightenment project, specifically the universal humanism of Liberalism and Marxism. While the 
Alternative Right is a reactionary populist movement, the NeoReactionaries take a non-populist 
approach fixated on an elitist reactionary right-wing framework based on “Human Biodiversity” 
(HBD) (eugenics), the concept of the cathedral,32 anti-democratic politics favouring monarchy, 
and an understanding of freedom premised on “the right to exit.” They are the group most likely 
to be found at the radical core of the Alternative Right yet still shun the label Alt-Right, due to its 
populist and anti-Semitic reputation. Most Dark Enlightenment theory was published online on 
publicly accessible blogs, which shaped the ideology’s intellectual and rhetorical content, rejecting 
traditional academia as the home of “thought police.” The Dark Enlightenment hit its peak in 
popularity in 2014 before being folded into the more popular Alt-Right movement within the 
Alternative Right when Nick Land and Curtis Yarvin moved on to other full-time projects. While 
the movement was small in number, many of the non-populist ideas within the Alternative Right 
can find their origins within this movement.   
 
30 Land, “The Dark Enlightenment.” 
31 Curtis Yarvin, “A Gentle Introduction to Unqualifed Reservations: Chapter 1: The Red Pill,” Unqualified 
Reservations, 2009, https://www.unqualified-reservations.org/2009/01/gentle-introduction-to-unqualified/. 
32 A concept coined by Curtis Yarvin to describe the role of government, media and intellectual institutions to police 
society through cultural norms, similar to the conception of hegemony by Althusser, Gramsci and Foucault.  
12 
 
The third group, that of the various European New Right ideologues, contributed to 
Alternative Right political theory through both the Far-Right publishing company in London, 
Arktos, and decades of non-English language scholarship. The texts of Julius Evola,33 the Post-
War Italian Fascist, or Alain de Benoist and Guillaume Faye’s work34 within the French New Right 
have existed for decades with active European readers. However, the English language audience 
of the European New Right was limited to right-wing polyglots until the Right-Wing publishing 
house Arktos began mass translation of European New Right and Fascists texts for online readers 
in the late 2000s. The European New Right is premised on right-wing cultural politics and the right 
to difference.35 The right to difference is akin to the idea of White Nationalism, rather than arguing 
that say, French culture and the French Ethnicity is the best in the world (or at least better than 
others), the right to difference argues that White French people should be allowed to live in isolated 
communities, segregated from non-white influence or contamination. The goal is to preserve the 
ethnicity and cultural values from the homogenizing influence of globalization and the influx of 
immigrants into France. The right to difference, unlike post-colonial or indigenous theories of 
cultural preservation, is based premised on preserving or reaffirming the structures of white 
supremacy and segregation rather than on correcting the legacy of genocide and colonial practices 
by imperial nations in the 19th and 20th centuries. The writings are known for Islamaphobia, anti-
immigrant sentiments which include advocating genocide, anti-American foreign policy, anti-
globalization policy and a rejection of liberal democracy. The various ideologies of the European 
 
33 Julius Evola, Notes on the Third Reich, ed. John B. Morgan and E. Christian Kopff, Kindle (London: Arktos, 
1996); Evola, Ride the Tiger: A Survival Manual for the Aristocrats of the Soul; Paul Furlong, Social and Political 
Thought of Julius Evola (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011). 
34 Tamir Bar-on, Rethinking the French New Right (New York: Routledge, 2013); Alain de Benoist and Charles 
Champetier, Manifesto For a European Renaissance, Kindle (London: Arktos, 2012); Alain de Benoist, The 
Problem of Democracy, ed. Sergio Knipe and John B. Morgan (London: Arktos, 2011); Guillaume Faye, 
Archeofuturism: European Visions of Post-Catastrophic Age, Kindle (Arktos, 2010); Guillaume Faye, Convergance 
of Catastrophes, Kindle (London: Arktos, 2012). 
35 Tamir Bar-on, Where Have All the Fascists Gone? (Burlington: Ashgate, 2007). 
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New Right range from toying with to fully embracing a fascist ideology, and draw upon the 
conservative revolutionary thinkers that supported the Nazi regime.36 After being isolated from his 
position of power within the White House Steve Bannon has dedicated himself to establishing an 
Alternative Right international through these ideas and the international community who has 
embraced the European New-Right’s ideology. 
The fourth and final body of literature comes from the American White Nationalist 
community. This group is the most public and acknowledged by mainstream news within the 
Alternative Right, though both their movement and its literature are far from unified. White 
Supremacy, the belief and systems that elevate whites over non-whites either due to historical 
legacy or explicit racial hierarchies, is widespread and actively examined by post-colonial critical 
theory literature. In contrast White Nationalism is the belief that whites should have their ethno-
states which exclude non-whites, which is a smaller subsection of White Supremacy. The White 
Nationalist canon ranges from the works of neo-Nazis like Francis Yockey37 to the 
paleoconservative ideology of Paul Gottfried.38 While existing racialized political ideologies have 
existed for centuries, the White Nationalist literature examined in this text responds explicitly to 
the post-civil rights and identity politics era discourse of the left, to present itself as Identitarians, 
or white identity politics.   
Three Considerations for those Examining the Alternative Right 
 
 
36 Julius Evola, Fascism Viewed from the Right, ed. E. Christian Kopff, Kindle (London: Arktos, 2013). 
37 Francis Parker Yockey, Imperium: The Philosophy of History and Politics, Ebook (Scotts Valley, California: 
CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012); Kevin Coogan, Dreamer of the Day: Francis Parker Yockey 
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For those new to the examination of the Far-Right and the Alternative Right, there are three 
positions than need to be examined before engaging in a nuanced understanding of the new 
Alternative Right movement. First, despite the crudeness of some who claim to speak for the Alt-
Right, Alternative Right ideas constitute a constellation of coherent political theories, not merely 
manifestos and internet memes.  Second, although the Alternative Right movement boasts only a 
small number of prominent academics and public intellectuals, their ideas are widely disseminated 
throughout the movement as memes propagated on social media.  Third, the Alternative Right is 
not characterized by a monolithic ideology; instead, Alternative Right thought draws on a diverse 
range of intellectual traditions. There are other academic and journalistic texts that can provide 
tactics for how to respond to the Alternative Right or explain the new political reality in American 
politics since Trump won the 2016 election. The purpose of this text is to demonstrate the 
ideological precursors to provide a better understanding of what the Alternative Right is; it is up 
to the non-philosophers to do something about it.  
For the first position, the Alternative Right is a post-liberal ideology rather than a derivative 
theory emerging as localization of broader fascism or conservative thought. 39 One of the consistent 
elements across the various Alternative Right political traditions is their attempted rejection of 
modernity and the establishment of a new ideology to replace existing modernity.40 The global 
New-Right varies based on local political theory traditions,41 the European New Right draws more 
 
39 In this case, literally an ideology for the post-modern era, rather than a Poststructural ideology or an ideology for 
late capitalism. 
40 As with the Fascism of the 20th century, the Alternative Right is fixated on the question of modernity and 
attempting to overcome the project of modernity. Unlike the American conservatives of the post-war period, the 
Alternative Right desires not to slow modernity but to find a way around it, though the success of the Alternative 
Right to imagine a new system to replace modernity is debatable. 
41 Mark Sedgwick, “Introduction,” in Key Thinkers of the Radical Right: Behind the New Threat to Liberal 
Democracy, ed. Mark Sedgwick, Kindle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). 
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upon continental theorists, such as the Conservative Revolutionaries,42 while the English language 
Alt-Right is known for its libertarian influences. The Alternative Right is paradigmatically 
different from conservative thought even if they may both be understood as right-wing, just as 
Postmodernism is different from Marxism while both being generally understood as left-wing. The 
theorists may come to some of the same conclusions, but their logic is axiomatically different. The 
Alternative Right and traditional conservatives may agree on some common issues and share an 
electoral platform within first-past-the-post elections, but their motivations are fundamentally 
different. The Alternative Right assembles a distinct ideological canon that combines elements of 
existing schools of thought, which means that the existing literature on libertarians, fascists and 
other far-right groups have incomplete pictures, and literature on conservative thought provides 
almost no picture of the Alternative Right ideology or theorists. 
The second position responds to the belief that the Alternative Right is made up of 
unintelligent people accepting the ideology of the elites. The Alternative Right tends to be populist, 
but that does not mean it is solely populist or without logic. Outside of a political theory class at a 
major university, it is unlikely that one will find someone who identifies themselves as a liberal 
because they read John Stuart Mill, John Locke or John Rawls;43 however, we would still call 
someone a liberal if they argued for human rights, democracy and private property. The core works 
of fascism and other non-economic Far-Right ideologies are typically taboo within university 
classrooms and rarely read approvingly. Therefore only those who actively agree with their politics 
or have an intellectual curiosity in fascism would read these texts. Despite this, those core readers 
 
42 Heidegger, Schmitt and other 1930’s German philosophers of the Nazi regime. 
43 James Burnham, Suicide of the West: An Essay on the Meaning and Destiny of Liberalism, Second Ame (New 
York: Encounter Books, 2014). 
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have disseminated Far-Right ideas through a plethora of different mediums, such as YouTube 
channels, political wikis, and memes. 
The final position is that the Far-Right is a philosophically sophisticated ideology with its 
systems of logic. Just as the divisions on the left have led to factionalism and intellectual civil 
wars, the right has been waging wars over the questions of anti-Semitism, racism, free trade, 
immigration, foreign policy and the role of the state. The logic is alien to those coming from a 
liberal or left-critical perspective, which is why it is so commonly derided, but to understand the 
ideology, it must be understood imminently.  
What makes the Alternative Right so new?  
 
At first, glance based on media and cultural osmosis, the Alternative Right appears to be a 
collection of poorly constructed and contradictory arguments, relying on the same traditional 
arguments espoused by right-wing politicians since the Second World War, though nothing could 
be farther from the case. What parallels the Alternative Right has with the conservative movement 
after the Second World War are limited to a handful of authors who are interpreted against the 
political consensus of Buckley and the National Review consensus.44 Even an influential figure 
such as James Burnham is read due to his influence on Patrick Buchanan rather than his influence 
on Buckley.45 The contemporary Alt-Right has more in common with the anti-communist Birchers 
than they do with the intellectual movement emerging out of the National Review in the post-war 
era.  
 
44 George H Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America: Since 1945, Kindle (Intercollegiate Studies 
Institute, 2014), 1010. 
45 David Neiwert, Alt-America: The Rise of the Radical Right in the Age of Trump, Kindle (London: Verso, 2017), 
5874. 
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The movement is a reactionary revolution responding to the shortcomings and isolation of 
the neoliberal system of globalization. The Alternative Right argues for an end to the 
multiculturalism and anti-nationalistic elements of globalization in the name of xenophobic self-
determination. The Alternative Right even goes so far as to argue that freedom is incompatible 
with democracy both domestically and internationally. For the NeoReactionaries in the Alternative 
Right, freedom is the ability to exit a system one disagrees with.46 Therefore global accords which 
limit national sovereignty or anti-hate speech laws are only legitimate if one accepts the choice to 
live under them. A system of politics in which people can willingly relocate without a sense of 
defined place is only possible within a post-globalized world where escape and exile are no longer 
taboo. By opting out of the system, and going Gault, (where one acts as the character John Gault 
in Atlas Shrugged by Ayn Rand and abandons society when it no longer suits their interests)47 the 
Alternative Right reject the totality of globalization and humanism. While the Alternative Right 
cannot escape the influences of conservativism completely, it is not neoliberalism with white 
supremacy, or libertarianism with populism, but rather a distinctly new paradigm for 
understanding politics. 
One of the primary ways in which the Alternative Right is unique has been its use of 
concepts and theories borrowed from critical academics (that is the illiberal left). While many 
critical theorists have drawn upon authors traditionally ascribed to the right for inspiration, such 
as Michel Foucault48 or Gilles Deleuze49 through their rehabilitation of Fredriech Nietzsche, this is 
not the case for American conservativism. The mainstream conservative right has mostly ignored 
 
46 Land, “The Dark Enlightenment”; Michael Anissimov, “How to Exit,” Medium, June 2016. 
47 Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged (New York: Random House, 1957). 
48 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Hommage a Jean Hyppolite, 1971, 145–72, 
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the contributions of left-wing scholars since the Second World War, as the mass migration of left-
wing theorists to the American conservative moment occurred in the aftermath of the Second 
World War and the horrors of Stalinism.50 An example of this expropriation of left-wing thought 
and the use of the ideas of the co-option of the struggle of position, public intellectuals and a critic 
of hegemony found within the work of Antonio Gramsci defines the French New Right.51 
Another trap to avoide is to assume that the reactionary ideas of the Alternative Right could 
be resolved if they were simply to abandon racial consciousness and embrace class consciousness. 
One left-wing reading of the NeoReactionary branch of the Alternative Right movement is that it 
is an incomplete Marxist analysis of political and economic power within the world. Peter 
Sandifer’s NeoReaction a Basilisk even goes as far as to argue that Mencius Molberg (real name 
Curtis Yarvin), 52 the founder of the NeoReactionary movement, is only one step removed from 
Marxism, due to his reading of Yarvin’s as one of global class struggle. However, Yarvin refuses 
to go the extra step and draw that connection, instead focusing on the cultural superstructure rather 
than the economic superstructure.53 The unacknowledged influence is not Karl Marx but James 
Burnham’s idea of the managerial class.54 Despite Sandifer’s suggestion, Yarvin and the rest of 
the Alternative Right are opposed to a Marxist reading of society, they may discuss the role of 
super-structures governing politics, but nowhere within the Alternative Right will you find a 
Marxist or socialist class analysis. The motivating factor for the Alternative Right’s populism, 
according to its authors, is cultural conflict against cultural elites, not economic ones. This 
resentement is unsurprising, Yarvin, like many in the Alternative Right, comes from an amateur 
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political theory tradition, relying on forums rather than graduate seminars.55 Yarvin’s formal 
education is in computer science, while his political theory is autodidactic, following the tradition 
of other autodidactic right-wing thinkers such as Julius Evola.56 The result of this autodidactic 
theory is a fixation on a select bibliography which helps fuel an ideological rather than disciplinary 
echo chamber.57  
One thing that interpretations of the Alternative Right which focus on populism ignore is 
the heritage of the Alternative Right’s intellectuals as the outcasts of the academic system. The 
online forums of the Alternative Right originated in cultural critiques of mass media, rather than 
forums to discuss economic and systemic inequality. Curtis Yarvin is not trained as a philosopher, 
but his works have inspired a substantial body of online literature. Even those within the 
Alternative Right with intellectual pedigree, such as Nick Land,58 have been removed from the 
traditional system of academic publication and publish their work online. While not explicitly 
banned from academics, the movement has established itself outside of the western academic 
environment, publishing in parallel journals and exploiting the shortcomings of the system to adapt 
to the 21st century digital community. Even though documents such as The Dark Enlightenment 
may have limited readership, it far surpasses many essays published in academic journals locked 
behind paywalls. 
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The simultaneous creation of a new political canon for the Alternative Right through online 
publications and reading lists containing a mixture of recognized political theorists and online 
commentaries has created a parallel space for Right-Wing political education. This non-
disciplinary space is a Foucauldian heterotopia where taboo political theory can exist without 
hegemonic pressure.59  This parallel space for political theory is all the more enticing as the cost 
of American university education has risen while the prospects for liberal-arts graduates have 
fallen.60 While the left-wing critiques of academic spaces by figures such as Pierre Bourdieu61 have 
been well received academically, they have not resulted in widespread academic change within 
the institutions of universities. The internet has allowed the dissemination of reading lists and texts 
for Far-Right thought, not only for those who are actively searching for these documents but also 
for many who stumble upon them accidentally. The content of a Far-Right blog post is appraised 
based on the number of views, shares, and references to it, all of which occur after it has been 
published, in contrast, the journal process for academics appraises the document before the public 
interaction. While peer review is an essential element to maintaining academic authority and the 
convention. The process of academic publishing is nonetheless disciplinary in its exclusion of 
dissenting perspectives. The canonical texts of the Alternative Right are therefore not located 
within official published mainstream academic journals but instead found openly on blogs and in 
both digital and physical bookstores. By evacuating the academic space, the Alternative Right has 
evolved outside of the existing ideological structure of academic political discourse drawing upon 
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a non-academic readership to expand their numbers. The result is not only a new political ideology 
but a new way of writing political theory. 
The initial difficulty facing academics investigating the Alternative Right from a critical 
theory perspective is the lack of existing philosophical investigations of the Far-Right. Any 
political theory investigation requires reading an almost entirely new canon without substantial 
secondary literature to draw upon, and what secondary literature that exists provides limited case 
studies. Left-wing activists and scholarship prefer researching anti-fascist/racist/sexist strategies 
rather than a critical examination of the primary literature of the Far-Right.62 Nuanced readings of 
the Far-Right are given little intellectual respect from left-wing publications63, except the 
American journal Telos which devoted issues to the topic in the 1990s.64 Liberal to left-wing 
publications rely on labelling the Alternative Right as Nazis and sensationalizing their positions to 
isolate them from the broader public. This tactic would have been useful fighting the last 
intellectual war against rising white supremacy found within the paleoconservative movement 
during the 1990s, and that was what William F. Buckley Jr. did to take down Pat Buchanan’s right-
wing insurgency within the Republican party,65 explicitly attacking the anti-Semitism within 
American conservatism. Unfortunately for those opposing the Alternative Right, that will not cut 
it in the present; the Alternative Right cannot be dismissed as merely white nationalists, they are 
not cartoonish National Socialists. They know how to play by the postmodern deconstructionist 
and discursive playbook in response to language policing by liberal websites. The tactic of 
exploiting the postmodern incredulity for metanarratives and universal truths has already been 
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implemented by United Russia for over a decade when officials addressed western journalists 
critiquing their anti-democratic politics.66 By rejecting the term Alt-Right in favour of most 
sensationalist terminology, the left-wing and mainstream media are allowing the Alt-Right to be 
considered an un-American aberration, presenting the influence of European theorists and 
governments as a contagion infecting American liberalism, rather than acknowledging the 
development of the American specific characteristics of the Alternative Right removed from most 
foreign influence.  
 The Elements of the Philosophy of the Alternative Right 
 
While the Alternative Right is not a monolith, it holds to three unified axioms.  Two it 
shares with the European New Right, and the third it takes from its American political theory 
legacy. As Tamir Bar-On explains in his work on the de Benoist and the European New Right, the 
European New Right is defined by its focus on the cultural metapolitics and “the right to 
difference.”67 Cultural metapolitics is a focus on culture as the primary site of political conflict, in 
contrast to Liberals focusing on legal rights, the Libertarian fixation on the market or Marxists 
being primarily concerned with class as the primary site of political conflict. The second is the 
“right to difference,” in which racial and cultural groups have the right to maintain a segregated 
and preserved identity in the face of homogenous globalization.68 The implications of this second 
point range from an anti-imperialistic and anti-colonial politics of isolationism, to full-fledged 
genocidal campaigns of exclusion and extermination of minority groups. The third foundational 
value, which separates the Anglosphere Alternative Right from the European New Right, is the 
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maintenance of individualism within a hierarchical socio-political framework. The principle of 
individual agency is maintained, despite a categorical rejection of equality and tabula rasa. 
Differences between humans are taken as a given and not something that should be corrected; not 
all humans should be treated or considered equal according to the Alternative Right, this extends 
to both individuals and larger social groups. There are no universal liberal human rights other than 
the right to power within the Alternative Right. These three values extend to justify the differences 
between the Alternative Right and other political ideologies. Beyond these three values, the 
Alternative Right shares a series of traits including a shared understanding of class, 
decentralization, anti-modernist culture, anti-democratic theory, racism or at the least a tolerance 
of racism, sexism and discrimination, free-speech and rejection of Christian moralism. While not 
all groups within the Alternative Right share identical or even complimentary traits, these values 
reflect the assemblage of the Alternative Right positions within the Anglosphere. 
Class: The Tale of Two Rabbles 
 
The Alternative Right articulates a coherent understanding of class, predicated on the 
rejection of society’s two rabbles. One of the most effective tools to understanding the Alternative 
Right, and what makes it different from that of conservative political theory, is its disdain for both 
the rich and poor rabble,69 rather than just the poor. The rabble is a concept posited by Hegel within 
The Philosophy of Right to describe those who are disconnected from the shared society of the 
state, the excess of either rabble will lead to the corruption and collapse of the state. The poor 
rabble, those unable to meet society’s material prerequisites, are alienated from society and are 
unfree. The second set of the rabble, that of the rich, are alienated from the social life of the state 
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because they have no desire to participate in the state, the rich rabble can afford to buy their way 
out of the social obligations of the state. The result of this disconnect, poverty and wealth, results 
in the corruption of civil society. Whereas conservatives dismiss the poor rabble for their outsider 
status eroding at the state, due to their inability to contribute, and Marxists critique the rich rabble 
for their alienation from the state and the general population, the Alternative Right finds both 
groups to be the detriment of society. The “Cuckservatives” and cosmopolitan cultural elites that 
compose the rich rabble neglect the responsibilities of the social elite to maintain traditional 
values,70 stressing masculinity and noblesse oblige in the face of tolerance and multiculturalism.71 
Just as the immigrants and minority groups have no part in society as they corrupt the status quo 
of white society, the rich rabble of cosmopolitan elites, in the eyes of the Alt-Right, sells out the 
purity of white society for short-term profit.  
 For the Alternative Right, the modern industrial society is unequal and fixated on the greed 
of elites who abandon social responsibility in favour of profits, while the increasing immigrant 
population prevents the remainder of the population from gaining from the increased production 
of the elites. The capitalist system corrupts the moral economy of society, levelling the function 
of aristocratic cultural elites. As Nick Land points out in the Dark Enlightenment, capitalism is 
currently incompatible with the cultural responsibilities of wealth,72 or as Hegel would describe it 
“The rich man thinks that he can buy anything because he knows himself as the power of the 
particularity of self-consciousness. Thus wealth can lead to the same mockery and shamelessness 
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that we find in the poor rabbles.”73 The key to conservative moralism is the patriarchal morality of 
the economic and social elites to guide society as an example, yet their fixation on profit and wealth 
distances these figures from their moral authority; this, in turn, brings us to why the 
“Cuckservative” is the subject of scorn as much as the immigrant within Alternative Right 
literature. This bifurcated rabble is at the heart of what defines the Alternative Right’s populism; 
it is a movement centred around the manufactured concept of “the people” which rejects the dual 
rabbles of the poor immigrant and the alienated liberal elite. Figures on the Far-Right like Samuel 
Francis understood that so long as capitalist interests among elites dominate the political economy, 
there would be no room for a politics of white nationalism.74 The economic interests of the 
economic elites would support immigration, which would increase the size of the “rabble,” diluting 
the influence and core of the American state and its white supremacist traditions.  
Populism, rather than being a political tool for mass politics or as a thin-centred ideology, 
should be understood as a core ideological position within the Alt-Right that has emerged out of a 
philosophical critique of liberal universalism and the dream of a society removed from class. 
Additionally, this understanding of class is fundamentally at odds with a left-wing populist project 
which would argue for the inclusion of the poor rabble into the body politics through class 
consciousness. For the Alt-Right populist, there is no inclusion of the corrupting influence of the 
poor or rich rabble, only the reification of the true people through racial class consciousness. 
Here, There and Everywhere: Deterritorialization 
 
The Alternative Right and the groups who support the Alternative Right rely on the concept 
of deterritorialization as a political strategy. Coming from the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
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Guattari,75 deterritorialization is the conception of political, economic and social reality removed 
from a geographical understanding of community and politics. The practices of a locale are 
removed from their place of origin and removed from a specific spatial definition. The Tory 
conservatism of the UK and Canada and the Jeffersonian liberalism that dominated American 
political thought has failed to respond to the impact of deterritorialization on geographically 
isolated or alienated communities. The urbanization and centralization of economic, cultural and 
technological growth within world cities such as New York or Toronto further a cosmopolitan and 
globalized economy of pluralistic cities. In contrast, the exurbs and rural areas see a population 
decline, due to decreasing birth rates, urban flight by college-educated youth, low rates of 
immigration and deindustrialization. The political values of these world cities, in the eyes of the 
non-liberal cultural-right, establish what can and cannot be said within the geographic and 
economic hinterlands, which in turn believe that they have no say in the cultural discourse within 
urban centres. 
 The Alternative Right has responded to this geographic cultural alienation in two ways, 
the first being a doubling down on regionalism and isolationism. The work of the Russian political 
theorist Alexander Dugin is an example of this,76 focusing on a return to regionalism stressing a 
politics of culture and the right to difference, like that of the “Clash of Civilizations” argument put 
forward by Samuel Huntington.77 Whereas Huntington focused on presenting a new way to 
understand the coming multi-polar world of international politics, Dugin validates the 
civilizational project as essential to ending American hegemony. Both authors see civilization 
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rather than globalization as the likely outcome of the current pax-Americana, but Dugin despises 
the American influence on world politics as homogenizing. Theories of the Far-Right like Dugin’s 
often draw upon Deleuze and Foucault to explain the internal failings of the liberal ideological 
hegemony, rather than embracing a class-based analysis. By retreating from the globalized space 
and opting out of the global economy through the reduction of immigration and protectionist 
economic measures, traditional values and culture can reappear. The policy of these members of 
the Alternative Right argue for a return to a romantic pre-modern system of cultural, religious and 
ethnic organization of world politics.  
It should come as no surprise that many White Nationalists who value racial purity in their 
communities see only retreat as an option, moving to isolated states in the American heartland 
away from multicultural cities. They deterritorialized themselves in contrast to earlier blood and 
soil movements and embraced an exodus to promised lands in rural Montana or New Hampshire 
to establish white only communities.78 This willingness to abandon land separates the devoted 
white nationalists in North America from the relatively static European Identitarians who are 
limited to the confines of their European nations and ancestral communities. 
The second way the Alternative Right has responded has been to embrace the 
deterritorialization of post-modernity. The technologically minded members of the Alternative 
Right see deterritorialization as a way to imagine a society akin to the internet communities where 
it was founded. A digital community has no physical space yet exists on a global scale. The values 
of a group can be preserved without the imposition of external bodies policing their values and 
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individualism. As the existing digital communities exist in segregated online forums, there is no 
need for a uniform policy. 
A consequence of this deterritorialized mindset is that the demographics and locations of 
the Alternative Right are challenging to pin down. If the Alternative Right were synonymous and 
perfectly correlated with Trump voters, it would be as easy as reading a map of the electoral 
college, but this is not the case. Many members of the Alternative Right can be found in heavily 
Democratic urban centres,79  and the consistent presence of the Alternative Right supporters in 
Berkeley suggests that one finds these groups inhabiting the same physical spaces as leftist 
radicals.80 While little polling or demographic research exists on the Alt-Right as of writing, based 
on the locations of authors and group leaders, the Alt-Lite, NeoReactionaries and Grey Tribe 
members tend to be found within cosmopolitan urban centres, while the White Nationalists are 
more likely to be found within the rust-belt or the American south. 
Anti-Modernist and Anti-Enlightenment 
 
A consistent element of the Alternative Right is its rejection of the liberal enlightenment 
project of modernity. The Alternative Right takes a very reactionary reading of modernity and the 
enlightenment project, which they connect with global financial capital, liberalism, military 
imperialism and globalization. The Enlightenment is an incredibly broad intellectual tradition that 
has inspired or influenced most Western political ideologies (liberalism, conservatism and 
Marxism). Critiquing the enlightenment is nothing new, almost every non-enlightenment thinker 
has responded to the legacy of the enlightenment, from post-colonial authors to post-modern 
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leftists to the current Alternative Right. The Alternative Right’s rejection of modernity has taken 
two distinct routes; one is the isolationist desire to return to a pastoral society of racial and cultural 
enclaves within a diverse and non-globalized world, and the second is technological 
accelerationism. Modernity’s totalizing project of globalization and enlightenment reason 
eliminates cultural differences in the eyes of many Alternative Right theorists. The pre-modern 
society’s hierarchical society allowed for stability. Under pre-modern feudalism, society is 
transparent and ordered, while modernity is, in contrast, an opaque and chaotic system. When the 
hierarchy of society is codified and established, one can live in relative isolation under a stable 
regime rather than live through anxiety generated by capitalistic creative destruction. This logic 
maintains the existing reactionary and deeply conservative theories, typically drawing upon 
theorists such as Burke81 or Oswald Spengler.82 For the White Nationalist, white only society in 
rural Montana would allow for stable pastoral society, though a band-aid solution ultimately for 
only the most radical, as the NeoReactionary Michael Anissimov pointed out.83 
 The second response to modernity is to “Ride the Tiger”84 and double down on 
modernization and focus on a post-modern society of digital communities. Akin to Marxists 
accelerating capitalism to bring about its destruction, the Alternative Right imagines that 
accelerating modernity is a solution to the hyper-competitive global world. One of the main 
influences on the Alternative Right is evolutionary theory, the development of human society is, 
in the eyes of the New Atheists of the Alternative Right, a continuation of the problem of 
evolutionary biology. Cooperation and equality, especially tolerance for those with “inferior” 
 
81 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (London: James Dodsley and Paul Mall, 1790). 
82 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, Vintage; R (Vintage, 2006). 
83 Michael Anissimov, “Why There Are No White Nationalists,” Medium, June 2016. 
84 Evola, Ride the Tiger: A Survival Manual for the Aristocrats of the Soul. 
30 
 
genes retard the evolution of humanity as a whole. This ideology is modern day social Darwinism, 
but rather than fixate on racial traits, and phrenology, decontextualized genetic tests under the 
name of “human biodiversity” are used to claim that society is artificially suppressing evolution 
and development. The existing system does not work efficiently and therefore needs to be 
accelerated through the process of creative destruction, highlighting the contradictions of the 
system so that they will inevitably be destroyed and replaced with more effective outcomes. The 
eventual outcome would be the end of the current system of modernity, which would be replaced 
with a system of neo-feudalism, based on neo-corporatism, which could, according to Yarvin and 
Faye, maintain long-term cultural and ecological stability.85  
Anti-liberal Democratic Consensus 
 
The Alternative Right’s most significant departure from the European New Right is its anti-
democratic stance. European New Right thinkers and political parties challenge the existing 
democratic system as ineffective and corrupt, which is nothing unique, even the most adamant 
liberal democracy theorists would accept that there are shortcomings with the system. In contrast 
to a reformist position, the Alternative Right views democracy as incompatible with personal 
freedom. Peter Thiel, the Silicon Valley billionaire, after reading Curtis Yarvin’s NeoReactionary 
critiques of democracy has gone so far as to state that democracy and individual freedom are 
incompatible publicly.86 Some NeoReactionaries go so far as wishing for an absolutist Jacobite 
monarchy, with a CEO as a king with absolute control over the state.87 The democratic system, in 
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the eyes of NeoReactionaries, the European New Right, White Nationalists and the members Grey 
Tribe, fails to protect against the domination of the majority against the minority, fetishizes the 
protection of minority interest groups at the expense of the system and leads to ever-increasing 
political corruption. The Alternative Right understands democracy as an imposition on the liberty 
of the individual to exercise their identity in the face of both external cultural expectations and 
regulations, and the increasing surveillance state apparatus. The Alternative Right contains a 
substantial number of critiques of democracy, ranging from its failure to provide long-term 
solutions to problems that cannot be solved during an election cycle to the imposition of cultural 
values through majoritarian legislation enforcing emancipatory human rights legislation that 
rejects dissenting hate speech.    
Even the strategy of the Alternative Right seeks to reject democracy. Drawing upon Vladislav 
Surkov’s idea of sovereign democracy88 the Alternative Right has actively undermined the concept 
of democracy as a legitimate system of governance, ideas that Steven Bannon and Peter Thiel 
latched onto. Campaigning on the idea that elected officials are career politicians who abuse a 
corrupt system is nothing new. Surkov and the Alternative Right’s political strategy relies on left-
wing critiques to legitimate right-wing claims that liberal democracy is ineffective and unfair.89 
Surkov’s response to Western journalists decrying the democracy in Russia as unfair and 
structurally problematic was to read Western academics critiquing Western democracies with the 
same language that the journalists used to decry Russian democracy. This logical fallacy slight of 
hand is the precursor to the political tactic par excellence within the Alternative Right, calling 
factual critiques “Fake News!” Even though Western democracies are far more liberal and 
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transparent than that of Russia, the journalist is now forced to factually discredit someone who is 
relying on affective imagery to prove a point.90 While one party is taking things literally and 
factually, the other is focusing on the affective image, pointing out the simulacra of post-modern 
politics and media coverage, the result is two ships passing in the night which never engage each 
other.91 When Trump began to discredit the presidential election as rigged, it was easy to respond 
with empirical facts, but it was difficult to impossible to discredit the aesthetic and affective truth 
in his statements. Despite decades of statistics to back up racial inequality, the failures of tough on 
crime legislation, and employment statistics used by liberal and progressive politicians and 
commentators, the lived experience of an individual will hold more political sway. Trump’s efforts 
to undermine the results of the election before his presumed loss is an excellent example of this, 
despite no evidence to suggest widespread voter fraud it received substantial media coverage.92  
Racism: beyond the dog whistle 
 
The Alternative Right almost universally embraces racism or racialized politics.93 Rather than 
implied white supremacy, white nationalists within the Alternative Right such as Richard Spencer 
argue for white identity politics as Identitarians; embracing White Nationalism rather than White 
Supremacy is a shift away from the current tradition of racial politics within the American Right 
since the civil rights movement. While the Republican right has relied on a dog whistle strategy 
known more commonly as the “southern strategy” since Nixon’s 1968 campaign,94 it has avoided 
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outright policies of black genocide or White Nationalism. White Nationalist movements, either 
during the civil rights movement or Pat Buchanan’s Republican Primary attempts, have been 
dismissed as fringe elements of mainstream conservatism and were isolated by figures like William 
F. Buckley Jr. During Theda Skocpol’s interviews with Tea-Party members for her book on the 
Tea Party the phrase “I am not racist but…” was used extensively to argue for racialized claims 
and opinions by Tea Party members who actively distance themselves from understanding 
themselves as racist. In contrast to this dog-whistle politics, the Alternative Right openly embraces 
the racist label, many on the Alternative Right explicitly state “I am a racist.”95 
 Even the racist politics of white supremacists and violence against people of colour are not 
enough for some members of the Alternative Right. NeoReactionary author Michael Anissimov96 
called out white supremacists in 2016 for not going far enough; it is not enough in his opinion to 
engage in racial politics to suppress people of colour, to engage in White Nationalism one needs 
to live in white only communities and exclude minorities.  According to Michael Anissimov, there 
are white supremacists, but those who wish to form a solely white nation are either few in number 
or unwilling to actively engage in these politics by moving to white only communities.97 The White 
Nationalists are therefore smaller in number than the broader community of racists, the act of living 
in a purely white community is challenging, requiring strong motivations that do not exist already. 
Which is why genocide, when discussed by the Alternative Right is dismissed, not for being 
morally wrong, but rather for its political inconvenience and impracticality, if they cannot convince 
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millions of people to move to all white communities, how can they convince tens of millions to 
commit genocide, which is far more personally dangerous and more difficult.  
The serious, “stoic” racism of earlier far-right movements stands in contrast with the more 
playful or comedic rhetorical racism of the Alternative Right. Stoic racism refers to the serious 
tone used by earlier generations of White Nationalists and supremacists, using their names rather 
than pseudonyms when addressing the public and demanding to be taken seriously by the press. 
The use of trolling by members of the Alternative Right, such as Lauren Southern, is one of the 
factors that separate the broader movement from the smaller ideologically dogmatic neo-Nazi and 
White Nationalist groups within the Alternative Right.98 Someone like Andrew Anglin, the founder 
of the Daily Stormer,99 lacks the ironic sense of humour or play found within the so-called "Alt-
Lite" which is occupied by political actors who capture the right-wing public through charm rather 
than fear. The Alternative Right relies on absurdly racist memes that are often so racist that they 
can be presented as a “joke.” A member of the Alternative Right may post a photo of a cartoon 
frog wearing a MAGA hat and a Nazi armband because it is so crass that it is meant to shock the 
“normies” but hide behind the “it is only a joke” defence if pushed. This “comedic” sensibility 
comes both from internet culture, on boards such as 4Chan and South Park, which justifies their 
crass humour as “making fun of everyone equally.” The result is a win-win situation for the broader 
Alternative Right, either they normalize highly racist jokes they consider “edgy” or the media 
backlash can be spun to criticize the liberal media or establishment as being too uptight, limiting 
their “free-speech.” It does not matter if the joke is not “funny” and actually hate speech; the results 
are the same for the movement.  This outright racism contrasts with the more popular dog whistle 
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politics of the mainstream conservative movement where a subtle racist/sexist/offensive reference 
is hidden as an implicit code that can be waved off if called out as unintentional, the Alternative 
Right joke, in contrast, is meant to be so absurd that no one can question its intention. 
Anti-Feminism and Free Speech 
 
The Alternative Right sees mainstream conservativism’s anti-feminism and oppressive anti-
minority politics and doubles down. While the Republican party and mainstream conservatism is 
no fan of feminism, it does not outright proclaim its hatred of women as a defining characteristic 
of its ideology. The Alt-Right has discouraged female participation and at times barred them from 
discussions.100 4Chan, one of the primary sites for Alt-Right discussions, is infamous for the 
perpetuation and publishing of misogynistic content, regularly attacking the feminist community 
on Tumblr.101 The Alt-Right is also closely tied to the “pick-up artist” community, who argue for 
tribalist male chauvinism, the manipulation of women into sex and misogyny.102  
By proclaiming their hate speech as free speech the Alternative Right and its allies force 
centrist liberals and those who are dogmatically attached to universal free speech into a difficult 
choice. While judicial and legislative bodies define the specifics of free speech, the practical 
everyday fight over hate speech within online spaces and university campuses is a continuous 
struggle. The progressive left has prided itself with its adherence to free speech and civil liberties 
for decades, but the Alternative Right’s use of discriminatory language that provokes hatred and 
violence under the guise of free speech undermines this legacy. The result is a catch-22, either the 
liberal-left shuts down hate speech fueling the resentment for left-wing culture and democracy, or 
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the Alternative Right gets to advocate hate speech publicly and argue the same sentiments.  The 
Alternative Right and Far-Right have regularly used individuals from various prominent identity 
groups to help support their cause. If the mantra is “representation matters” then the Alternative 
Right will present some token representatives to speak on behalf of entire populations (Jews, 
women or Queer men). Critical scholars and activists on the left will critique these choices to no 
end, but by doing so, they complicate the message that they are trying to present. A graduate 
student or professor with degrees in critical theory can probably tell the difference between the 
identity politics of a marginalized racial group and the racial supremacy of a white nationalist 
movement, but an outsider may be confused by the terminology of identity politics. The result 
becomes a twofold campaign, the first to further the mainstream acceptance of Alternative Right 
politics, and the second is to discredit the identity politics movement by suggesting false 
equivalencies.  
The Alternative Right is exploiting the theory heavy rhetoric of identity politics as both a site 
of critique for political gain and to lampoon it within their texts. Despite the extensive non-
academic support for movements such as Black Lives Matter (BLM), identity politics requires a 
historical understanding of the oppression of marginalized groups within society, one which can 
be challenging to grasp for those outside of the affected community. The intellectual one-
upmanship of contemporary progressive culture leaves little space for those using out-dated terms 
or ideas such as “women’s studies” or “gay rights” opposed to “gender studies” or LGBTQ rights, 
those who use incorrect terminology are often publicly shamed on social media for their ignorance. 
The Alternative Right theory and practice undermine these progressive identity politics campaigns, 
by simply presenting an alternative position, no matter how obnoxious, such as All Lives Matter 
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(ALM) or the “Alt-Left.”103 These terms, no matter how recently created and with no correlation 
to reality, provide a narrative of two-sided political conflict for the media to exploit. The use of 
the phrase ALM is a nefarious choice of discursive politics, as the name does not contradict the 
BLM name, but instead forces BLM to justify what its name means through technical language 
coming from the postcolonial and African American studies discourse.  
Rejection of Christian Moralism 
 
  While many members of the Alternative Right are Christian, the movement is also home 
to a vast array of non-Christians who would have been excluded from the Christian dominated Tea 
Party or the Paleoconservative movement and treated with absolute scorn by the Christian Far-
Right.  The Protestant moralism of Christianity within America is marginal within the Alt-Right 
and the broader Alternative Right.  Most of the prominent intellectuals in the movement take 
Nietzsche’s stance that Christianity is slave morality, or they adopt a new Atheist position 
influenced by Richard Dawkins or Sam Harris. The European New Right of Guillaume Faye or 
Alain de Benoist even goes so far as to call themselves pagans and oppose Christianity.104 
 While both Christian evangelicalism and the rest of the Alternative Right agree on many 
social concepts including the patriarchy, traditional family structure and marginalizing female 
agency, the rationale for these choices is often very different. For the non-Christian Alternative 
Right, the rationale for traditional values came from their long-term stability and proven track 
record, rather than their moral or historical values. For Faye, cultural values and especially 
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religious ones need to be evaluated rather than blindly accepted and passed on.105 If we take 
abortion as an example of how the Alternative Right differs from the evangelical Christian 
morality found within the United States, we see a clear separation. Matthew Lyons argues that the 
White Nationalist perspective within the Alternative Right stresses its value within a eugenic 
politics against women of colour and the poor, as they believe that a disproportionate number of 
abortions come from these women,106 this also provides the added benefit of eugenically disposing 
of “defective” white babies. There is no moral “pro-life” argument based on the sanctity of life. 
Abortion is, therefore, for the White Nationalists a tool of biological determinism to further an 
evolutionary understanding of White Nationalism, not a policy derived from the bible. From a 
social Darwinist position, abortion will help lead to the preservation of the white race and combat 
the demographic decline of the white population within the United States. Another perspective, 
coming from the Freakonomics readers within the Grey Tribe is that abortions reduce the number 
of babies born into poverty, which reduces the amount of crime in society and is, therefore, a net 
positive for society both reducing crime and the number of non-whites at the same time.107 One 
argument that is absent from Alternative Right literature would be the sovereignty of a woman’s 
right to choose what happens to their own body, which is the argument of feminists, which the 
movement despises. 
A Revolutionary Reactionary Movement 
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The Alternative Right is not a new phase of the neoliberal tradition of right-wing 
conservativism in the United States, but instead a new reactionary ideology. The Alternative Right 
is a revolutionary movement; it expresses a new understanding of the world rather than merely 
presenting a series of reforms. Just as Thomas Kuhn describes revolutionary science through the 
creation of a new paradigm, ideology when merely reformist is a reasonable change adapting 
existing structures, making them more effective as a tool for shaping our social reality.108 The 
Alternative Right demands the end of immigration and the expulsion of non-whites, not 
“immigration reform.” The Alternative Right supports incrementalism only in the court of public 
opinion by moving the Overton Window of acceptable discourse.  
The political thought and practice of the Alternative Right is reactionary rather than 
conservative. Whereas conservative thought and practice is of slow reform and the maintenance 
of the status quo over the long term, reactionaries are fundamentally counter-revolutionaries 
responding to the changes to the system that have emerged during modernity. Starting with the 
response to the French Revolution in the 1790s and the concert of Europe, the reactionary platform 
has been one of organized resistance with a concentrated effort to “put the genie back in the bottle,” 
returning to a pre-revolutionary social order.109 For the Alternative Right, there is a split between 
a passionate desire to return to a romantic and homogenous past and a technologically fixated 
desire to create a space for a white and male society that overcomes their perceived limitations 
with the multicultural society.110 
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One of the essential elements of the Alternative Right cultural counter-revolution is its 
existence as an event which ruptures the sensible political reality rather than plastering over issues 
maintaining the status quo. The Alternative Right rejects the reformist platform in favour of 
advancing a new set of political and cultural norms that are sensationally unacceptable to suggest 
in mixed company. Therefore the policy failures of a right-wing populist like Donald Trump are 
acceptable if the ideas are widely discussed by the media, moving political discourse in line with 
the new vision of the future, one which redefines the American right-wing.111 It does not matter if 
a Wall along the US Mexico border is built or not, so long as it makes it possible for politicians to 
argue for the end of all non-white immigration on mainstream news so that the next political 
candidate can fight for a white only state.  
While the original use of the Overton Window framework was to expand public acceptance 
of libertarian free-market policy to replace public education, the Alternative Right has used it to 
redefine politics along a left-right cultural spectrum.112 By redefining the right-left political 
spectrum in the United States along a cultural rather than economic spectrum, the Alternative Right 
can push for a consistent political project without being outflanked by the economically motivated 
right wing. The Overton window theory was initially applied to "economic" considerations like 
school choice; it is also obvious that these policies also have a white nationalist and supremacist 
backing as well. To have more school choice will, in practice in the United States, lead to legal 
segregation of racial groups, or at least that is what the white nationalists like Jared Taylor desire. 
Taylor spends much of his text White Identity on the role of school choice and white flight, where 
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that option is not available.113 Even in the most economic application, the Overton window is used 
or (being very generous) subverted to further white supremacy. For the mainstream Republican 
party, this was a side benefit in the form of a dog whistle, but as the Alternative Right has risen to 
prominence within the American Right, these economic considerations now take a backseat to the 
racial elements of these policies. Therefore, replacing the right-wing economic reforms of the 
Republican party with a reactionary cultural revolution. 
A revolution and its revolutionaries need not be emancipatory or progressive, as the 
Conservative Revolutionaries of Weimar Germany demonstrated.114 Revolutions discussed within 
the liberal political theory canon respond to the political organization and ideologies of traditional 
social hierarchy, such as The Rights of Man.115 Mussolini and Hitler both ascribed the Fascist and 
National Socialist movements as fundamentally revolutionary movements that provided an 
ideological break from the monarchist and aristocratic conservatism of earlier periods.116 The 
Alternative Right puts forward a new understanding of politics post-globalization that is 
revolutionary rather than merely reformist or a reinstitution of fascist ideals, even though some 
members are self-ascribed as or labelled Neo-Nazis or Fascists.117 One of the uniting features of 
Alternative Right theory is the presentation of a new radically different society for implementation 
during the revolutionary period caused by the collapse of western democracy or environmental 
catastrophe. 
A New Reactionary Ideology 
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As this chapter has demonstrated, the Alternative Right is a new ideology and a reactionary 
one. While the movement is populist and reactionary, intellectual concepts are not paper tigers. 
The logic is alien to the various enlightenment traditions, drawing from the anti-enlightenment 
theories of both the reactionary tradition and the post-modernist critiques of modernization. The 
Alternative Right is a distinct political ideology that draws upon a diverse body of non-
conservative political theories, yet widespread discussion of the Alternative Right and its 
motivations keeps returning to inaccurate caricatures of the ideology rather than examining the 
foundations. As the Alternative Right focuses on 1) the right to difference 2) cultural metapolitics 
and 3) individualism within hierarchical politics, the combination of these axioms has no adequate 
populist or mainstream precursor within North American society, as the problems they address are 
those of a globalized world. The Alternative Right is also in its ideological infancy within the 
United States, we see no explicitly Alternative Right political parties in North America (as we 
currently see in Europe). Culturally the movement is still small, with a limited demographic base, 
but this may change as the rough edges are normalized. The movement’s acceptance as merely a 
populist movement will be a trojan horse for the Alternative Right’s ideology to become more 
widespread. 
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Chapter 2: Who is the Alternative Right? 
 
What is the Alt-Right minimum? 
 
 While the second part of this text describes the various elements of the Alternative Right 
through comparative political theory, this chapter addresses the far more straightforward problem 
of what the Alternative Right is not. While most ideologies, political theorists and political agents 
are not included within the Alternative Right, several political movements and figures are 
popularly misunderstood as precursors or members of the Alt-Right and broader Alternative Right, 
this chapter will first address some misconceptions about the Alternative Right and how they 
engage in politics before addressing the three most common groups mislabeled as the Alt-Right; 
Donald Trump, Nazis, and the Tea-Party.  
What defines the Alternative Right?  
 
To explain why the three groups have been mislabelled as Alt-Right, it is necessary to 
explore what makes the Alternative Right unique from mainstream conservatism and how it has 
developed within the 21st century. The most comprehensive analysis of who makes up the 
American Far Right, of which the Alt-Right is a specific, yet still diverse, branch, comes from 
Matthew Lyons’s decades of research and specifically his text Insurgent Supremacists.118 Lyons 
defines the American Far Right as "political forces that (a) regard human inequality as natural, 
inevitable, or desirable and (b) reject the legitimacy of the established political system."119 Which 
when mixed with the definition of the European New Right by Tamir Bar-On, we get three core 
values for the American Alt-Right: 1) the right to difference, 2) the primacy of cultural 
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metapolitics, and 3) hierarchical individualism and the subsequent rejection of existing liberal-
democracy.120  
From these three core values we can get something approaching fascism, but the two are 
not synonymous. If one accepts the definition of Fascism from Roger Griffin, “a palingenetic form 
of populist ultranationalism” then the Alternative Right can sometimes be understood as fascist,121 
especially when it comes from the voices of America First White Nationalists who venerate Trump 
with almost mythical fervor. Yet this group within the Alternative Right is not a majority, many 
of the figures within the Alternative Right are anti-populist, for example Nick Land’s highly elitist 
framework,122 or they are ambivalent on the issue of nationalism, like Peter Thiel who actively 
rejects a nationalist political project. Those within the Alternative Right who are closest to the 
White Nationalist and populist groups are the most classically fascistic, while those who adopt the 
broader positions of the Alternative Right but reject the Alt-Right label tend to be less fascistic as 
they are less nationalist and populist. The connective tissue with fascism found within the entirety 
of Alternative Right thinking is the palingenesis of reactionary thought, which due to the political 
context of the globalization of the 21st century is embraced without classical fascism’s fixation on 
state-based ultranationalism. 
While the rejection of liberal-democracy can be found across the European New Right and 
the rise of authoritarian populism, hierarchical individualism is far less prominent within European 
Far-Right discourse. The reason for its absence is due to the relatively weak tradition of libertarian 
thought within the old world. Americans and to a somewhat lesser extent, Canadians, are removed 
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from the collective traditionalism of the European system (apart from Quebec and the American 
South which adopt more European political influences and the legacy of a slave society 
respectively).123 The campaigns for “blood and soil” and the preservation of culture can be found 
more so in Quebec and the American South, while the more radical individualism of the Grey 
Tribe, NeoReactionaries and campus reactionaries tends to focus on biological determinism and 
other eugenics research rather than fixate on romantic histories. It is unclear as of 2019 if this will 
be smoothed out between the European and American Alternative Right, with the libertarian ideas 
of the American theorists merging with the quasi-feudalist and aristocratic reactionary thought of 
European theorists. 
Lyons takes a humanizing approach to examining the American Far-Right, understanding 
their membership as human beings; this stands in contrast to how they are typically portrayed as 
monsters and fictionalized boogiemen; which dominates much of the left-wing and liberal 
approaches to the Far-Right.124 These human beings are responding to structural pressures (even if 
not as "legitimate" as other forms of oppression in the eyes of most progressives) rather than 
merely unthinking pawns of capitalist leaders and Far-Right demagogues.125 This methodology, 
which this text embraces, retains the humanity of the subject rather than imposing a dehumanizing 
perspective which views the members of the populist and far-right movements as the pawns of big 
capitalists suffering under false consciousness. This text also takes the position that the Far-Right 
(not necessarily the Alt-Right) is not just about white males being upset about race or gender.126 
The Alternative Right poses both an existential threat to the social democracy of western liberal-
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democracies and a visceral physical threat as its extremist wing murders ethnic minorities and 
women in acts of terrorist violence.127 
There are two Alt-Rights, the first is the limited group of white nationalists that emerged 
in 2007 connected with Richard Spencer, they grew in popularity and reached a temporary 
crescendo in August of 2017 with Charlottesville, where they faced significant resistance. They 
are typically understood as the most radical members of the Far-Right. The second Alt-Right, the 
Alternative Right is the broader coalition of a new right-wing ideology, which is significantly more 
porous and rhizomatic. The Alternative Right is a constellation of different but associated political 
theories and practices which, while not goose-stepping to the beat of the same drum are all moving 
in more or less the same Far-Right direction. It is easy to lump these two groups together, but it 
would be a mistake to treat them as mutually inclusive or synonymous. The Alt-Lite, the 
Manosphere, NeoReactionaries, Grey Tribe techno-libertarians, traditionalists and other right-
wing extremists do not share the same ideological positions but fit within either Tamir Bar-On’s 
definition of the European New Right or Matthew Lyons’ definition of the American Far-Right. 
The result is a spectrum of overlapping ideas which orbit around a core of radical Right-Wing 
ideas. Politically it is also necessary to acknowledge the difference between the Alt-Right and the 
Alternative Right, so that we can label Alternative Right figures such as Paul Gottfried or Nick 
Land, as members of the Alternative Right as they distance themselves from the Alt-Right 
subgroup, otherwise Far-Right thinkers could cloak themselves in technicalities and pedantic 
differences to maintain mainstream acceptability.128 
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To demonstrate how the Alternative Right is not solely filled with White Nationalists who 
hate Jews, one needs to look no further than the technophilic and Men’s Rights advocate wing of 
the Alternative Right. The technophilic groups known as the Grey Tribe, within the Alternative 
Right typically have little to do with the explicit white nationalist wing of the movement such as 
the Alt-Right, but it rejects the identity politics discourse of feminist and anti-racist movements. 
While rejecting reforms to the structural violence that perpetuates racial and sexist policies, the 
technophilic wing is highly apprehensive of outright white nationalism (though authors within the 
movement, such as Nick Land, suggest that this is one of public relations rather than moral 
compulsion).129 White Nationalism, Neo-Nazism or terrorist attacks are not acceptable for many 
of the more moderate Alt-Lite members of the Alternative Right. While ranging from apathetic to 
supportive of racism, the technophilic wing known as the Grey Tribe has a very public and 
pronounced sexist framework, which they use to justify their hate speech against women and 
feminists. The technophilic wing of the Alt-Right, intimately connected with the American Tech 
sector, has intimidated, harassed and shamed female and feminist journalists who comment on the 
sexist elements of their “community.” The prime example of this is the 2014 Gamergate 
controversy, in which a group of largely male “gamers” attacked female journalists commenting 
on sexism within the video game industry, many of the journalists, such as Anita Sarkeesian 
received death threats for their reporting.130  
The Alternative Right can be read as a response to several different movements within the 
Anglosphere; the first, the globalized capitalism of neoliberalism; the second, the rise of post-
positivist discourse within universities and popular culture; and the third, the acceleration of 
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technological change with a specific focus on automation and social media. Each of these areas 
defines the movement’s scope and agenda. First, the response to globalization and neoliberalism, 
which is the most obvious to the news watching public. The movement’s electoral success in 2016 
was incredibly shocking for many left-wing commentators,131 due to its success within traditionally 
centre-left or left-wing communities within the white working class, with the success of Brexit 
within the industrial towns in the UK known for supporting Labour and Trump’s victories in the 
Midwest.132  
Second, the response to the post-positivist and progressive culture on university campuses 
and throughout popular culture has resulted in a collective feeling of loss or encroachment within 
the traditional majority white and masculine spaces. While conservative figures have been 
furthering this narrative since at least William F. Buckley’s God and Man at Yale, the shift since 
the 1990s has resulted in a rapid expansion in the number of non-white and non-male voices within 
mainstream media and universities (though still less than representative of the general 
population).133 While traditional Burkean conservativism has been filled with intellectual figures 
such as William F Buckley or Winston Churchill, the anglophone right has seen a pronounced 
retreat from the academic and intellectual spaces.134 As Richard Hofstadter stressed even within 
the 1960s, the American public rejected cosmopolitan intellectualism, and the electorally minded 
conservative intellectuals followed the course.135 The neoconservative/neoliberal movements 
within the 1980s to the present only furthered this division. The rise of identity politics and the 
shift from positivist to post-positivist social science has challenged the traditional narratives of 
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politics and Whig history. The historical narrative from the Far-Right has a long tradition stressing 
a narrative of decline, with reactionary authors like Thomas Carlyle and Oswald Spengler arguing 
a decline of the west since the 1800s.136 These romantic interpretations of the past, reconstructing 
the narratives of Anti-Bellum south or pre-modern Europe have even less credibility within 
academic departments, yet they remain popular accounts of history for the left-behinds. Instead of 
using the academic spaces of their predecessors, the Far-Right has adopted the digital equivalent 
of the underground press of previous political movements by using internet message boards and 
independent publishers to spread their ideas. Many of the English language translations of the post-
war (neo)-Fascist movements, such as Evola or Dugin, are found out of independent political 
publishing companies focusing on online distribution rather than mainstream publishing houses.137 
The result has been a retreat onto the internet where a parallel space has formed to create new 
Right-wing theories. 
The conspiratorial work of Curtis Yarvin and the Alt-Right message boards which 
coordinated Gamergate explicitly focused on the perceived banishment of right-wing and 
libertarian thought from these public spaces.138 While libertarian and mainstream conservatives 
were known for dog whistle politics, they rarely got away with outright racist remarks. The 
Alternative Right lacks none of the doublespeak, accelerating their hate speech under the guise of 
free speech with the goal of (de)-politicizing all media and academic spaces to prevent critical or 
minority perspectives from gaining traction. 
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The third area of change has been the rapid growth in the internet and social media over 
the past three decades. Due to the geographic isolation of Far-Right activists or their presence 
within urban centres dominated by liberals and leftists, the publication of Far-Right material was 
limited. With the internet the proliferation of these ideas has exploded, it is almost impossible to 
find a significant social media platform that did not have a Far-Right presence, with some 
platforms such as YouTube promoting Alt-Lite content for significant financial gain.139 The 
expansion of social media has resulted in a bifurcation of the American Right between the 
Alternative Right which is predominantly younger and online, consuming digital content without 
gatekeeping and the older Fox/cable news audience dominating the older mainstream conservative 
population. 
The culmination of these three trends is a new form of segregation from liberal and global 
culture. What the Far-Right’s authors such as Curtis Yarvin stress is a new kind of isolationism.140 
While opt-in was the framework for understanding the process of globalizing capitalism under 
right-wing and centrist neoliberalism, the Alternative Right wishes for an option to opt-out; 
stressing that political freedom comes not from mandatory human rights, tolerance, and 
participation in an alienating system of global capitalism, but rather the ability to leave a social 
contract one finds disagreeable.141 Drawing partially upon the libertarian spirit of Ayn Rand’s John 
Galt, the new conception of freedom stresses a desire to disengage from the political commitments 
and obligations of democratic life.142 The Alternative Right is driven by the question “If we live in 
a social contract, why can’t we end the contract and leave? One cannot consent to a contract if they 
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have no option to refuse it.” Separating this tradition from the earlier libertarian tradition is a 
complete abandonment of social totality. Rather than demanding the nation or system reflect the 
libertarian ethos, many in the Alternative Right merely wish to be removed from the system. The 
choice to opt-out ranges from Brexit to supporters of the Alt-Right such as Peter Thiel, wishing to 
create a capitalist island in the Pacific Ocean removed from both the taxation and ethical 
commitments of the American State.143  
The Big Joke 
 
Economically and politically the Alternative Right argues for a parallel state system for 
governance. As with the earlier Fascist movements, the state has both a bureaucratic component, 
one which is run as a utilitarian law-based system, and the second which is an aesthetic 
representational government.144 While most of the society can function within a neoliberal 
algorithmic way which is highly depoliticized, accepting deregulation or automatic “depoliticized” 
stabilization, the second part of the state functions for aesthetic purposes. While a liberal 
government may put forward legislation to address an issue, both to gain political support and to 
establish a policy, the Alternative Right focuses on introducing a policy that is at its most effective 
when proposed rather than when implemented. The result is the practice of the “Big Joke.” An 
event such as the “Muslim Ban” in 2017, presented a clear political image to the American public 
and the international community, even before it is implemented. Everyday political and economic 
considerations are depoliticized while the actions of the state on the national or international scale 
are turned into a spectacle. Donald Trump’s administration has slashed funding and regulation for 
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organizations such as FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency),145 while publicly 
donating private money to charity. If examined from a utilitarian perspective the policies make no 
sense, if examined aesthetically like a performance then the government policies make sense. It is 
a comical performance, where the audience either does not get that it is a joke, is in on the joke or 
is outraged by the joke. The media follows up on the “Big Joke” by asking “is it a joke?” or 
pointing out the absurdity of the spectacle while ignoring the non-aesthetic consequences of the 
legislation that was put forward or made into law.  
The best example of this “Big Joke” philosophy is the use of memes by the Alt-Right. 
While not an essential element of its ideological conception of the world, the movement has been 
intimately connected with internet memes and the online culture that disseminates these memes. 
Internet memes are easy to share and often use innocuous images (Pepe the Frog for example), 
therefore if a post becomes viral the ideas of the Alternative Right can quickly be shared across 
Twitter, 4chan or Reddit. The Alt-Right subsection of the movement has been the most infamous 
and successful group to use memes to radicalize and gain followers within the Alternative Right. 
While the use of memes is not limited to the Alt-Right, as Socialist, feminist, and liberal memes 
are also easy to find online, the Alt-Right’s use of memes serves a dual purpose, for internal 
communication and public outcry.146  
The use of memes such as “I do not want to live on this planet anymore”147 capture the 
imagination of the apolitical “south park libertarians’, whose political ideology serves as a gateway 
to the Alt-Right for younger politically apathetic young men. It is a special message which needs 
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to be decoded by those in the know, taken literally or “seriously” these memes miss the point, one 
needs an ironic sense of detachment to engage and “read” the memes. The heart of the “south park 
libertarian” thought process is a rejection of every political group or commitment as absurd and 
contradictory, stressing that one should critique everything, regardless of punching down or up. 
While unlikely to reject global warming as a hoax, they will target climate change activists for 
being too political and/or absurd when they mention the impact of factory farming on the 
environment despite the two ideas being connected. On the other hand, they will decry the 
government support of large businesses within a supposedly free market system.148 The objective 
is to stress a balance between multiple perspectives by targeting the absurdity of both perspectives, 
that which is emotionally charged rather than derived from rational thought. By aggressively 
targeting both sides of the conflict and hiding behind an ironic or satirical demeanour, the comedy 
becomes increasingly antagonistic, as, with a drug, a tolerance slowly builds up over time, 
requiring more outlandish jokes. 
Under the veneer of a joke, an Alt-Right meme will often draw upon shocking imagery in 
a desire to evoke an affective response, rupture the sensible reality in which it is placed. Such an 
online post intends to trigger the audience, which is both a practical technique to spread the meme, 
relying on the controversy to gain popularity and a direct critique of the academic and activist 
culture of inclusion and identity politics. Under the guise of free speech, the authors of these 
memes can claim an ironic detachment from work, arguing that the intention is to make a joke. 
Earlier movements on the Far-Right drew upon dog whistle politics, such as the image/word “88” 
(a reference to Heil Hitler, H being the 8th letter of the alphabet), but they were limited to 
codewords for members of a secret club. The contemporary use of memes ranges from the 
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shocking exploitation memes which explicitly draw upon swastikas and racially charged imagery 
to invoke a response, to the premediated meme which turns a non-political figure or gesture into a 
symbol of hate, with Taylor Swift, the “okay” sign, and the primary campaign of Andrew Yang 
being examples of this appropriation.149 Exploiting the space opened up by mainstream liberal and 
conservative media in response to the campaigns for tolerance and respect for trauma found on 
college campuses, labelled “political correctness,” the use of these hostile and triggering memes 
becomes normalized as a response to the “absurdity of political correctness.” The Alternative 
Right’s hate speech, white nationalist or misogynistic meme becomes the subject of national 
debate through the amplification by mainstream media by those condemning it and those who in 
turn condemn those who condemn the hate speech for “overreacting.”150 By doing so, the Alt-Right 
exploits the disagreements between what is free speech and hate speech, driving a wedge between 
Liberals and “progressives” who value hate speech legislation over free speech legislation. 
While the trolling element of the Far-Right has gained media attention, the movement 
would not have captured mass public support if it was focused exclusively on gaining the attention 
and support from self-avowed white-supremacists and fascist communities. Instead, the movement 
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has addressed the growing apathy and disengagement with civil politics, focusing on the rise of 
technocratic automation and deindustrialization which has reduced the career and life perspective 
of Millennials and Zoomers.151 The Alternative Right attracts support from technological 
enthusiasts who wish for a more utilitarian/efficient society rather than one based on sociological, 
materialist and historical considerations. The technocratic community may disagree with white 
supremacy and think that men and women should be paid the same wage, but view affirmative 
action policies as unfair and ineffective, due to their perceived inefficiency and privileging of 
exogenous factors. This same community may even pass on the memes mentioned earlier, 
attacking the perceived problems of social science and humanities’ “political correctness.” 
The attacks on “political correctness” are a way of shielding the Alternative Right’s less 
radical members from intense scrutiny and public shaming. The Alternative Right rejects the 
mainstream and critical social science scholarship in favour of business and STEM fields. When 
in power Alternative Right and Alternative Right friendly politicians actively defund progressive 
departments and universities or establish free-speech laws which allow for hate speech on 
university campuses.152 What social science that is supported by the Alternative Right relies on 
either the mathematical modelling and biological determinism to appear apolitical and 
ahistorical,153 or is heavily focused on the concept of “western civilization” to separate whites from 
non-whites.  
Why should they be called the Alternative Right? 
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Ultimately we must use the term Alternative Right to discuss this movement because 
labelling them all as Nazis, fascists or white supremacists is akin to calling all communists 
Stalinists, it is both factually wrong and ineffective at examining the issue. Matthew Lyons argues: 
 ... a campaign to abolish the term Alt-right doesn’t help us do this and makes it 
harder. If we want to understand the Alt-Right’s strengths and weaknesses, we 
need to understand what it shares with older white nationalist currents — but 
also what sets it apart. By contrast, the “don’t use ‘alt-right’” campaign promotes 
misunderstanding and ignorance about the movement it’s trying to confront.154  
The Alt-Right has transgressed the language politics of sites such as Stormfront;155 they are 
not afraid of being called racists. Even those who decry the white nationalism of the ideological 
core of the Alt-Right and its anti-Semitism are often proponents of white supremacy, Islamophobia 
and patriarchal politics. The term Alt-Right has been around since 2008, and it was chosen not to 
disguise racist remarks, but rather to set the proud White Nationalists apart from the mainstream 
conservatives who pretend or downplay their racism.156  
The term Alternative Right allows academics and political activists to describe a broad 
social trend within the anglophone far-right without being reduced to “Reducto Ad Hitlerum” and 
other logical fallacies which impede the discussion on the nature of the Far-Right. The term 
“Alternative Right” is an effective discursive tool to describe the assemblage of ideological 
positions without erasing the disagreements between the Alternative Right and other Right-wing 
groups, and it separates the movement from the logical framework of classical fascism which arises 
by calling it “neo-fascism” or “neo-nazism.”  
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As Lyons points out, white supremacy is not some monolithic unity, it develops and 
changes over time, the emergence of dedicated White Nationalism after the civil rights movement 
is indicative of these developments as the White Nationalists have rejected the possibility of living 
with other racists and wish to live entirely removed from non-white populations, only after 
entrenched Jim Crow laws were repealed.157  
The Alternative Right is not the exact same thing as White Nationalism. The Alternative 
Right is not the same thing as the Incel movement. The Alternative Right is not a perfect match 
with Trumpism. The Alternative Right is not be abandoned because it is marginally more 
acceptable than the term Far-Right or Extremist Right. It is a distinct political entity that should be 
understood as it is rather than as a boogieman haunting the imagination of Centrists and Leftists. 
Another reason to call them the Alternative Right rather than fascist or white supremacist 
is that it downplays the sexism of the movement. Defining the Alt-Right as merely a white 
nationalist group ignores the aspects of the movement that are merely tolerant of white 
nationalism.158 Most of the NeoReactionaries, members of the "manosphere," some of the 
European New Right, and the techno-libertarians all ignore or downplay their racism where they 
can. NeoReactionaries may invoke racial eugenics, but this does not mean merely favouring 
whites. For example when their racial statistics show that Koreans, Japanese or Jewish groups have 
higher IQs, then NeoReactionaries think they should be subsequently promoted through eugenic 
policies.159 Some of the Alternative Right have gone so far as to include minority groups within 
the movement for both strategic or philosophical reasons. It may surprise people outside of the 
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Alt-Right to know that there is a considerable number of white nationalist Jews within the 
Alternative Right who advocate racial hatred against non-whites, but find targeting white Jews 
completely unacceptable.160 American Renaissance, Jared Taylor's publication, advocates for the 
inclusion of Jews within the Alternative Right, while many Neo-Nazi groups within the Alternative 
Right target those same Jewish members.161 For example, Paul Gottfried who coined the term 
Alternative Right should be understood as a prominent figure who influenced the Alt-Right even 
if he is Jewish and disagrees with Richard Spencer’s subgroup of the Alternative Right.162  
Another paradoxical minority group within the Alt-Right is the male homosexual 
population. As prominently demonstrated in the Netherlands, the Far-Right can rally around 
homosexuality or women's rights if it is used to gain support against Islam or to return to male 
tribalism to create a space without women.163 Just as the Alt-Right's members may support Israel 
to gain an ally against Islamic groups, by promoting the most superficial elements of Gay rights 
(opposed to the rights of trans-people or the politics of the broader queer community), the Alt-
Right can promote Islamophobia easier. 
The inclusion of non-typical followers within the Alternative Right reached its apotheosis 
in the form of Milo Yiannopoulos, a gay Jewish man who has a fetish for black men.164 As a former 
writer for Breitbart and Trump surrogate, he served as an iconoclastic figure soaking up media 
attention for the Alt-Right.  In 2014 Yiannopoulos became infamous as he supported and 
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publicized the Gamergate movement while working for Breitbart.165 He used Gamergate as an 
opportunity to make a stand within the so-called "culture wars," arguing that other mediums have 
collapsed into left-wing politics after including feminist and identity politics within TV or film.166 
Understood within this logic feminist critiques of video games were attacks on the free speech in 
video games. Yiannopoulos trolled the public by both providing a “gay friend” to deny claims that 
the Alt-Right is homophobic, while at the same time engaging in both anti-feminist and anti-queer 
politics.  Despite his publicity and infamy within the mainstream press, Milo was also highly 
divisive within the Alt-Right, many dismissed him as an opportunist member of the Alt-Lite. 
Perhaps the most important part of the Milo example is his banishment from the movement and 
subsequent bankruptcy. The public faces of the Alt-Lite have shifted from fringe figures to those 
who adopt a more traditional public persona in line with traditional conservativism. When the 
Alternative Right and the Alt-Right were a fringe idea rather than one with mainstream 
acceptability, figures like Milo were acceptable. Since 2016 the ideological positions of the 
Alternative Right have progressed from online chat rooms to viable and growing political 
perspectives in anglophone politics.  
The Overton Window 
 
The critical political strategy of the Alt-Right from its inception has been the use or 
widening of the Overton Window. The Overton Window was developed by Joe Overton during 
the 1990s while working for Mackinac Center for Public Policy in Michigan.167 Rather than 
directly write a policy for state officials, the focus of a think tank according to Overton was to 
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change the political climate and acceptability of policy. For Overton, the public policy exists on a 
linear spectrum, and despite the logical arguments and campaigning of political groups only 
policies within a subsection of that spectrum, the "Overton Window" are possible to implement.168 
Elected politicians cannot successfully engage in policies outside of this window, therefore think 
tanks and other non-democratically elected organizations are charged with 
expanding/contracting/shifting the Overton Window to reflect the political positions of that 
political group. 
The Overton Window theory has significant flaws that should be quickly addressed before 
discussing the influence of the idea on Right-Wing thought and praxis. One significant fault is the 
idea of narrow linear spectrum politics; it results in one-dimensional policy between a supposed 
left and right. The system of linear policy choices reflects a mathematical and economic system of 
public policy that erases the differences between policy options. The original example for the 
Overton Window is school choice in the United States, placing all options on a spectrum between 
mandatory universal public education and completely deregulated and unsubsidized education.169 
What this does not question is the nature of schools themselves or even how they would be 
organized outside of how much choice the parent has in selecting which school their child attends 
and how much they are willing to pay for out of pocket and through their taxes. The second failing 
of the idea is that it is effectively a less complicated and nuanced take on Slavoj Zizek's 
understanding of ideology, where an ideologically defined construction of politics limits the scope 
of reasonable discourse.170 The Overton Window is a useful policy tool within a consensus two-
party system fighting over the centre within a particular ideology, but the moment that complexity 
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and competing ideologies emerge the analytical tool is far less informative as many debates occur 
on a particular element of public policy without a consensus on what the choices are. 
Despite these failings, the Overton Window is a useful pedagogical tool for motivating 
Right-Wing politics. Rather than attempting to enter elected office and change politics, as the 
Libertarian movement attempted in 1980, by adopting a praxis based on the Overton Window, the 
objectives of radical and fringe movements are framed regarding discourse first, and policy change 
and elected representation second. White nationalist groups know that the politics of a white only 
state is not only a logistical nightmare but also highly unpopular,171 therefore since the mid-2000s 
when White Nationalists adopted the rhetoric of the Overton Window, their goal has been to shift 
public opinion against people of colour. If the end goal is the white only state, then it is necessary 
to be able to express that opinion publicly first, to do that they have attempted to normalize racial 
slurs, symbols of white supremacy and the presentation of minorities as second-class citizens. This 
explicit racism is one reason the White Nationalists within the Alternative Right endorsed Trump 
within the Republican primaries so quickly. Even though they knew he would not be able to create 
a white's only America, he would shift discourse while on the campaign trail, and if he theoretically 
won the presidency that would be a bonus.  
After Romney's failure in 2012 the GOP softened their policy on immigration as an attempt 
to court the Hispanic vote, two of the front-runners in 2015 before Trump entering the race, Marco 
Rubio and Jeb were solidly in favour of more open and less racist immigration policy.172 With 
Trump's anti-immigrant and anti-Mexican rhetoric on the opening days of the campaign trail, he 
was shifting Republican discourse away from inclusive politics. Therefore, if the White Nationalist 
 
171 Anissimov, “Why There Are No White Nationalists.” 
172 Weigel, “Cuckservative - the Conservative Insult of the Month, Explained.” 
62 
 
groups supported Trump, they would help shift the Overton Window back towards a more racially 
charged Republican party, which would help maintain or expand the acceptability of racist politics 
and discourse for the American public. 
The critical difference between the Overton Window as a political project and incremental 
policy change is that the often smaller political movements lack the resources to implement a minor 
policy shift.173 Libertarian thinkers use the abolitionist movement as the best example of the 
Overton Window working historically; it started with hearing out abolitionists within Congress 
long before congressional policy changes were made on a National level to end slavery.174 They 
also use this example because it downplays the racial politics of the libertarian movement. The 
focus of the abolitionist campaign was centred on changing discourse rather than improving the 
material conditions of existing slaves through marginal policy changes. One starts by changing 
public perception of an unthinkable policy, not with the goal of minor changes that are already 
acceptable just logistically difficult, but by making it okay to talk about in the public sphere. 
What the Alt-Right is not: 
 
Now that several vital tactics and strategies have been laid out, the misconceptions about 
Donald Trump, Fascism and the Tea Party can be resolved. The objective of this section is not to 
absolve these groups of misdeeds or to say that they are not politically relevant, but to stress that 
they are not the same as the Alternative Right. 
Donald Trump and the Alt-Lite 
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The Trump-Alternative Right coalition is one of the most challenging topics for studying 
the Alternative Right as Trump has been the most popular news story in North America since he 
put his name forward during the Republican Primary in 2015. Much of the journalistic and 
academic work covering him and his advisors is sensationalist and popular; with every author 
attempting to provide a new hot take, an easy punchline or a moment of presidential glory to 
examine under a microscope. This reporting has produced a lot of noise and confusion. When one 
adds the Alt-Right, which is known for lying to the press, making ironic "jokes," extremism and 
the amplified echo chambers of social media, it is difficult to find actual linkages rather than 
aesthetic connections blurred together over time.  
As a point of clarification, for Donald Trump, we need to separate the man from his 
followers, voters and advisors, Trump the man has shown no signs of awareness of almost any 
theorist mentioned within this text other than perhaps Richard Spencer (who publicly pledged 
loyalty to him in front of a large crowd of followers chanting Trump’s name). Donald Trump has 
shown no consistent ideological perspective throughout his political life. To suggest that he 
manifested the Alternative Right ideology to win the 2016 campaign would be absurd. This 
inconsistency in political views means that his views are sometimes in line with the Alternative 
Right but not uniformly so or consistently.  Studies of the Alternative Right should example Trump 
in parallel and intertwined with the Alt-Right and the Alternative Right rather than as the same 
entity or even synonymously. Members of his administration and prominent advisors (past or 
present) such as Steve Bannon are members of the Alternative Right, but even then, they are 
typically Alt-Lite rather than members of the radical core. As per the spectrum theory of the 
Alternative Right introduced earlier, the term Alt-Lite is one of intensity and location rather than 
of kind. 
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The insurgency of the Alt-Right within the Republican party should not be understood or 
read as a deliberate push by billionaire backers like the libertarian Koch Brothers or Mercers trying 
to gain control of the system. Whereas there are ample volumes written on the influence of the 
billionaire donor class in the United States, the most famous of which is Jane Meyer’s Dark 
Money,175 the rise of the Alternative Right appears to be a genuine grassroots movement which 
was only injected with outside billionaire funding when it posed a real chance of influencing the 
election. It is far more accurate to see the Alternative Right as a counter-revolution against the 
Tea-Party and their billionaire donors, as Trump's message (taken as a proxy for the resentment of 
the rank and file of the Republican party who are more likely to hold Alternative Right perspectives 
than the party elite) was twofold: 1) revanchist white supremacy and 2) draining the swamp. The 
first message was amplified by the liberal media for being the easy target, but the second was 
downplayed. Anecdotally, when asking colleagues what Trump's central platform during the 2016 
election was, few could identify the anti-establishment and anti-corruption platform that he 
campaigned on — understanding that Trump’s victory in the primaries was due to the endorsement 
of the Alternative Right in opposition to the mainstream conservative options. 
Not all members of the Alternative Right find Trump a spokesperson for their agenda. For 
example, Michael Perilloux, a NeoReactionary, argued that Donald Trump does not go far enough, 
he is an actor within a corrupt system, an actor who is closer to the Alt-Right's perspectives than 
any previous presidential candidate, but still a member of that system.176 The Alternative Right has 
seen increased popularity due to Trump’s endorsement of their ideas and memes, but it would be 
difficult to imagine Trump reading any of the political theory literature within the Alt-Right 
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beyond reading the memes on Twitter and the summaries of their views as translated by 
mainstream conservatives on cable news programs. Perilloux, a NeoReactionary author, 
commenting on Trump's claims to the Alt-Right demonstrates this point:  
he (Trump) is simply another phenomenon within the arcane workings of the 
system, as worthy of support as the ebb and flow of the tides. Surely, the 
unprecedented nature of his campaign warrants excited interest as a historical 
case-study and promising fore-shock of true restoration, but he is not the king, 
and we have a way to go yet." (Perilloux as quoted by Dylan Matthews.)177  
The Alternative Right is still a minority share of the American Right, even if it is a growing 
share; it is profoundly radical and far more vocal and active than other members of Trump's 
electoral coalition. While there is no official way of checking, it is likely that many Trump 
supporters are not members of the Alternative Right and most are not members of the Alt-Right. 
The Alternative Right was accelerated after Trump's victory; the new standard has been set, it is 
no longer absurd to believe that a campaign based on hate speech and Alternative Right politics 
would win a significant general election. 
Trumpism and his electoral victory provided a more distinct set of questions than those 
raised by an examination of the Alternative Right. When examining the impact of the Alt-Right, 
we are looking at the most radicalized elements of the Right (Alternative or mainstream Right). 
When looking at Trump’s success, we are examining how and why self-described moderates 
would support Trump and his openly racist policies, which were unacceptable to discuss in public 
a decade earlier, or how Trump provides the United States with a quasi-authoritarian demagogue 
as commander in chief.178 These are indeed terrifying realities for the United States and the world 
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at large, but these do not make him a fascist or a member of the Alt-Right. The study of Trump 
and his impact on American politics requires an understanding of the Alternative/Alt-Right to 
demonstrate his success online and through Twitter, just as any reading of the Alternative Right 
cannot ignore Trump and the influx of populism into the Alternative Right during his campaign. 
The Alternative Right, for example, does not see the end of immigration as enough for their 
long-term success, which is why most members of the Alternative Right see Trump as a stepping 
stone to a larger project rather than as the “Führer for a thousand-year Reich.” Demographically 
the movement takes the claim that more non-white babies are born each year than white ones and 
deduces that there is no way for the white population to maintain its current percentage of the 
population. The solutions that the Alternative Right proposes are mixed, Ted Sallis suggests that 
the white nationalists assert themselves within multicultural discussions, arguing for the 
preservation of the white race as if it were a minority group being erased through a genocidal 
campaign.179  Many in the Alt-Right saw Trump as a chance to push the Overton window towards 
the white nationalist position(s), knowing that he was never a real white nationalist, as countless 
members of the Alt-Right are quick to remind readers that his daughter converted to Judaism and 
married a Jewish billionaire.  
During the 2016 election, the Alt-Right effectively discredited mainstream establishment 
candidates within the GOP by repeatedly calling them Cuckservatives on social media, eroding 
their claims to the right.180 As the primaries in 2012 had demonstrated playing to the more 
radicalized right-wing base of the Republican party had been useful, but it had alienated centrist 
minority voters, which resulted in most of the GOP candidates softening their stance on 
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immigration. As Trump had positioned himself from the first day of the campaign as the “tough 
on immigration” candidate, it forced many in the GOP to keep moving to the right with little 
credibility to chase the polls in a crowded primary field. These attacks extended outside of the 
candidates, targeting the bastion of mainstream Republican thought, the National Review. With 
repeated harassment of the male staffers by sending them racial cuckold porn and in one case 
sending images of their children in gas chambers.181 As per the norm for the Alt-Right, the goal 
was to humiliate the men by making rape fantasies about their wives and children, the women and 
children targeted were almost entirely silenced from the reporting and were presented as helpless 
bystanders. Just as with Gamergate and the broader work of the manosphere, women were treated 
as prizes to be won or lost. 
While Trump and his administration have proven to not be Fascists,182 at least not by the 
definitions of any noted historians or political scientists of Fascism, they have adopted some 
semiotics from Fascist regimes and sympathetic movements. The child concentration camps, 
known officially as youth detention centres for immigrants, in 2018 include an image of Trump 
along with a quote from Art of the Deal, which echoed the "Arbeit Macht Frei" of the gates of 
Auschwitz.183 Trump's America First slogan also calls back to the 1930's fascist sympathizers. 
Most of these comparisons are aesthetic choices which normalize policy and discursive choices to 
pull policy and public opinion to the right.  It is highly unlikely that illegal attacks or violence will 
be perpetrated to suppress voting or the government arresting leaders or candidates of the 
Democratic party. Instead, the institutional practice of voter suppression and gerrymandering of 
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the Republican party will likely continue. Rather than seeing a Fascist takeover or a Fascist 
administration, the political shift of Trump's election and administration has been the 
transformation of the existing Republican party into one more in line with the Alternative Right 
rather than mainstream conservatism. The Republican party is not controlled by the Alternative 
Right, somewhat sympathetic members are now given the space to voice their views, with the 
leaders and the moderates of the party shifting policy positions to capture their more vocal 
members, just as they did to respond to the Tea Party insurgency of 2010-2012. 
The Alternative Right's pull within the Trump administration was significantly eroded after 
the media catastrophe of the Charlottesville rally in August 2017, when Bannon and Sebastian 
Gorka were fired.184 After August 2017 the connection between Trump and the Alternative/Alt-
Right was weakened enough that no serious analysis can conflate the two together. A united 
Alternative Right, even if it was just a dream, disappeared as the movement divided itself in 
opposition to the white nationalist question, with the Alt-Lite and Manosphere members distancing 
themselves from the Alt-Right and the Neo-Nazis. While still more unified than the Left in the 
United States, the monolith that the Alt-Right may have claimed to be was proven false. Since then 
no group or individual has effectively organized the Alt-Right or successfully claimed leadership 
of the American Far-Right; though it is unlikely that any figure will attempt to claim the leadership 
mantle of the Alt-Right so long as Trump maintains a high approval rating among Republicans. 
As any Far-Right insurgent would either need to replace Trump (if he was impeached or abdicated 
his position) or gain his complete confidence (no figure has approached this yet).  
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What made the Charlottesville rally indirectly successful was how Trump convinced the 
media and much of the public that anti-fascist and left-wing groups were equally to blame for the 
violence. Soon after the rally, Antifa was labelled by the Department of Homeland Security as 
supporting "domestic terrorist violence,"185 and some in the media started using Trump's term "Alt-
Left" to claim that social democratic and liberal counter-protestors were militant left-wing radicals. 
By labelling the centre-left as radicals, the resulting false equivalency has shifted political 
discourse in the United States rightward, by demonizing non-violent protests, which has been a 
common practice by those opposing the Civil Rights movement. 
Moving past Trump and how he used the Alternative Right for political gain, is the question 
of how to understand the mainstream Alt-Lite and its relationship to the Alt-Right’s radical core? 
Considering the Alt-Lite as separate from the more radical members of the movement does the 
larger movement a considerable benefit, as it normalizes there up until recently, radical beliefs. 
For some core members of the Alt-Right such as Richard Spencer, the Alt-Lite are opportunists 
who are exploiting the popularity of the movement, the example par-excellence is Breitbart, which 
had both Steven Bannon and Milo Yiannopoulos as editor and writer respectively. The Alt-Lite 
tones down the racist rhetoric of the Alt-Right from full-blown proclamations for genocides, while 
holding to the broader Alternative Right ideology.  
Angela Nagle argues for the significance of the Alt-Right/Lite divide, both in her book Kill 
all the Normies186 and her 2017 Atlantic article in December of the same year.187 The argument is 
premised upon a divide between the media and White House-friendly members of the Alternative 
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Right, such as Steven Bannon, being right-wing political opportunists who see the Alternative 
Right’s platform as a way forward to gain electoral support opposed to the more ideologically 
driven members of the movement, such as Richard Spencer, essentially arguing for a 
moderate/fanatic divide (in contrast to a spectrum between radical cores and the moderates).  The 
Alt-Right plays the ideologically driven vanguard to the sympathetic and more numerous Alt-Lite. 
Many political movements have an ideological core with less devoted followers who hold less 
dogmatic beliefs. What makes the Alternative Right peculiar is that the inclusion of Jews, 
homosexuals and non-whites within the Alternative Right is unacceptable for the white nationalist 
communities within the Alternative Right, the result is a seemingly strange contradiction if we 
define the Alternative Right strictly as white nationalists. Understood within the framework of the 
Overton Window vs incremental policy changes, the contradiction is resolved, the debate is one of 
strategy rather than objective. The core Alt-Right membership advocates for expanding the scope 
of acceptable discourse with their Unite the Right rallies and the normalization of White 
Nationalism. In contrast, the seemingly more moderate members of the Alternative Right actively 
push for acceptable racist policies such as the Border Wall or expanding anti-immigrant 
legislation, seeing the white nationalists as uncomfortable bedfellows for their larger right-wing 
project. This is how Trump’s older supporters are brought into the Alternative Right, not by Alt-
Right memes but by the more “acceptable” Alt-Lite figures. 
As Matthew Lyons clearly and emphatically states in his chapter dedicated to the Trump 
question in his book Insurgent Supremacists, “Trump is not a Fascist.”188 While the continuous 
slandering of American presidents for being "fascists" has been almost universally frivolous, 
Trump appears, at least at first, as an exception. Trump is the first outright populist American 
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president in anyone's lifetime and the most vocally opposed to democracy in as long. Yet the fears 
that Trump would topple the American establishment were put to rest within the first year of his 
presidency. Despite Republican control of the courts, state legislatures, the senate and congress 
the party was unable to easily pass unified legislation during the first year of his presidency, let 
alone take the steps that previous fascist or authoritarian governments took to cement power. As 
Corey Robin pointed out, on his website, Trump failed to do the one thing that every single Fascist 
administration has ever done, crush the left immediately upon taking control of the government.189 
If Trump was a Fascist or ideologically committed to the White Nationalist or Alt-Right core of 
the Alternative Right there would have been more significant advances rather than half measures 
in his first 100 days. The pressure on the Democratic party to adopt social democratic policies has 
only increased since Trump was inaugurated, and it shows no signs of slowing. Where Trump's 
administration has changed politics, it has mostly been through the erosion of political precedence 
and the normalization of Alternative Right ideas and language, rather than actual policy changes. 
The F Word and National Socialism 
 
Within the study of fascism by non-fascist and anti-fascist thinkers, there is a quest for a 
perfect encapsulation of fascism into a parsimonious definition. This quest for “Ur-Fascism” or 
the Fascist minimum is akin to a grail quest; researchers spend years of their lives hunting down a 
perfect explanation for this ideology; some in response to the trauma of National Socialism’s 
genocide and terror after a decade in power,190 while others attempt to stop it from happening here 
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at home and seek for the germ to be eradicated in its infancy.191 Italian Fascism was fixated on the 
role of the state and lacked the fixation on race that dominated National Socialism, which in turn 
lacked the religious fundamentalism of the Romanian Iron Guard, what common threads that 
existed must be qualitatively examined and differentiated rather than processed through an easy to 
read flowchart/diagnostic test to see if something is fascist. The hunt for Ur-Fascism is a failed 
one from the start; just as pure-liberalism or communism does not exist, the abstracted notion of 
Fascism is a fantasy. It is an analytical dream for parsimonious theory rather than one of practical 
use for those facing it down on the street. There was no platonic form of fascism; this is even more 
true for fascism than for liberalism or communism, which at least have collected works by 
communists and liberals explaining what their ideology is rather than relying on historians after 
the fact explaining their ideology.192 Is there a fascist minimum, is racism and eugenics a fascist 
idea or a particular trait?193  
If one wishes to apply the idea of a fascist minimum to the Alternative Right, then perhaps 
Roger Griffin’s definition could be of use: "a political ideology whose core in its various 
permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism.”194 But this definition only 
applies to the most state centric groups within the Alternative Right, ignoring the more libertarian 
and isolationist groups. Even if we take an approximate definition of fascism without reducing it 
to an Ur-Fascism it will be more effective than nothing. Some factions in the Alternative Right are 
more fascist than others but that means that those opposing or studying the Alternative Right are 
placed in the unfortunate rhetorical position that "not all" members of the Alt-Right are fascist. 
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There is no platonic form of Fascism, as with any other ideology, the quest to label the Alternative 
Right as fascist is therefore one of political tactics and political organization for unified opposition 
rather than a parsimonious analytical tool for investigation by academics.  
 The Alternative Right or Alt-Right, broadly understood as the collection of the European 
New Right, American Alt-Right and other authoritarian right-wing anti-free trade politics, is the 
new fascism for the 21st century. Academic authors are scrambling to find the “Alt-Right 
minimum” where none exists. The movements share some common characteristics, authors and 
strategies but they are not a uniform monolith, just as the fascism of the interwar period lacked a 
unified ideological minimum. For this text, the quest for an “Alt-Right minimum” is postponed 
indefinitely, until the movement fully condenses into a tangible historical entity. Any claims to an 
“Alt-Right minimum” are snapshots of a singular moment rather than a descriptive model. 
One of the more debatable labels for the Alternative Right is that of fascist; the term is 
widely used and poorly defined by most public figures and academics. It has the unfortunate 
position as a term that both means something concrete, a nuanced ideological system, and the 
broadest and easiest term for political evil. If the Alternative Right is to be understood as a 
continuation of Fascism, the most crucial academic distinction that must be made is that the 
Alternative Right is not National Socialism. If one reads fascism as a historical phenomenon or as 
a continuation of National Socialism through skinhead and neo-Nazi movements, then reading the 
Alternative Right as a fascist movement provides a sloppy portrayal of the movement for minor 
rhetorical gains. Historiography and contemporary political theory on Fascism argue that National 
Socialism is one form of Fascism, and for most not even the most generic example of Fascism.195 
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The literature on Fascism since the 1970s has continually pointed to the flaws that arise when 
National Socialism is taken as the default for Fascist movements.  Roger Griffin, a prominent 
theorist and historian on Fascism, has articulated very clearly that those groups which have taken 
up the banner of Fascist politics with more than limited success have done so without the Swastika 
or the Goose Step.196 Instead, they have separated themselves from the Nazi legacy. Matthew 
Lyons has also defended the need to understand this movement on its own grounds rather than 
recycle historical terms.197 To suggest that “a Nazi is a Nazi is a Nazi,” and that all members of the 
Alternative Right are Nazis is a problem because the Alternative Right’s members are not goose-
stepping card-carrying Germans of the National Socialist party. It would be as absurd as walking 
into a Democratic Socialists of America meeting and calling them Bolsheviks or calling a group 
of liberals Whigs, it is intellectually and rhetorically lazy. Either the term has a concrete definition, 
or it is yet another political insult to motivate the public into action.  
There is no denying that the Alt-Right uses the images of the Nazi party to affect the public, 
internet trolls have been relying on these images for over a decade, but that does not make them 
Nazis. They are indeed responsible for normalizing fascist iconography and ideas, spreading hate 
speech, targeting minorities, and in their own words “moving the Overton window” towards 
Fascism when they use the imagery of the Nazi party. Yet to ascribe to them the label of their 
imagery would require calling them Vikings or crusaders as well, because they dress up like them 
and use their iconography online for the purpose of political iconography. It is appropriate to call 
them fascistic, as they adopt fascistic imagery, but it provides the movement with legitimacy and 
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credibility to label them the continuation of the Nazi party. As the Alternative Right, are not literal 
Nazis, it is more appropriate to call them fascistic or fascists.198 
The Alternative Right is a quasi-fascistic movement, one that draws partially upon a 
generalizable political theory of fascism detached from the historical conditions of inter-war 
Europe and the Nazi party, typically through neo-fascist thinkers such as Julius Evola.199 The 
ideology of the Alternative Right maps onto fascism if you read fascism as a collection of 
nationalist authoritarian ideologies that respond to the economic and cultural conditions of 
modernity within a capitalist society while rejecting communism and democracy. If you are 
charitable in your readings of Fascism as a political theory then connections can be made, but the 
public literature connecting Fascism with the Alternative Right is sensationalist and out of date. 
The popular work by Timothy Synder, On Tyranny, for example, is fixated on the realities of the 
1930s and 1940s without serious reflection on the changes within the Far-Right over the 
subsequent 70 to 80 years.200 Fascist movements support nationalism and typically engage in ultra-
nationalistic violence, but this does not always translate into racism and vice versa (liberalism has 
a significant history of nationalist racism resulting in genocide and liberalism is in many ways the 
antithesis of Fascism). The fixation on anti-Semitism and racism within National Socialism is 
underplayed in other successful Fascist movements such as Italian Fascism or the Falangist 
movements in Spain. The intersection of Italy and anti-Semitism was limited until the Second 
World War and the introduction of racial laws started in 1939.201 The period of the Salo republic 
during the occupation of Northern Italy by Germany during the final years of the war is the only 
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time that Italy could be understood as adopting National Socialism, during which it was a puppet 
state and treated as a separate political system by Italian Fascists.202  
The Alternative Right is still in relative ideological infancy, the movement’s fractured 
origins and divergent literature have done little to clarify a cohesive and easy to label definition. 
While the Alternative Right has been dominated by white supremacists and other racially focused 
nationalists, this is only one of the intellectual streams of the movement, even though it is the most 
vocal. Despite White Nationalists coming from a non-fascist tradition, they are colloquially 
connected to the Fascists due to the easy semiotic shorthand and a legacy of scholarship equating 
any racist movement with the Nazi party.203  
Roger Griffin describes Fascism as a slime mold, one which grows in ideal locations, for 
example within failing democracies, but is devoid of a true agency of its own.204 It moves and 
grows but is limited to ideal environments and lacks a unified brain and is instead a swarm; just 
like internet movements moving with little centralization or hierarchy. The implication for this 
rhizomatic structure is its difficulty in suppression, as with a terrorist cell the state cannot cut off 
the head and solve the problem, but instead, must fight an asymmetric war against the insurgency. 
Griffin sees 21st century fascism emerging from a decentralized and uncensorable threat from a 
small activist group, leading to the rise of lone-wolf attacks and independently emerging fascist 
communities, removed from a centralized organizational hub such as an official party. Over time 
a series of the unofficial state-activist connections, i.e. indirect police and para-military support, 
will be supplemented by the regional fascist organizations; which will allow local movements to 
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commit hate crimes without incriminating the entire movement or the supportive government.205 
The Radical Right will adopt extremist organizational structures akin to a terrorist cell system, 
allowing for the flow of radicals into and eventual hijacking of mainstream parties. Griffin also 
suspects that there will be an exploitation of the left-wing anti-globalization movement which will 
hijack left-wing critiques of cultural hegemony. Those fascists who are not committing acts of 
terror will likely adopt an agenda based on the mainstreaming of xenophobia and racism with the 
intention of creating further internationalized groups with linkages to other far-right movements.206 
All of these characteristics describe the Alternative Right movement to a T. As we see 21st century 
fascism will not dress in the affectation of armed parades of the SA for serious mobilization.207 It 
will take the calm, benign garb of the day; they will dress like Richard Spencer in suits with clean-
cut haircuts and walk through the halls of power like any other political group. It should therefore 
not surprise us that the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville in 2017 was an abnormality for 
21st century fascism, one that faced far more backlash than nearly any other Alternative Right 
event, leading to the decline of organized mass rallies. 
Aesthetically and affectively the Neo-Nazi rally is a lightning rod for the public outcry 
from almost every part of the political spectrum. The Nazis have been vilified for decades within 
American media and are synonymous with evil, dressing up as one elicits only hatred and disgust 
from the broader public, as even members of the Alternative Right are disgusted by Nazis.208 The 
rally in Charlottesville failed because it looked like the worst of both worlds, taking the villainous 
and violent image of the Neo-Nazi and paring it with dorky looking white college students, in polo 
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shirts, khakis and tiki torches. While the rally would lead to the murder of a counter-protester, the 
success of the Alt-Right to integrate themselves into the mainstream started to unravel. While 
Trump would critique "both sides" in a public address in August 2017, tolerance toward the 
broader Alt-Right, at the cost of some radical support, was maintained.209 The mass protests and 
actions during the 2016 campaign and the first half year of the Trump administration were replaced 
with a diversified campaign of normalization by the broader Alt-Right coalition and the emergence 
of individual terrorist acts. 
Lyons defines fascism as "a revolutionary form of right-wing populism, inspired by a 
totalitarian vision of collective rebirth, that challenges capitalist political and cultural power while 
promoting economic and social hierarchy."210 This definition is helpful, but many elements of the 
broader Alternative Right are supportive of capitalism but not unified or enthusiastic in their 
support, with some embracing a TINA (There is no alternative) mindset. While some completely 
reject finance capitalism, others wish to double down on capitalism, they all almost universally 
protest the existing liberal-democratic-capitalist system. Lyons’s definition helps as an analytical 
tool for investigating the current far-right. Lyons has stepped away from the Fascist label within 
his most recent work on the American Far-Right after 2013, mainly because the word has become 
a boogieman rather than an effective analytical tool for providing a taxonomy of which members 
of the Alternative Right’s are “true” fascists opposed to fellow travellers. As mentioned earlier, 
the quest for Ur-Fascism has left us with little useful terminology for describing contemporary 
rather than historical fascism. As both Griffin and Lyons suggest, there is no reason to believe that 
Fascism in the 21st century will look or behave like the Fascism of the past. It is not classical 
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fascism; it is something different that has evolved out of a different climate, like a bacterium it has 
developed an immunity to the common antibiotics that held off the infection for decades. 
After decades of the Nazis serving as a cultural shorthand for evil, the term has become 
almost meaningless, resulting in both the terms reductio ad Hitlerum and Godwin’s Law, which 
refers to the frequent practice of calling anything terrible a Nazi or akin to Hitler. The technique 
serves a rhetorical purpose within the arguments of those wishing to dismiss and marginalize the 
Alt-Right, which has proven to be mildly useful. Decrying the events of Charlottesville Virginia 
in August 2017 as the work of (neo)-Nazis served as a useful rallying cry, but it undermined the 
positions of the subsequent debate concerning the role of Confederate statues and the 
normalization of white supremacy within America.211 By positioning the most violent and 
objectional members of the Alternative Right (predominantly Alt-Right and Neo-Nazi members) 
as Nazis, the remaining membership looks far better in the eyes of the public. Understanding the 
Alternative Right as a spectrum between the radical core(s) of the Alt-Right and the “moderate” 
Alt-Lite prevents the segmentation that has repeatedly occurred after acts of terror by members of 
the Alt-Right. Alt-Lite members attached to the mainstream anglosphere media or those with 
significant social media face limited scrutiny after these acts of terror, for example figures 
associated with the Alternative Right can condemn the acts of violence in Christchurch despite 
promoting “great replacement” arguments on Youtube and Twitter.212 
The Aesthetics of the Fascist Chic 
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Contemporaries in the Alt-Right imitate the Fascist project, and it is aesthetic ideal, even 
if the ideal is an impossibility. As there was never a homogeneous past devoid of human migration 
the pure nation-state or self-determination logic used to justify their racial segregation is a 
simulacrum of myth with no origin. To play pretend by using a romantic reading of history to form 
a new state is nothing new, the American and French Revolutions drew upon Rome, the Khmer 
Rouge the Khmer empire and Nazi Germany drew upon the First and Second Reichs. The absurdity 
of the present comes not from relying on a romantic and mythological past, but it is placed in a 
postmodern media culture where everything is understood as remix already. The use of Nazi 
iconography and aesthetics is both a way to present themselves as “cool/edgy” and to terrify those 
traumatized by the horrors of National Socialism. 
The Alt-Right uses the iconography of the Third Reich because it has aesthetic power more 
so than their fixation with the political theory and strategies of the Nazi party. Richard Spencer's 
infamous “Heil Trump” is one of the typical examples of Nazi iconography and symbolism that is 
used within the Alt-Right, but the use of it is mostly symbolic, rather than a proclamation of the 
ideology. The image of fascism and the reality of fascism are two distinct elements of the aesthetics 
of politics. The Nazi label is, for the most part, avoided by members of the Alternative Right with 
mainstream media attention, especially political opportunists who do not want to be no-platformed 
and removed from social media platforms. Lauren Southern, an Alt-Right vlogger, rejects the Nazi 
label, wears shirts declaring "I am not a Nazi!", while advocating for Islamophobia, xenophobia 
and anti-feminist politics, walking the pre-Unite the Right line between dog whistling and outright 
hate speech.213 Lauren Southern is not alone in this mantra of publicly stating that “they are not a 
racist” while supporting the Alternative Right with Paul Gottfried, who coined the term Alt-Right, 
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also distancing himself with the same claim of “not a Nazi.”214 Southern, as with many members 
of the Alternative Right avoids the explicit racist label of the “unacceptable racist statement,” 
instead living within the grey area of publicly acceptable racist views of nativism and 
Islamophobia. Ideologically this serves several essential functions; the first is painfully apparent, 
the potential member does not want to join an organization that is synonymous with the “bad 
guys”, repackaging racism into a more acceptable platform that tiptoes around the most racist 
phrases and positions has been a boon for the movement. Secondly, the Alternative Right can avoid 
a fixation on the failed politics of the Nazi party and open the movement to contemporary political 
praxis and statecraft drawing on post-modernist ideas rather than play by a 80 year old political 
playbook.  
These blurred lines throughout the Alternative Right spectrum over who is a “Nazi” and 
their use of fascist iconography has led to dubious journalistic both-sideisms. Even though white 
nationalism is on the rise and in the White House and deemed one of the most significant terrorist 
threats to American society, mainstream news outlets such as the New York Times still publish 
uncritical works on the movement. This coverage reached a zenith with the publishing of the piece 
"A Voice of Hate in America's Heartland" by Richard Fausset, in which Fausset interviews a white 
nationalist in Ohio and provides a solid take on his hate crimes.215 The Atlantic quickly lampooned 
the absurdity of the article in their response "Nazis are Just Like You and me, Except They're 
Nazis."216 Quoting Fausset on the Alt-Right interviewee Tony Hovater:  
He is the Nazi sympathizer next door, polite and low-key at a time the old 
boundaries of accepted political activity can seem alarmingly in flux. Most 
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Americans would be disgusted and baffled by his casually approving remarks 
about Hitler, disdain for democracy and believe that the races are better off 
separate. However, his tattoos are innocuous pop-culture references: a slice of 
cherry pie adorns one arm, a homage to the TV show “Twin Peaks.” He says he 
prefers to spread the gospel of white nationalism with satire. He is a big 
“Seinfeld” fan. 217 
The article mirrors disbelief that that racist legacy and tradition of the United States would 
reappear with widespread support as if the only way someone could be a Nazi was to be the 
embodiment of pure evil. Hovater does not describe himself as a racist, despite thinking that Jews 
control finance and the media and that he thinks races should be separated and thinks that it would 
have been better if the Nazis had won World War II.218 The cognitive dissonance is astounding as 
if one's personal beliefs had no relation to the reality that they live. While Hannah Arendt's ground-
breaking work on the banality of evil was published half a century ago, it provided a far more 
precise understanding that Eichmann, while a human being with a family, was an accomplice in 
the genocide of millions of people.219 The work was also published long after the Nazi party had 
been eliminated and no longer posed a threat to the world. Eichmann himself was driven across 
the world, hiding under an assumed name as a manual labourer before being caught. One of the 
purposes of her work was to demonstrate how anyone can accomplish mass violence and crimes 
against humanity. In contrast, Fausset's piece provides a megaphone for an active hate group, by 
downplaying the threat of the White Nationalists like Tony Hovater to pluralistic liberal 
democracies. This middle ground position has subsequently become impossible after the publicity 
of the unite the right rally has forced most members of the movement to either leave the movement 
altogether or tolerate the connection to National Socialism. 
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The Tea Party and Libertarian Neoliberalism 
 
While the distinctions between the Alternative Right and Fascism or Donald Trump’s 
administration can be examined through ideological difference, the difference between the 
Alternative Right and the Tea Party is one of demographics. While both movements are right wing, 
the Tea Party was a loyal opposition to the United States government with the backing of 
billionaires wishing for lower taxes and deregulation. These aims are the continuation of the 
neoliberal project for the past thirty years, with the influx of libertarian ideas, in contrast, the 
Alternative Right has defined itself as a very disloyal opposition fearing government conspiracy 
and a complete distaste for electoralism. Even the name of the movement, the Tea-Party, comes 
from a patriotic tradition at the heart of what it means to be American, in contrast, the Alternative 
Right, especially Curtis Yarvin’s NeoReactionary framework, distrusts the revolutionary 
democracy that formed the United States.220 
The definitive work on the demographics of the Tea-Party was done by Theda Skocpol and 
Vanessa Williamson, while at this point almost a decade out of date, provides insights into this 
loyal opposition. The Tea-Party is dominated by wealthy older white evangelical Americans who 
identify with the Republican party and or conservative ideology.221 The Tea-Party, at least 
according to the research of Skocpol and Williamson was about 200,000 people active during 
2011.222 As with other political parties, the core members who actively attended meetings was 
much smaller than that. The tea-party membership had few public sector workers, except the 
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military and police, and was mainly middle class.223  While some libertarian university students 
were present, specifically around colleges, "Adults 25-45 were not much in evidence."224 The Tea-
Party favours more libertarian-leaning Republican candidates, rejecting more moderate 
Republicans, which they view as a part of the establishment.  
In contrast to the research on the Tea-Party, the John Birch Society, the KKK and other 
Far-Right movements in the United States, there is insufficient data to tell how many members are 
part of  the Alt-Right let alone the Alternative Right.  Based on the public rallies like Unite the 
Right, we know that they have a lot of young men, but exact numbers are currently unavailable.225 
We know that the Alt-Right is dominated by internet natives who use pseudonyms to 
communicate, but that does not mean that each account is linked to a flesh and blood person. The 
Dark Enlightenment subreddit home to one branch of NeoReactionaries had 10,000 members on 
January 25th, 2017 and 12,000 members as of November 2nd, 2017 and 16,000 members as of 
May 4th, 2019,226 while the Alt-right subreddit had 13,000 on January 10th, Reddit would ban it on 
the First of February 2017.227 Though the numbers for these right-wing subreddits pales in 
comparison to left-wing subreddits such as r/latecapitalism, which boast several hundred thousand 
members.228 One can be a member of the Alt-Right and not join a subreddit or follow them on 
Twitter, which makes these numbers only somewhat useful at examining the influence and 
popularity of this movement.  
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The Tea-Party, like most right-wing populist movements, did not draw upon the poorest or 
most economically disenfranchised but preferably those who saw an economic loss real or 
predicted. As Saul Alinsky described them, “The have some, want mores,” that make up the 
reactionary right,  in times of crisis identify with the elites more so than the “have nots.”229 They 
understand the  political promise unfulfilled or broken by the social contract is a violation of their 
rights as citizens. They wish to enforce this contract against the corrupt elites who violated it. The 
Tea-Party holds revanchist politics of decline that mirrors the politics of the Alternative Right, but 
this comes from personal experience rather than a promise never fulfilled. They are those who now 
see a decline rather than those who have only lived through a period of decline and precariousness. 
A white middle-class voter in their 50's has likely seen prosperous jobs, and believes that hard 
work pays off within the relative meritocracy of contemporary capitalist, a Millennial or Zoomer 
who has seen little material progress, living through economic depression and austerity does not 
have that luxury.    
Some elements of the Tea-Party could be described as part of a radical right rather than 
hard-line economic conservatives, such as the Oath Keepers or Birchers, but this group has been 
understood as outside of the mainstream of the tea party.230 While able to attract some fringe 
groups, the respectability of the Tea Party came from its predominately less than radical 
conservativism. The Tea Party’s two main bases of support were evangelicals and libertarians who 
were united in support of conservative government and economic policy. The unity over economic 
policy more than anything else is what separates this movement from the Alternative Right which 
define themselves in opposition to the globalization and immigration that walks hand in hand with 
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the free markets and low taxes of Libertarian-Conservatism. The objective was to reduce the size 
of government and taxation, rather than cancel immigration, make American an ethnostate and end 
the American democracy, as the Alternative Right advocates. 
The Tea-Party’s anti-intellectualism comfortably fits into the history of American 
populism, originally imagined as a populist revolt against out of touch and corrupt elites, which is 
akin to the 1890’s Populists or 1930’s followers of Father Coughlin and Huey Long.231 This birth 
out of populism does not apply to the Alternative Right, which despite an anti-academic platform, 
was initially created by intellectual groups sharing fringe ideas within online academic salons, it 
started its life as an elitist project, one based on aristocratic elites and anti-government conspiracy 
theorists rather than mass populism. The Tea-Party was anti-intellectual, rejecting most 
contemporary social science, looking down upon experts and those who were in almost anyway 
connected to the elites. They would read the Bible, Atlas Shrugged, and the constitution, and the 
occasional libertarian text, but the Tea-Party did not create a comprehensive political canon of 
original work which they disseminated to the public, which is what a majority of the early 
Alternative Right groups devoted their time and energy towards. The academic and intellectual 
work was isolated to the dark money think tanks. The Tea-Party was also decidedly anti-science, 
arguing against evolution from the perspective of religion.232 The Alternative Right, for the most 
part, are highly scientific in their outlook on evolution, as its way of justifying the eugenic racial 
policies of White Nationalism. Therefore, science is necessary to the Alternative Right’s ideology 
in a way that is anathema to the Tea-Party’s creationist undertones.  
 
231 Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1983). 
232 Skocpol and Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism, 165. 
87 
 
While the Tea-Party is disproportionately male, according to Skocpol and Williamson's 
research 55-60% are men, this is in line with the demographics for the conservative population in 
the US.233 They argue that they saw a considerable number of female leaders within the Tea-Party 
and that the movement was far from a boys-only club. The Tea-Party is far from a feminist project, 
advocating defunding planned parenthood, typically vocal opposition to same-sex-marriage and 
rarely saw a problem with austerity targeting single mothers, but the group cannot be considered 
an anti-woman hate group. In contrast, the Alt-Right is partially defined by an anti-feminist 
politics, typified by the Proud Boys who are proudly misogynistic.234 The membership 
demographics for the Alt-Right is, as always, trying to quantify, but the leadership is 
overwhelmingly male for the Alt-Right. Female leaders exist within the broader European 
Alternative Right, but they are rare within the Anglosphere. Even the anecdotal evidence from 
photographs of Proud Boy rallies or the August 2017 Unite the Right rally shows almost no women 
in attendance.235 This is in line with understanding the Tea-Party as a right-wing neoliberal and 
libertarian movement, which treats women as an atomistic individuals rather than as the 
submissive property of men, unlike Alt-Right which fixates on the misogynistic oppression of 
women. 
The Tea-Party responded to the first black president with hostility, the racial element of 
the response cannot be dismissed when one hears the responses from the Tea-Party members who 
use racialized language to describe Obama.236 The Tea-Party members held racist views of Latinos 
and African-Americans, though they also viewed whites as less hard working overall when 
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compared to other conservatives,237 which implies that the Tea Party is far less fixated on ideas of 
White Nationalism and supremacy than other Far-Right movements. As the movement was 
fundamentally focused on economic concerns regarding taxation, adding the taboo elements of 
racial supremacy would have been counterproductive even if they were widely held private views. 
The Tea-Party was actively aware of its racial demographic problem, which is why it used token 
African-Americans at rallies to present a more diverse community. This attempt at racial tokenism 
did not extend towards Muslims though, where the movement was known for unapologetic 
Islamophobia.238 All of this is to say that the Tea-Party reflected the consensus of pre-Trump 
Republicans to tiptoe around racial discrimination rather than outright embrace the practices as the 
Alternative Right would subsequently do.  
If the diverging takes on race and gender were not enough to separate the Alt-Right from 
the Tea Party, then the role of young people within the movements should make it crystal clear. 
The Tea-Party members when polled, rejected American youth for being lazy and entitled, fixating 
on the poor work ethic of the unemployed students and the new “social justice” education within 
universities. Despite the empirical data that shows that there were incredibly high rates of youth 
unemployment due to the economic recession and rapidly growing student debt due to increasing 
tuition costs, the Tea-Party’s older membership was focused on how in their day one could get a 
job and pay for university.239 While the curriculum of the university would be a shared target with 
the Alternative Right, the antagonistic attitude of the Alternative Right, and their distaste for baby 
boomer morality and economic perspective are driven by the Alternative Right’s distaste for anti-
millennial rhetoric from the Tea-Party’s older membership. The Alternative Right was initially 
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understood as a youth movement by the mainstream press, and only later after the foundations 
were laid online did the movement embrace an older crowd who share Alternative Right 
conspiracy theories and memes.240 
Any confusion about what the Alternative Right is comes from attempting to place its 
square peg into a round hole of existing movements. The Alternative Right is a new reactionary 
movement that furthers the cause of Far-Right politics based on a combination of racial and gender 
oppression, traditionalism and anti-democratic politics in the 21st century. Laying the blame at any 
single figure’s feet, such as Trump, gives him an undue amount of political agency and undermines 
the decades of social and intellectual pressure from the Far-Right on American politics. Calling 
the Alternative Right a continuation of the Tea-Party or Neoliberalism ignores the movement’s 
initial call to action, which was to overthrow the “Cuckservatives” who defined themselves by 
Neoliberal ideology. Calling them Fascists, at least in the 21st century is a rhetorical tool rather 
than an adequate descriptive analysis, which ignores the decades of literature on Fascism which 
lacks a parsimonious definition of Ur-Fascism.  The Tea-Party which led an “AstroTurfed” 
insurrection on the Republican party establishment was ultimately eroded and subsumed by 
Alternative Right influences. Even equating the Alt-Right with Trump ignores the rise of the 
Alternative Right before the presidential campaign of Donald Trump. Additionally, when Trump 
does leave office, this will not mean the end of the Alternative Right.  
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Chapter 3: A Quick History of the American Alternative Right 
 
Introduction 
 
The first questions that should be asked when examining any new ideology are “where it 
came from?” and subsequently “what is it reacting to?”. The Western non-economic far-right was 
a minor or tertiary concern within left-wing critical scholarship and the anti-extremist law 
enforcement for the first decade and a half of the 21st century.241 The primary object of investigation 
for critical theorists has been the Neoliberalism of the past three decades.242 Critical theory 
literature has focused on the structural state violence rather than the violence of Right-wing 
terrorists and hate groups found within Western 21st century societies. One finds the inverted 
totalitarianism of Sheldon Wolin or the structural violence of Žižek discussing capitalism and 
liberal ideology, not armed street violence and hate crimes.243 The purpose of this chapter is to 
cover how the Alternative Right has emerged as a response to neoliberal globalization, the rise of 
left-wing cultural politics such as identity politics and feminism writ large, and the increase in 
economic-conservatism at the cost of right-wing cultural conservatism.  
This chapter covers a brief history of the Alternative Right until 2017, with a focus on the 
intellectual history of the movement after 2008. The history of the Alternative Right prior to 2017 
has had three semi-porous time periods, a precursor period, an incubation period and the 
contemporary period. While the Alternative Right may draw upon theorists and events before 
1968, this is a shared tradition rather than their own unique development. The ideas pre-war 
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Fascists or the works of Nietzsche and Heidegger are influential to the movement,244 but they are 
not Alternative Right theorists or theories in themselves, and at most appropriated by the 
movement. These thinkers are part of a shared western philosophical tradition rather than explicitly 
theorists for the Alternative Right. The precursor period refers to the period between 1968 and 
2007, during which many authors now infamous within the Alternative Right were publishing but 
lacked broad appeal and a minimal English-language readership. The incubation period (2008-
2014) contains the gestation and publishing of foundational Alternative Right political theory 
within the NeoReactionary, Alt-Right and White Nationalist communities, and the rapid expansion 
of right-wing thought after the 2008 Financial Crisis. The contemporary period started in 2014 
when Gamergate and the attempted NPI conference in Budapest brought the Alt-Right and its allies 
into conflict with liberal and left-wing critics. During this period the Far-Right made a series of 
increasingly successful electoral gains across the EU and the United States, which catapulted the 
movement into mainstream discourse. The analysis of this period ends just before Charlottesville’s 
Unite the Right rally which resulted in a fracturing of the populist protests of the Alternative Right 
that has yet to be sufficiently documented to establish an adequate history. 
The Precursor Period 
 
While the members of the Alternative Right may stress an academic legacy stretching back 
to Burke and the reactionary authors of the 1800s like Oswald Spengler or Thomas Carlyle,245 
these authors, like Nietzsche, Heidegger and Carl Schmitt are not the Alternative Right, nor are 
they writing about the politics of late capitalism.246 While each of these authors is an established 
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precursor to the Alternative Right, they are shared precursors with other non-right-wing groups. 
While Ronald Beiner’s work on Nietzsche and Heidegger demonstrated that these authors are 
influential on the Alternative Right,247 they also influence critical left-wing anti-fascist and anti-
Alternative Right literature.248 They can be understood as the pre-history of the movement, whereas 
the broader culturally focused right-wing emerged in the aftermath of 1968. The Alternative Right 
literature is not only fixated on an intellectual history for justifying its legitimacy, but most if not 
all arguments from the American White Nationalists also stress a cultural, racial and biological 
history stretching back throughout all of Western Civilization and Indo-Europeans development 
for tens of thousands of years.249 
As the Alternative Right is a response in part to conservative thought, it is necessary to 
provide a few remarks to separate the two traditions. Reactionary thought is not necessarily the 
thought of conservatism. Reactionary thinking is aristocratic and patriarchal, while conservative 
thought is typically bourgeois and paternal, yet both stress social hierarchy. While conservativism 
can be found in its infancy as a response to the French Revolution, drawing upon Maistre and 
Burke for intellectual foundations.250 The conservative movement  has stressed a sense of 
progressive conservation of the status quo as the default position. Conservatives tend to argue that 
the French liberal revolution of 1789 went too far while claiming the Jacobin revolution of 1793 
as all the proof in the world that one must avoid the politics of revolution, yet it would be unlikely 
to find a modern-day conservative who would be in praise of the ancien regime. A reactionary 
decries both liberal revolutions as a breakdown in the social hierarchy and the decline of social 
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order. Both the conservative and reactionary are nostalgic for a past that is lost or merely a fictive 
one that never exists.  
People on the left often fail to realize this, but conservatism does speak to and 
for people who have lost something. It may be landed estates or the privileges 
of white skin, the unquestioned authority of a husband or the untrammelled 
rights of a factory owner. The loss may be as material as money or as ethereal 
as a sense of standing. It may be a loss of something that was never legitimately 
owned in the first place; it may, when compared with what the conservative 
retains, be small. Even so, it is a loss, and nothing is ever so cherished as that 
which we no longer possess. It used to be one of the great virtues of the left that 
it alone understood the often zero-sum nature of politics, where the gains of one 
class necessarily entail the losses of another. However, as that sense of conflict 
diminishes on the left, it has fallen to the right to remind voters that there are 
losers in politics and that it is they- and only they- who speak for them. "All 
conservatism begins with loss," Andrew Sullivan rightly notes, which makes 
conservatism not the Party of Order, as Mill and others have claimed, but the 
party of the loser.251 
The politics of reactionaries, in contrast, fights with a revanchist fervour utterly rejecting the 
politics of loss. What makes conservatism, which should be understood akin to Toryism, 
Jeffersonian democracy or Burkean thought, different from reactionary thought, is that for the 
reactionary the ancien regime should have been maintained and that the project of modernity and 
the enlightenment have been failures. Reactionary thinking never champions the bourgeois 
mentality that dominates conservative thought; commerce is not the purpose of existence; 
hierarchy is essential not merely a precondition for an ordered society. Reactionaries are the 
continuation of the anti-enlightenment tradition of Jacobites, absolutists and the aristocrats, 
stubbornly rejecting the liberal values and axioms of a modern world. It is from this position that 
understanding the Alternative Right must take place, from a historical perspective rather than a 
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liberal-economic centric understanding of right-wing politics as one of free markets, low taxes and 
religious faith. 
The American Far-Right 
 
The history of the Alternative Right runs as a response to the political changes by the 
American conservative elite during the 20th and 21st century. During the Cold War, prominent 
conservative and libertarian theorists such as William F. Buckley, Milton Friedman, Fredrich von 
Hayek, Murray Rothbard and Ayn Rand favoured a war of ideas within both American and 
international politics.252 Adopting a liberal framework of education and rational discourse, made 
possible by free speech protection and tax loopholes, privately funded think tanks appeared across 
the American political landscape, such as the Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation. The goal 
of these think tanks was twofold, convince the public that free-market conservative ideology is the 
best possible system of political economy and to increase the wealth of those who invest in these 
think tanks, either through deregulation or tax cuts. Since the 1950s these think tanks have 
published reports, drafted legislation and lectured on economics and politics from a libertarian or 
conservative perspective with substantial success.253 The War of Ideas at least economically has 
been a success. Even the once left-wing parties have embraced these free-market principles with 
the rise of Third-Way parties, such as Clinton’s “Blue Dog” Democrats.254 While conservative 
intellectuals and business owners gained from this free-market ideology, it would sow the seeds 
for the Alternative Right’s emergence.  
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Before the National Review's founding in 1955, there was minimal conservative political 
scholarship in the United States, at least not a unified intellectual platform with respectability. As 
Louis Hartz’s work on America’s liberal tradition demonstrated, the lack of feudalism and the 
dominance of liberal Lockean political theory left little intellectual soil for the American 
conservative to construct an independent political identity.255 This all changed with William F. 
Buckley Jr.’s founding of the National Review. Over the next half-century, Buckley held the 
various groups in check by providing a degree of authority over the disparate groups on the 
American Right, providing the intellectual publications for conservative ideas, and the presentation 
of cultural sophistication.256 In the subsequent sixty years, the American conservative intellectual 
community has established itself within both academic and media circles as a legitimate response 
to American liberalism within the media and in the policy. While in control of the National Review, 
Buckley could limit the publication of any anti-Semitic treatise or radical right conspiracy that one 
could find in the John Birch Society,257 this control limited the ability of more radical right-wing 
groups from gaining a platform within the Republican Party or the broader right-wing coalition. 
Within this limited media environment, the populist elements of the American right were 
efficiently barred from achieving the critical mass necessary to expand beyond their existing base 
of support.  
One consequence of fixating on the war of ideas was the right-wing abandonment of 
populist or popular mass action, both as a discursive technique to rally moderate liberals from the 
more radical left-wing politics, and secondly to move away from the Fascist right’s use of mass 
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demonstrations. The populist and popular mass action was commonplace within American politics 
during the first half of the 20th century. However, starting in the late 1960s, with the introduction 
of the Silent Majority and the Southern Strategy within Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign, the 
focus of political change within American society shifted towards lobbying and campaign 
contributions.258 Voluntary political participation from grassroots activism was replaced by a 
professional class of political actors and media ad campaigns. After the Civil Rights movement 
and LBJ’s Great Society platform, the once overlapping policies of the Democrats and Republicans 
began drifting apart, leading to political polarization. While the economic values of both parties 
would still overwhelmingly favour capitalist free markets, in which a liberal utilitarian framework 
was the language of debate, the cultural values of the political base of both parties shifted.  
The fractures of unity emerged post-Nixon, as faith in the government propelled Ronald 
Reagan in the presidency, and the re-emergence of radical right-wing groups, including the Klan 
and neo-Nazi organizations. Lyons places the emergence of the Alternative Right in the 1970s and 
1980s as some rightists moved away from the US government, and towards more radical right-
wing politics.259 The consequence of this movement away from the US government, removed the 
tradition of the loyal opposition, a prerequisite for representative democratic politics. The loyal 
opposition had allowed peaceful continuity throughout Anglo-American democracies for 
centuries, with only a few exceptions, such as the American Civil War. These right-wing groups 
broke with that tradition, ultimately leading to a combative relationship where presidential 
candidates calling the opposition party treasonous would be normalized, something unthinkable in 
the 1960s and 70s. The loyalty of these right-wing groups was almost put to the test in late 2016 
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before the November elections, as the then Presidential candidate Donald Trump attempted to 
ready his followers to reject the results of the election if he did not win, “Of course there is large 
scale voter fraud happening on and before election day. Why do Republican leaders deny what is 
going on? So naïve!”260 
In the United States, the Far-Right paleoconservative movement came out of the Christian 
evangelical movement and the remnants of the anti-Semitic and anti-civil rights movements, which 
put forward a millennialist agenda which battled with Republican party elites during the 1990s, 
only to be put down by William F. Buckley.261 This group was one of the few genuine threats to 
establishment Republicans from the right in the post-civil-rights era, and one of the only culturally 
predicated factions, in contrast to the economic radicalism that was primarily embraced by the 
party’s insurgency after the financial crisis, the Tea-Party. The other radical group within the 
Republican party that of the libertarian movement inspired by Ayn Rand’s Objectivism and 
Rothbard’s Libertarianism262 failed to find third-party success and efficiently folded itself into the 
Republican party. Though in 2016 the Libertarian party would achieve some success drawing upon 
economic-conservatives who tepidly opposed Trump before his electoral victory, but this is an 
exception to the general non-entity of the Libertarian party in American politics. Rather than 
attempt to win elections from a third-party position, rich libertarians quietly bankrolled candidates 
of their choice, influencing the party through think tanks, campaign donations, super PACs and 
primary challenges. Billionaire libertarians such as David Koch were so well incorporated that by 
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2016 the primaries were being read as an extended job interview for the billionaires funding the 
party.263 
By 2009, the conservative elites had completed their transition from waging a war of ideas 
against the American Left and the left-wing members of the democratic party to directly funding 
political campaigns of right-wing Republicans, even if they publicly denied this.264 The 2010 case 
Citizens United v. FEC, which allowed effectively unlimited political campaign contributions 
made it easier for elite conservative business owners to directly fund the campaigns of those who 
wished to reduce taxes, decrease spending and further deregulation. The Alternative Right, while 
existent, only significantly emerged when the GOP political supporters began to acknowledge the 
failures and injustice that arose out of the policies of these conservative and libertarian elites within 
the party establishment. The first Alternative Right groups to call themselves the Alt-Right started 
forming in 2007 and 2008. They argued against the mainstream conservative failures during the 
cultural War of Ideas (which they had lost on university campuses and in the mainstream liberal 
media), the influx of immigration due to globalization and free trade agreements, the dawning 
precarious economic reality that emerged during the financial crisis leaving a generation of young 
white men underemployed, and the undeniable corruption and influence economic elites had over 
the democratic system in the United States. Each of these can be directly linked to the failures of 
mainstream conservative politicians and the super-rich figures who have funded their movement, 
which is why Republican mainstream candidates such as Jeb Bush or Mitt Romney failed to illicit 
significant popular support during 2012 or 2016.  
Neoliberal Hegemony and its discontents 
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The Far-Right reappeared after a 30-year disappearance from electoral democracies in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.265 In the aftermath of the Second World War, the far-right was marginal 
in Western democracies, the far-right MSI (Italian Social Movement) in Italy, for example, 
managed little more than 4-5% of the popular vote in Italy during the initial post-war period.266 
The removal of the fascist movements from Europe by allied powers through the de-Nazification 
of Germany and internal cleansing by Franco in Spain and Salazar in Portugal left the groups 
politically and financially unable to reappear after the war. The exception to this was the rise of 
Right-Wing terrorist groups, such as those supported by the CIA during Operation Gladio in Italy 
during the post-war period.267 While this strategy of tension and the appearance of what the Francis 
Yockey biographer Kevin Coogan describes as the post-war Fascist international, it was 
significantly weaker than the Far-Right during the 1930’s and limited to terrorist attacks rather 
than electoral victories.268 
In the United States, political motivated Far-Right groups would achieve minimal success 
electorally after 1968, with only the occasional victory of David Duke or an insurgent primary 
challenge keeping the movement in the collective imagination.269 Those members of the far-right 
who had political success were cloaked in conservatism or the new libertarian philosophies of the 
1950s and 60s rather than Fascism or traditionalism. The Barry Goldwater campaign and the 
segregationists in the American South were not Fascists or members of what Matthew Lyons 
 
265 Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, 509. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Coogan, Dreamer of the Day: Francis Parker Yockey and the Postwar Fasist International, 332. 
268 Ibid., 333. 
269 Zeskind, Blood and Politics: The History of the White Nationalist Movement from the Margins to the 
Mainstream, 261. 
100 
 
would describe as the Far-Right, merely right-wing populists that comfortably fit within the 
existing political narrative of American populism and the Republican party. 
 In the 1980s the Eurosceptic movement began to reincorporate many of the tenants of 
Fascist and Traditionalist thought, such as nationalist identity, favouring autarkic development 
opposed to free trade and an electoral focus on the emotional betrayal of the perceived 
marginalization of working-class nationals by foreign and immigrant labour. In Europe, the rise of 
economic free-trade fixated right-wing politics would face more significant opposition from the 
right. The rise of the neoliberal consensus since the 1980s promoted globalization, free-trade and 
the prominence of international finance, but this also leads to a more bureaucratic state which 
based choices on utilitarian calculus rather than a political debate. This calculus which dominated 
American politics was challenged within Europe. The right-wing Euroskeptics argued for the 
preservation of domestic culture against globalization, an increased focus on the working class and 
middle-class ethnic majorities, a group, increasingly ignored by left-wing movements, rather than 
focus on the utilitarian and financial calculus of neoliberalism. An integrationist pan-European 
multicultural identity remained a limited movement with success primarily found within the 
aspirational classes and the trans-national capitalist classes. The Eurosceptic movement stressed 
some of the same talking points of earlier Fascist movements, that of revanchism and a politics of 
decline from glory.  
On the other side of the Atlantic, the new post-ideology world of Francis Fukuyama's End 
of History and the Last Man did not sit well with many of the culturally right-wing thinkers.270 A 
world of economics without politics was uninspired and depressing, not an end state. Critiques of 
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contemporary conservatives as profit-seeking opportunists is nothing new, even Irving Kristol and 
William F. Buckley were calling the modern conservative movement uninspired. As Irving Kristol 
responds in an interview with Corey Robin in 2000:  
The Republican Party is tying itself into knots. Over what? Prescriptions for 
elderly people? Who gives a damn? I think it's disgusting that... presidential 
politics of the most important country in the world should revolve around 
prescriptions for elderly people. Future historians will find this very hard to 
believe. It's not Athens. It's not Rome. It's not anything.271 
 Kristol is not alone in this sentiment, the American Far-Right shared this disgust with the 
depoliticization of American politics into utilitarian calculus. While critical theorists on the left 
have maligned the emergence of the TINA mindset,272 the cultural-right shared a similar nihilistic 
apathy where they could also see no end to neoliberal capitalism. The perception of American 
stagnation would be replaced with decline following 9/11 only a year later. 
American Decline 
 
The rise of social media and internet comment sections broke the economic and 
mainstream-conservative stranglehold of Right-wing American thought in the early 2000s. The 
various right-wing conspiracy groups, talk radio shows and internet publications found a fertile 
soil that took some time for the public at large to notice. The aforementioned nihilism and apathy 
were turned into a search for meaning where there was none to be found, resulting in a wave of 
conspiratorial thinking. The Alt-Right started as one of those publications in 2007, Richard 
Spencer's Alternative Right was a movement that began as Buckley died and positioned itself as 
the antithesis of the mainstream conservative right.273 Websites such as Alex Jones’s Info Wars 
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captured this new space by providing populist right-wing conspiracy news, something that would 
have been unthinkable on network news and marginal on a specialty cable channel. After nearly 
every terrorist or mass shooting incident Alex Jones would call it a false flag, suggesting that the 
government faked the Sandy Hook attack on elementary school students to justify gun control 
legislation.274 The fact that no substantial gun control legislation was ever passed has been largely 
ignored by Alex Jones and his supporters. The Far-Right conspiracies of government control and 
oppression would only be further exacerbated by Obama’s election.  
By the middle of the Trump administration, the fixation on conspiracy theories would 
become the dominant framework for conceptualizing news for millions of Americans. Both the 
radical right’s Qanon conspiracy, which suggests that there is a secret conspiracy by the deep state 
against Trump involving child prostitution and secret coded messages on 4chan, and the centre-
left’s fixation on an elaborate conspiracy where Russia secretly controls Donald Trump, known as 
Russiagate, proved to be some of the dominant stories for American cable news programs.275 Even 
if these conspiracies are taken as trivialities and novelties, they hold sway over the media landscape 
in contemporary America, which allows for increasingly radical and absurd ideas to gain 
credibility and support. 
While a small digital community obsessed with conspiracy theories was initially imagined 
as X-files cosplayers, it has subsequently bled into the real world resulting in acts of violence. In 
2009 the right-wing conspiracy theorist Richard Poplawski murdered several cops for trying to 
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evict him from his home.276 These murders, while not as widely covered as later mass shootings, 
would set the precedent that even minor altercations between right-wing extremists and law 
enforcement could result in police casualties, resulting in an unofficial policy of non-enforcement 
of White Nationalist and anti-state violence.277 The standoff between the Federal government and 
Cliven Bundy in 2014 presented proof that the US government would not violently threaten the 
Far-Right on American soil. Between 2016 and 2019 there have been no subsequent significant 
acts of mass violence by US police against Alt-Right or Far-Right demonstrations. So long as they 
possessed enough weapons and media attention/support that it would damage the credibility of the 
US state the more legitimate mainstream right-wing institutions and organizations have done little 
to stop them.278 In contrast, left-wing demonstrations face significant threats of physical violence 
or legal punishments from law enforcement organizations such as the Department of Homeland 
Security.279    
Despite the rise of White Nationalist terrorists after the election of Barrack Obama, there 
was little coverage or public belief that they posed a serious threat during the first term of the 
Obama presidency.280 Even in the case of Poplawski, his Far-Right and white supremacist views 
were dismissed and ignored in the immediate aftermath of the incident, only publicly becoming 
known several weeks later.281 Later when a right-wing extremist shot Gabrielle Giffords, a 
democratic congressperson and six others, it was the history of paranoid schizophrenia rather than 
the ideological motivations of the attack which were publicly acknowledged and condemned. 
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Dylann Roof’s murder of several African-American churchgoers in 2015 was initially dismissed 
as merely an act of mass violence rather than a hate crime until the press was presented with 
overwhelming evidence that he was a White Nationalist.282 
As the early rhetoric of the Patriot movement demonstrates, the Far-Right of the early 
Obama years was less open with their racism.283 They adopted a system of "colour-blindness" 
toward racism, rather than strict racist White Nationalism. Despite this “colour-blind” policy the 
Patriot movement and constitutional originalists often use the term "14th amendment citizens" to 
describe black Americans as second class citizens added to the country contrary to the founding 
father's wishes.284 In practice, Patriot groups rarely kick white-nationalists out of the proverbial 
bed; though the movement grew extensively during Obama's presidency due to the racial 
resentmetn towards the first African-American president. Before the election of Trump and the 
subsequent Unite the Right rally a year later, colour-blind racism would be a common defence for 
Right-Wing groups, denying systemic racism while opposing explicit racism. In 2014 the limit for 
mainstream conservative support for Far-Right groups was explicit racist remarks, where they only 
denounced Cliven Bundy after he publicly maked racist anti-black comments.285 If the same event 
were to occur after 2017, it is unlikely racial comments or claims of sexual assault would lead to 
denouncements by conservative elites. 
The Incubatory Period 
 
 The massive social shift during 2008 and 2009 created the Alt-Right, the economic and 
political norms became untethered from the normality of the post-cold war period. While 9/11 
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shook the security of the American population, the cultural hegemony of mainstream American 
culture was not under significant threat. The Beijing Olympics in August of 2008 brought China 
to the forefront of the world stage, challenging American economic and political power in a way 
that had not been felt since the Cold War, a fear of the influence of Russia (which would worsen 
throughout the Crimean war, the Syrian Civil War and the 2016 election tampering). The financial 
crisis that occurred a month later liquidated and destroyed trillions of dollars of wealth and 
destabilized many communities. The subsequent debt crisis almost destroyed the stability of the 
EU and opened the door to Right-Wing euro-skeptics. This ongoing crisis within the EU would be 
further exacerbated by the following migrant crisis and the long-term demographic crisis facing 
many European states. The election of the first black president two months into the Financial crisis 
motivated the Far-Right into action. All the while 2008 was the first American election that was 
influenced by Twitter, Facebook and other forms of social media setting the precedence for all 
subsequent campaigns. The result was a perfect storm that shifted American politics. 
 The financial crisis and the election of Barrack Obama are the moment of conception for 
the Alt-Right. Before the Fall of 2008, militias and white nationalism were on the decline, even 
Taki magazine, a Far-Right magazine connected to the Alternative Right, published an article on 
the rise and decline of the Alternative Right in the face of mainstream conservatism.286 The 
marginal influence of militias changed with the election of Obama, which was followed by a 
drastic increase in hate crimes and pro-gun and nationalist movements. In 2007 there were 131 
militia groups (armed right-wing nationalist groups) within the United States, which was down 
from its all-time peak of 868 in 1996, after Obama’s election the number increased to 512 in 2009 
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and 1360 by 2011.287 The Alternative Right and the various Far-Right hate groups have 
subsequently multiplied even more and have spread across the Anglosphere into Canada and New 
Zealand.288  
The Tea-Party and the Overton Window 
 
The libertarian movement in the United States launched a grassroots campaign by Ron Paul 
during the 2008 Republican primaries which captured the attention and pocketbooks of a populist 
insurgency of Far-Right, racist and libertarian Republicans, but Ron Paul’s campaign was a fringe 
candidacy with no real chance of winning the primary.289 It was not until 2009 that a libertarian 
movement would gain the public spotlight. The Tea-Party movement started in earnest on February 
19th, 2009 after Rick Santelli, a Chicago trader called for an anti-tax protest.290 Despite the initial 
appearance of the Tea-Party as a grassroots campaign, it was always an Astroturf movement 
(grassroots in appearance but privately funded by wealthy backers who are not actively involved 
in the day to day of the movement). Jane Meyer’s work on the Koch Brothers highlights in detail 
how billions of dollars of political lobbying were hidden from the public through intermediaries 
to maintain the façade of grassroots activism.291 In addition to the millions of dollars in funding, 
an addition of somewhere between several hundred million to over a billion dollars of in-kind 
advertising would be provided for the Tea Party through cable news broadcasts advocating for the 
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Tea-Party.292 This habit would, in turn, help Trump campaign with effectively free advertising on 
major news outlets. 
Despite the initial presentation of the Tea Party as a non-partisan movement by Fox News, 
the Tea-Party was fueled by Far-Right groups.293 The rise of the Tea-Party brought in conspiracy 
groups which had been widely marginalized, such as the Birchers. The Tea-Party’s growth was 
also correlated with the rise in right-wing militias.294 The mainstream Republican party rejected 
advances to include the Tea-Party in 2009,295 as it was initially deemed too radical. The inclusion 
and attempted infiltration of the Neo-Nazi group, Stormfront, did little to provide the movement 
with mainstream acceptability.296 This populist groundswell and insertion of the Far-Right made 
the mainstream Republican party apprehensive of the tea party, resulting in the rejection of the 
movement during 2009. The Tea-Party was viewed as a threat to mainstream 
neoliberal/neoconservative Republicans, but functioned within the party, not against the party.297 
This status quo position contrasts starkly with how Trump and his Alternative Right supporters 
rejected mainstream Republicans. 
As with groups such as the Tea-Party, the Alternative Right focused on the feeling of 
alienation from both mainstream politics and culture, which complemented the existing fears of 
economic alienation from the globalized economy that had been present since the advent of 
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Association). The movement funnelled this resentment and 
anger towards wedge issues which would further garner support from moderates who would be 
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apprehensive of the Alternative Right’s Neo-Nazis and White Nationalists. The White Nationalist 
support during the Obama administration was rising, between 2012 and 2017 the number of white 
nationalists on Twitter increased by 600%.298  Drawing upon the perceived sense of injustice that 
affirmative action policies and emancipatory political movements of feminism or Black Lives 
Matter (BLM), the Far-Right, with support from Fox news, Info Wars, and later Breitbart targeted 
identity politics as its primary political concern. The use of these racial and anti-minority wedge 
issues goes beyond the politics of typical right-wing political campaigns by fully embracing 
populist politics. According to Ruth Wodak, contemporary right-wing populism is defined by its 
use of political minorities as a scapegoat for the current problems of the state, which manifests into 
a politics of fear and secondly appeals to anti-intellectualism and a return to pre-modernist 
thinking.299  
 The Tea-Party presented every challenge to the status quo as a source of radical politics, 
increasing taxes to reduce the debt was socialism; Obamacare was national socialism.300 Members 
of the Far-Right pushed for an opening of the Overton window to normalize white nationalism and 
anti-democratic politics. Early tea party slogans were filled with ad hitlerum attacks on Obama in 
which everyone was labelled an authoritarian or a fascist, which helped stifle later critiques of 
Trump’s authoritarianism, resulting in a situation of “a boy who cried wolf.”  The Tea-Party was 
happy to close the Overton window once it included the Tea-Party agenda of a geriatric libertarian 
right-wing platform. The last thing that the Tea-Party base wanted was a real revolution either 
from the Left or Right. The economic demands of the Tea-Party were ideological lines in the sand; 
in contrast, the eventual Alternative Right policies were not fixated on free markets as an end in 
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themselves. Instead, they understood that economic policies would allow for cultural victories on 
a civilizational level rather than an economic one.  
The Internet: 4Chan and Reddit 
 
One of the most frequent questions asked in the literature on the Alternative Right is “how 
a group of suburban white men became radicalized?” For the outside observer we can see how a 
white man born into a community known for its racist legacy could become a white nationalist or 
a Klansmen, but how does a teenager in the suburbs become a radicalized member of a Far-Right 
hate group? The dominant answer within the literature is that it occurred in online communities 
such as 4Chan or various subreddits301. One significant technological distinction of the Alternative 
Right movement that separates it from both the Paleoconservatives and earlier white supremacist 
groups is the reliance on digital technology and social media. Whereas the earlier Far-Right 
movements were dominated by traditionalist and conservative values, which relied on 
geographically situated communities, the Alternative Right built on the deterritorialization of the 
internet to emerge, both in the United States and across Europe. 
Early internet culture relied on enthusiast forums which centred around an existing interest 
outside of the internet. These groups typically coalesced around gaming, anime or TV shows such 
as the X-Files. Enthusiast forums were almost unanimously driven by anonymous avatars opposed 
to the social media profiles which use the users’ real name and face as is generally found on social 
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media sites such as Facebook.302 The most infamous of these communities was 4Chan, the seedy 
Mos Eisley cantina of the internet; one could see anything if one knew where and how to look. 
4Chan included but was not limited to pedophiles, gamers, anime fans, neo-nazis, men's rights 
advocates, pornography enthusiasts to anything popular but not socially accepted.303 While other 
forums had strict moderator enforcement to maintain decorum, such as vulgar language or racism, 
but as one poster on 4chan said: "On 4chan you can be banned for being off-topic, but not for 
making racist posts."304 Moot, the founder of 4chan waged a losing war against racist posts, 
particularly those found on /n/ or /new/ (the news boards), which would fill up with racist posts 
and "red-pill" content.305 Over time the racist comments transitioned from the language of 4chan 
into "plain-text" right-wing racist rants. Despite initial attempts to contain right-wing and racist 
thought, the culture on 4chan moved further and further to the right. 
Although 4chan was known initially for Anonymous, a decentralized anarchist group 
known for opposing authoritarian groups and addressing injustice as a vigilante group,306 it began 
to take on a more reactionary and self-described “anti-SJW” politics. Movements such as 
Anonymous captured the anxiety and desire to change society for thousands of teenagers rebelling 
against the hypocrisy and injustice within modern society. David Kushner’s expose on one 
Anonymous member, Deric Lostutter, who was responsible for revealing documents on the cover-
up of the Steubenville rapists in 2012, paints the picture of Anonymous as a group of morally grey 
internet Robin Hoods. These morally grey Robin Hoods would be replaced by more radical anti- 
“SJW”/feminist hacktivists that formed the Alt-Right. The idea that any group within the 
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contemporary Alt-Right or broader Alternative Right would target a group of rich white men for 
sexually assaulting women is almost absurd, which demonstrates just how quickly these internet 
communities radicalized during the 2010s. 
While 4Chan is the most infamous community due to its highly radicalized Far-right 
community, Reddit became a site for the Alt-Right merely for its size. Reddit is composed of 
thousands of different subreddits, which are mini-forums for various interests such as TV, Star 
Wars, cute animal photos, world news and anything else under the sun. Unlike 4Chan, reddit is 
akin to Twitter where different political, cultural and national groups share the website, which is 
why practically every political belief has its subreddit. While some of the most significant 
communities have hundreds of thousands to millions of members, most communities are tiny, 
focusing in on a very particular interest or meme. Therefore a subreddit with over 3000 members 
would place it in the top 2% of all subreddits (as of 2015), this left plenty of room for small niche 
to hate groups to exist without becoming censored.  
Unlike Facebook and to some extent Twitter, Reddit accounts are typically anonymous, 
which means that views that are unacceptable to share on Facebook because one’s work colleagues 
or family members could see, are easily expressed on reddit. The hate communities on Reddit did 
not take off until the middle of the Obama administration, for example, the anti-black "GreatApes" 
subreddit appeared in November 2013, with the purpose of the subreddit to collect stereotypical 
racist news stories about African-American violence and crime.307 Within a year this subreddit had 
expanded across forty-six new subreddits known as the Chimpire, each of which covered a 
different element of racist news. Despite the proliferation of violent videos and images that can 
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only be understood as hate speech, a user is not allowed to advocate for violence on Reddit, or 
their account or subreddit will be banned, which is how some of these subreddits were eventually 
banned. Unlike ISIS or other Jihadist groups online, white supremacist content typically overlaps 
with elected Republican officials, which is why Twitter refuses to ban their content 
automatically.308 For white supremacist content to be banned from twitter, it must be manually 
targeted and labelled as hate speech that violates the user’s agreement with the website. 
 Some attempts have been made to create Far-Right communities outside of Reddit and 
Twitter, but they have been a mixed success at best (Voat is one example, a mostly defunct Reddit 
clone founded in an attempt to migrate away from Reddit in 2014 after Reddit began to police the 
harassment on many of their subreddits, including /r/FatPeopleHate).309 After the influence of 
Reddit and the Alt-Right subreddits were made apparent to the broader public, the moderators have 
taken limited actions and banned some of the more violent subreddits. By early 2017 most of the 
significant hate groups and Alt-Right subreddits were banned from the platform. As with almost 
all Alternative Right content online, the difference between the radical cores of the Alt-Right and 
the more moderate online posts across the more “moderate” spectrum of the Alternative Right is 
that the Alt-Lite views which intersect with Republican party policies are given a pass.310  
The Appearance of Alternative Right political Theory 
 
 
308 Joseph Cox and Jason Koebler, “Why Won’t Twitter Treat White Supremacy like ISIS? Because It Would Mean 
Banning Some Republicans Too.,” Motherboard (New York, April 2019). 
309 Matt Reynolds, “The Wheels Are Falling off the Alt-Right’s Version of the Internet,” Wired (London, July 
2018); Adi Robertson, “Welcome to Voat: Reddit Killer, Troll Haven, and the Strange Face of Internet Free 
Speech,” The Verge, July 2015. 
310 Cox and Koebler, “Why Won’t Twitter Treat White Supremacy like ISIS? Because It Would Mean Banning 
Some Republicans Too.” 
113 
 
The other significant development during this period was the creation of an Alternative 
Right canon. Between 2007 and 2013 the NeoReactionary movement emerged online, primarily 
on libertarian blogs and forums suggesting that the compatibility between democracy and freedom 
was reaching a breaking point. The theorists of the so-called Dark Enlightenment utilized the 
technological developments in academic research that Google and internet databases made 
possible for the first time in human history, the mass proliferation of academic and historical texts 
over the internet and the rapid dissemination of radical texts without intellectual gatekeeping.311 
Before the advent of Google Books or Google scholar, it would be incredibly time consuming and 
expensive to access books at university archives or from fringe publishing houses as historians of 
the American Far-Right have repeatedly demonstrated the publication of Far-Right texts required 
extensive mailing lists and on the ground organization.312 For a 16 year old in the 1980’s living in 
a small town they would have to actively search for someone within the Far-Right to explain to 
them who a figure like Julius Evola was, then manage to find one of the few English translations 
of Evola either by going to a research university library or finding a Far-Right book vendor. By 
2012 a 16-year-old would be presented with a detailed reading list highlighting which texts make 
up the NeoReactionary canon, what Alternative Right thinkers and Youtube channels they could 
follow every week and find several active communities to join all within 5 minutes of Googling 
“anti-white racism.” 
The development radically changed the accessibility of Far-Right political thought. While 
an academic text from a reputable publisher will provide citations and an extensive bibliography 
of suggested readings, it pales in comparison to the convenience of the early Alternative Right 
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blogs during the incubatory period. When reading Curtis Yarvin’s blog, one will find public access 
to every source, term and suggested reading through a hyperlink.313 His work is still filled with 
factual errors and logical fallacies, but for the non-academic reader, his work could be shared easily 
online.  
Compounding the growth of these blogs and Far-Right accessibility was the proliferation 
of English language translations of Alternative Right texts from Europe. With Arktos, Counter 
Current publishing and Washington Summit Publishing all releasing new and translated copies of 
right-wing texts online and in eBook editions these radical ideas became infinitely more accessible. 
Rather than place a mail order for an obscure text, a right-wing organizer could order one on his 
e-Reader and have it ready to go in seconds. As the Alternative Right grew in infamy during the 
contemporary period, these texts would provide a legitimating authenticity and legacy to latch on 
to that internet bloggers and twitter avatars never could. 
The Contemporary Period 
 
 Just as the Alternative Right’s Incubatory period began in August of 2008, the Alt-Right 
as a defined movement started in the fall of 2014, with the broader Alternative Right existing since 
the ’90s within the Anglosphere. In 2014 the Islamic State was on the rise, global fears over Ebola 
were sensationalized and gaining wall to wall coverage, and the Republicans were walking into 
another electoral victory in the midterms.314 Despite these events gaining massive popularity, it 
would be the 2014 National Policy Institute conference in Budapest and a violent debate within 
the video game community, known as Gamergate that would herald in the age of the Alt-Right. 
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Budapest 2014 
 
The National Policy Institute (NPI) in its current iteration is Richard Spencer’s think tank 
organization for providing legitimacy for the Alt-Right, providing an intellectual face for White 
Nationalism. In October 2014, NPI attempted to gather American and European members of the 
Far-Right in Budapest. The combination of this attempted conference and the concurrent 
Gamergate incident marks the start of the contemporary Alt-Right. The meeting was intended to 
gather the nascent Alt-Right and Right-wing populists within an academic environment. While the 
event was a complete failure, after the venue hosting the conference cancelled, the Hungarian 
prime minister used every legal means to prevent the gathering.315 Jobbik the Far-Right Hungarian 
nationalist party cut connections with the conference, and Richard Spencer was barred from the 
Schengen states within the EU for three years after being arrested by Hungarian police on October 
3rd.316  
The line up for the conference was a who is who of the intellectual influences of the Alt-
Right. The speakers for the conference included: Alexander Dugin (The Eurasian Fascist who 
founded the National Bolshevik party and has close connections with the Kremlin as a chief 
ideologist), John Morgan (The editor-in-chief of Arktos media, the primary publisher and 
translating company for European New Right and Fascists texts including the works of Julius 
Evola, Alexander Dugin and Guillaume Faye, Arktos was also a co-sponsor of the conference), 
and Jared Taylor (The founder of American Renaissance, an academic journal for White 
Nationalist articles), in addition to other prominent members of the European and American Far-
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Right. 317 In contrast, later attempts to unite the right on both sides of the Atlantic would be met 
with significantly more (though still limited) success when organized by the more Alt-Lite figure 
of Steve Bannon.318 
 After the failed conference the Alt-Right began rapidly expanding its reach and popularity 
online. Although not directly caused by the failed NPI event, the transition from the intellectualism 
to the populism of the Alternative Right, especially in the Anglosphere occurred after 2014. As 
members of the NeoReactionary movement known as the Dark Enlightenment noticed, the 
intellectualism and salon atmosphere of the Alt-Right transitioned into populist meme-based 
discussions throughout 2014.319 The atmosphere of the Far-Right focused less on intellectual 
arguments that dominated the 2007-2014 period for the Alt-Right’s online communities and 
instead became almost uncontrollable hate sites. The primary theoretical contributes to the 
Alternative Right reached their peak, with few significant canonical texts appearing after 2014 
such as Leviathan and its Enemies by the then deceased Samuel Francis.320 While the rise of 
militias and the Far-Right during the incubatory period was rapid, the reporting on their growth 
and political presence was marginal in comparison to the post-2014 coverage, yet other than some 
selective coverage on Gamergate, mostly as a novelty, these online-centric hate groups faced little 
opposition. Before 2017 few of the Alternative Right and Alt-Right subreddits, youtube channels 
and Twitter accounts faced significant deplatforming. The electoral success of the European Far-
Right, the emergence of Trump within the Republican Primaries, the popularity of Right-Wing 
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online communities and the outright racism against the Black Lives Matter movement all exploded 
in popularity around the fall of 2014.  
Gamergate 
 
One of the most infamous events in the formation of the Alt-Right was the “debate” within 
the video game community during 2014 and 2015 known as Gamergate. Gamergate started as a 
response to the positive feedback that female indie game developer Zoe Quinn received for her 
game Depression Quest. After the initial feedback, her ex-boyfriend launched a near 10,000-word 
response to her work and their relationship, alleging that the positive feedback for her game was 
due to a sexual relationship between her and Nathan Grayson, a journalist at Kotaku.321 This post 
led to a witch hunt against women in the video game industry, feminist critics and those opposed 
to “ethics in games journalism." While the video game industry was notorious for low ethical 
standards when it came to reviews, with widespread and almost continuous allegations of 
financially incentivizing positive reviews, this was overwhelmingly due to the oligopoly of 
publishers colluding with the oligopoly of major video game-centric news and review outlets. 
Reviews for indie games made by individuals or small teams had never seen widespread corruption 
because the financial incentive was rarely significant enough to justify bribery, considering the 
scale of an indie game’s budget of a couple hundred thousand dollars at the most compared with a 
AAA game studio producing games that cost tens of millions of dollars. The corruption in the 
games industry was due to monopolistic and oligopolistic practices within the highly capitalist 
video game industry, not sexual favours between indie game producers and reviewers.  
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Much of the video game community had built up a persecution complex over the previous 
two decades before Gamergate, as video games had only very recently received first amendment 
protection as a recognized art within the United States. American activist Jack Thompson had 
previously led a campaign against violence and sex in video games between 1993 and 2008, and 
film critic Roger Ebert had famously declared that video games could never be an art form for the 
last eight years of his life. Most reviews of games leading up to Gamergate had more in common 
with consumer reports than with artistic critiques. One of the prime targets during the height of 
#Gamergate was Anita Sarkeesian, known for her YouTube channel on misogynistic tropes within 
video games,322 which were met with intense backlash.  The audience mistook critique for an 
attempt to ban misogyny within video games. Any criticism of a video game which included even 
the smallest feminist critique was then interpreted as oppressive thought police trying to keep the 
gamer community down.  
The response by the #Gamergate community was clear and overwhelming. In 2014 Quinn, 
Sarkessian and other women or feminists within the video game industry received death threats, 
graphic abuse including depictions of rape, and various acts of cyber terrorism including doxing 
or hacking and leaking their private files.323 After these initial attacks, members of the Alt-Right 
such as Milo Yiannopoulos joined the bandwagon, arguing that:  
I might be a homo, but I still believe the strong should protect the weak and 
gamers have very little social capital and a large, well-funded and tightly co-
ordinated industry of left-wing liars talking shit about them constantly.324 
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 Another member of the bandwagon was Mike Cernovich, who was the Lawyer who 
defended those targeting Zoe Quinn and the other women targeted during Gamergate;325 he has 
since become a vocal Alt-Right figure who puts forward male tribalism and anti-feminist politics. 
The tactics and strategies used within Gamergate would set the stage for further politics by the 
Alternative Right, by taking “ethics in games journalism” and extending it into a more significant 
metaphysical battle for their existence against a threat. 
Milo Yiannopoulos presented Gamergate as a part of a more significant culture war, 
positioning the so-called "hardcore" gamers as apart of an oppressed minority which is unable to 
express their opinions and are being censored by liberal media.326 What is shocking about 
Yiannopolous's article "The Authoritarian Left Was on Course to win the Culture Wars Then 
Along Came #Gamergate" is not that he takes the side of the hyper-masculine community, but how 
he targets the opposition to Gamergate and describes them as neo-Nazis, rapists, liars discredited 
by the press and scammers.327 In hindsight, the group Yiannopoulos describes matches those he 
campaigned with during 2016, despite the irony, what makes this observation relevant is that it 
demonstrates how Yiannopoulos along with other members of the broader Alt-Lite transitioned 
into more radical right-wing positions between #Gamergate and the Trump presidency. They 
shifted from the “moderate” edge of the Alternative Right spectrum and moved closer to the radical 
cores.  Even though Yiannopoulos openly criticized video gamers before 2014, the Gamergate 
 
325 Malone, “Zoe and the Trolls.” 
326 Yiannopoulos, “The Authoritarian Left Was on Course to Win the Culture Wars... Then along Came 
#Gamergate.” 
327 Ibid. 
120 
 
movement proved to be too valuable a movement to ignore, which is why in September 2014 he, 
and Breitbart, entered into the political consciousness of gamers.328 
Another aspect of the video game community that bled into the Alt-Right during 
Gamergate was the understanding of an ideological core with a nearly encyclopedic knowledge of 
the culture/movement and an opportunistic fringe. Within the video game community behind 
Gamergate, the concept of gamer meant someone who participated in the video game culture, 
played violent games such as shooters, grand strategy games or difficult console or PC games. To 
be a gamer one needed to be a member of the same internet communities, play the same games, 
watch the same movies and perform the "gamer" lifestyle. Demographically the proportion of 
people who play video games which could be called a gamer has decreased, with the rise of mobile 
games which can be played on iPhones (such as Pokemon Go or Candy Crush). With the expansion 
of arthouse style indie games and a more inclusive selection of games, the barriers to entry have 
dropped which has allowed more people to play video games. As with the Alt-Right vs Alt-Lite 
and the NeoReactionary-Alt-Right debates or the concept of white-nationalism, this is one of 
purity and intensity.329 What was once an "elite" group with a cultural tradition has been "watered 
down" by a broader community who lack that tradition, at least in the eyes of the “core” 
exclusionist community. The private boys club could no longer be maintained, and those ruining 
the status quo must be removed. This boys only club is further fueled by a persecution complex 
found within the gaming community which helps justify the logic of the majority being oppressed 
by the minority, despite little empirical evidence to suggest this. 
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Gamergate allowed for the spectrum of Alternative Right views to gain widespread 
acknowledgement, something that Steve Bannon became keenly aware of.330 The Alternative Right 
was united in their opposition to feminism and progressive politics in games, this by itself was an 
easy sell to the public. A video game that is focused on addressing the affective experience of a 
depressed person searching for a way out of alienation is not a fun game to play, but it is an artistic 
game. By isolating the threats to the artists rather than the broader community, and by dog 
whistling that these artists deserved the threats, figures like Yiannopoulos could normalize the 
radical right-wing positions while drawing upon radical actions.331 Just as with Cliven Bundy, the 
Far-Right took the public stage and argued that the core philosophy is right, but the specifics 
argued by the ideological cores were at times too far. This motivated the radicals within the 
Alternative Right with implicit support but kept the media personalities safe from direct quotation 
as their literal statements were okay to share on social media or mainstream cable news channels. 
As the Alternative Right has discovered, it is only when some makes absolutely undefendable 
comments that they will face serious public shame, but the scrutiny will be minor when it is an 
implicit dog whistle arguing the same core idea. 
The Republican Primaries 
 
What had started as a coup against the party leadership and moderately conservative 
Republicans by the Tea-Party movement in 2010 and 2012, had reached its apex in the 2016 
Republican Primaries, as the saying goes, “First as tragedy, then as farce.” The uneasy coalition 
between the grassroots Tea Party communities and the Astroturfed ones broke by late 2015. The 
somewhat concealed Koch Brothers’ Kochtopus (their collection of Super PACS) became apparent 
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to those following the primaries with all the major candidates campaigning for their war chest,332 
with two exceptions Kasich and Trump, both defining themselves in opposition to their backing. 
The Republican brand had been eroding since the Bush administration, declining approval for the 
party and the influence of large donors forced the presidential primary candidates to position 
themselves as outsiders rather than party insiders.  
While it became apparent in 2015 and 2016 that the radical right had issues with the 
mainstream GOP, the insurgency started during the Bush years as the racist right had abandoned 
the mainstream GOP. The influence of party elites, which had been eroded by the Tea-Party 
insurgency, met its logical conclusion as the mainstream Republican candidates such as Jeb Bush 
was outflanked by former Tea-Party members now turned mainstream candidate like Marco Rubio 
and to a lesser extent Ted Cruz. When the Republican National Committee introduced pro-
immigration policies, they were denounced as Cuckservatives, opening up space for the 
Alternative Right’s anti-immigration policies to gain widespread support as the party leadership 
lost control. The Alternative Right spent most of the primaries attacking them for being soft and 
unsupportive of the white supremacy issues that they had dog whistled for the previous 
generation.333 
The 2016 election also introduced the public to the idea of fake news. Despite decades of 
academic proof that news was biased, and that journalism was not capable of objective coverage, 
much of the pundit community was caught off guard. The right-wing politics of Fox News was 
routinely presented as a blemish in the “otherwise balanced news coverage”  as it had spent the 
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previous eight years presenting the Tea-Party and other Far-Right groups as moderate centrists334. 
What was less apparent was the influence of social media to provide political echo chambers for 
highly political news with no factual basis. The earlier fringe conspiracy programs by Alex Jones 
and other talk radio stations became more frequent and normalized as Fox news failed to provide 
positive coverage for Trump and the Alternative Right. 
As Trump entered the Republican primaries, he was initially faced with scorn and derision 
as commentators quickly dismissed his chances within the mainstream press, but the Alternative 
Right quickly endorsed him. By September of 2015 David Duke, Jared Taylor, Peter Brimelow, 
Patrick Buchanan and Richard Spencer had all endorse Donald Trump publicly.335 Even if the Alt-
Right was still mostly online and out of the public spotlight, most of the prominent American 
Alternative Right leaders rallied behind Trump before he had widespread support.  
Trump Victorious 
 
Trump won the 2016 election to national surprise. An electoral college victory relies on  
winner takes all state victories, blowouts in predominately urban and liberal states such as 
California and New York value as much as a minor victory in these states, which led to Hillary 
Clinton winning the popular vote but losing the electoral college. The traditionally Democratic 
states of Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Michigan all went for Trump and became the centre of the 
infamous narrative after Trump’s victory. While the Alt-Right figures such as Yiannopolous never 
campaigned within the American heartland before Trump’s electoral win, the messages of Trump 
and the Alternative Right struck a chord.  Responding to both the failure of the Left, embodied by 
the Democratic party, to provide an emancipatory politics for labour and the outright corruption 
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of mainstream politicians on both sides of the aisle, the Alternative Right’s attacks on the 
intersectional left and Hillary Clinton gained far more popular support than political scientists and 
pundits imagined possible.336 Steve Bannon, who came from  a blue-collar Catholic Democratic 
household in Virginia, as with many Trump surrogates responded to the failures of the Democratic 
and Republican party elites to maintain the middle-class values and economic status after the 
implementation of NAFTA and other neoliberal policies.337 The result was the tail wagging the 
dog, the electoral shift within several swing states justified the rising ideology of the Alternative 
Right and the so-called deplorables across the board and elevated their influence into mainstream 
politics.  
The Alternative Right’s rise to prominence within the American consciousness could not 
have been possible without the precariously employed and unemployed middle class of the United 
States voting for Trump in crucial swing states. However, there is little empirical evidence to show 
that these voters were indeed part of the radical core of the Alternative Right; they may have had 
MAGA hats, but they were not reading Curtis Yarvin or making their own Pepe the frog memes. 
The Alt-Right had a significant social media presence, but the radical core of the movement was 
not significant enough to be the deciding factor in the election, though the popularity of the broader 
movement may have. The odds of Trump’s victory were at best unlikely and at worst deemed a 
“once in 200 years” event given the 2% odds that many mainstream outlets were giving him.338 
Despite this, as with the Tea Party in 2010,339 the lack of ground game was ignored by mainstream 
media coverage after the election, with the specific Alt-Right media figures gaining popularity and 
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infamy rather than the appeal of the Alternative Right more broadly in the wake of several decades 
of wage stagnation, conservative and conspiratorial media pressure and resentment towards Hillary 
Clinton. Previously fringe figures such as Richard Spencer and Milo Yiannoplous were given a 
public spotlight and platform that would have been unthinkable two years earlier, and the 
normalization of the Alternative Right began in earnest. 
The Future of the Alt-Right 
 
 While the three periods of the Alternative Right examined in this chapter are porous with 
extensive continuity, the growth in the movement within each phase has been exponential. What 
was first some radical fringe figures in the 1980s and 1990s established a space both online and 
within the Republican party and in the broader anglosphere. The ideas and concepts put forward 
in the incubatory period are purposefully radical, and even the most optimistic theorist of the 
Alternative Right would not have predicted the growth of the movement from a small fringe within 
the Far-Right community to a significant political movement within North American politics with 
widespread recognition.  With the electoral success of the movement and its allies throughout the 
contemporary period, it could no longer live in the shadows away from public discourse. The 
contemporary period saw the movement gain mainstream acceptability radicalizing more young 
men within North American society. This period came to a crescendo in August 2017 in the 
aftermath of the Unite the Right rally which saw the actively Alt-Right members of Trump’s 
administration being fired.340 Despite the setbacks in August 2017, the movement has not 
 
340 Sophie Tatum, “Gorka: Bannon, Others ‘Systematically Undermined,’” CNN, August 26, 2017. 
126 
 
disappeared, just disengaged from street level protests, returning to the cultural and digital activism 
that Alt-Right thinkers such as Curtis Yarvin suggested during the incubatory period.341  
It is likely that the current trends within the Alternative Right will continue into the near 
future, with the normalization of many of their ideas and platforms within mainstream American 
life. While it is unclear if the Alternative Right will subsume the Republican Party or if the 
Republican party will incorporate their ideas into their platform while maintaining the existing 
power structure, it is undeniable that the Alternative Right has shifted the ideological positions of 
right-wing politics within the Anglosphere. 
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Part 2: The Political Theorists Who Influenced the Alt-Right 
 
 While the first question of this text is how the divergent political theory traditions of the 
Alt-Right have coalesced into a new reactionary political ideology, this lacks a clear narrative for 
the reader to process this development. Gathering a selection of different ideological positions and 
creating some coherent narrative for the reader is difficult, should the theories be introduced in 
chronological order, starting with the Post-War Fascists and European New Right before moving 
to the present online literature. This may at first appear the logical progression for the next four 
chapters, but this ignores how this ideology has emerged as a significant political force within 
North America. Few if any members of the movement picked up work on Julius Evola or Samuel 
Francis then watched the self-help youtube videos of Jordan Peterson as the tipping point leading 
to their acts of terrorism. Instead, this text will progress through the process of radicalization just 
as the radicalized alt-right youth experience, first with the online “non-political” right-wing, then 
progressing through the Neoreactionary influenced works which incorporate race science and a 
radically anti-democratic conception of the state. At this point, theoretical radicalized youth would 
further incorporate the existing global political theories of the European New Right, and the 
classical American White Nationalist literature, neither body of literature, would be encountered 
by accident and are deliberate choices by radicalized right-wing youth, especially for those too 
young to remember the Clinton or Bush administrations. While not all members of the Alt-Right 
are introduced to this literature in this order, this provides the inquisitive reader outside of the Far-
Right the opportunity to slowly wade into the ideological deep-end, rather than jump directly in.  
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Chapter 4: The Grey Tribe: South Park Libertarians, Jordan Peterson, the 
Radicalization of Young Men 
  
Introduction 
 
The radical cores of the Alt-Right, white nationalists and the broader reactionary far-right 
movement did not emerge from the void as a political entity; rather it germinated over the better 
part of two decades within online communities that were initially created to share their mutual 
enjoyment of popular culture and “edgy” commentary on current affairs. The Grey Tribe is the 
first stepping stone for many within the Alternative Right and the most important pathway for 
young men.  
Rather than limit the Alternative Right to the small ideological core built by Richard 
Spencer, this chapter will use a broader definition to capture the movement. The Alternative Right 
is defined by three axioms, the first is the right to difference, the second is the primacy of cultural 
metapolitics, and the third is an individualistic hierarchal conception of human society. The right 
to difference is the right to develop a culture away from the influences of globalization and 
multiculturalism, which is a politics of segregation and exit. For policy, this means ending non-
white immigration, maintaining traditional gender roles and retreating from liberal globalization 
wherever possible. For the Alternative Right, this could be summarized by the phrase “if you 
cannot beat them then leave them.” The primacy of cultural metapolitics is the fixation on (mass 
popular) culture as the fundamental axiom of politics, just as class struggle defines Marxism or 
individual freedoms and property rights defines liberalism. To change public policy, the culture 
must change first, which is why the Alternative Right is so fixated on changing sites of culture 
such as the university and popular media. The individualistic hierarchical conception of human 
society is typically argued through the negation of equality and egalitarian politics, and the 
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promotion of tribalism and hypercompetitive survival of the fittest rhetoric. Unlike liberalism’s 
tabula rasa argument that all men are created equal, the Alternative Right understands human 
capacity to be genetically determined, which results in a social Darwinist framework. To 
understand how and why the Alt-Right and the Alternative Right emerged, one must first 
understand the ideological and cultural development of the Grey Tribe and the Far-Right mantra 
of Andrew Breitbart that “politics is downstream of culture,”342 which is one of the most precise 
articulations of the primacy of cultural metapolitics within contemporary society. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the fundamental question of how a 16-year-old from 
a stable family without significant trauma, a modicum of economic privilege and social stability 
devotes their life to terrorist attacks against women and racial minorities? The answer is one of 
radicalization, both through the active work of existing Far-Right thinkers and through a culture 
fundamentally motivated by individualism, shock humour, internalized persecution complexes and 
toxic hypermasculinity. While the different targets of these radicals may vary, the origin of this 
dis-organized community is consistently the same. The common thread between many of the 
terrorist and far-right personalities is a shared origin in the Grey Tribe, a “non-political” 
community that positioned itself away from Red State and Blue State America during the Bush 
and early Obama administrations.  
The Grey Tribe is the term used to coin the emergent “third-way” within American political 
life by the blogger Scott Alexander.343 The Grey Tribe (emphasis on the term Tribe, which becomes 
a codeword for race in Alternative Right Literature) occupies a mixture of "red tribe" and "blue 
tribe" mentalities (named after the colours of the Republicans and Democrats respectively). Unlike 
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the NeoReactionaries, European New Right, White Nationalists or the subsequent Alt-lite/Right, 
the Grey Tribe did not consider itself to be right-wing or even particularly political. As Scott 
Alexander put it in 2014: 
There is a partly-formed attempt to spin off a Grey Tribe typified by libertarian 
political beliefs, Dawkins-style atheism, vague annoyance that the question of 
gay rights even comes up, eating paleo, drinking Soylent, calling in rides on 
Uber, reading lots of blogs, calling American football “sportsball”, getting 
conspicuously upset about the War on Drugs and the NSA, and listening to filk 
– but for our current purposes this is a distraction and they can safely be 
considered part of the Blue Tribe most of the time344 
While the exact timeline of the “Grey Tribe” is unnecessary, it started in earnest in the 1990s with 
the rise of cyberculture. The Grey Tribe, despite being an American idea is an international 
community within the Anglosphere, and more broadly the English-speaking digital world. 
Prominent figures within the Grey Tribe are often international figures who fall within the vague 
in-between space between the genuine mass-media celebrity and the internet famous YouTuber or 
tech figure, as will be discussed later, these figures include Peter Thiel, Elon Musk, Jordan 
Peterson or Steve Jobs. It is necessary first to explain why and how it emerged through a 
resentment towards mainstream liberal culture and its further path to radicalization. 
To understand the transition from the generally “centre-left friendly” Grey Tribe of the Obama 
years to the outright white nationalist biological determinism of those in the Grey Tribe during the 
Trump presidency requires an awareness that these developments are not universal but rather a 
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general trend. The group is highly individualistic with little centralized organization, members of 
the Grey Tribe may be self-avowed communists or anarchists, but the more significant trend has 
been a rightward shift. This chapter will examine Peter Thiel, Jordan Peterson and Brenton Tarrant 
(the 2019 Christchurch terrorist) as exemplars of the Grey Tribes ideological development and 
growing radicalization. Peter Thiel, the Silicon Valley venture capitalist, is an anti-democratic 
billionaire who has privately funded far-right thinkers and political campaigns associated with the 
Far-Right, such as Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign. Jordan Peterson does not consider himself 
part of the Alt-Right, but he associates and tours with leaders of the Alt-lite and has spent several 
years radicalizing young men with misogynistic, anti-trans and anti-egalitarian rhetoric and should 
be classified as a member of the Alternative Right. Brenton Tarrant, while not a significant 
influence on the movement, is indicative of the radicalization of youth within the Grey Tribe from 
centre-left positions to outright fascism and terrorism. 
The Alternative Right Political Theory as a (pop)-Cultural Development 
 
The development of Alternative Right philosophy was a dialectical progression from 
cultural resentment towards post-modern politics, economics and culture within a neoliberal 
hegemony since the 1990s. As shown in earlier chapters, the development occurred in response to 
globalization culturally and politically. Each step moved the core of the Alternative Right ideology 
from one of cultural resentment to a full-fledged reactionary ideology. The common origin for the 
Alt-Right’s radical cores is a shared cultural salon focused on culture and media rather than what 
would be traditionally understood as political praxis. For example, the Alt-Right may target a 
popular mass media film for staring female leads in a property once dominated by men, while 
ignoring a local municipal election. This fixation on culture separates them from the existing blood 
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and soil white nationalism which emerged in response to the perceived abandonment of the white 
supremacist traditions through the conservative economic and National Review consensus.  
Older White Nationalists who were initially popular in the 1990s, such as Jared Taylor, 
may have disliked the idea of multicultural representation in films, but they did not devote the 
majority of their time and energy to posting these views on Twitter or social media. The White 
Nationalist project of the 1980s and 1990s was one of militias and armed violence; it took itself 
seriously. The Alt-Right did not emerge as a typical white nationalist organization; instead it quasi-
satirically adopted the white nationalist mantle as it gained popularity drawing upon older 
Alternative Right figures and literature. When it fully embraced the white nationalist mantel it, 
Kronos like, begin to eat any rivals it could find to make the Alternative Right synonymous with 
the radical cores known as the Alt-Right. While there was little to no laughter or theatre of the 
absurd for the White Nationalists of the 1990s, the ideology of the contemporary Alt-Right is 
defined by humour and satire, which is exemplified by its use of memes.   
The culture war debate that has existed since the collapse of the Soviet Union is the 
effective start for the Alternative Right. With state communism defeated, social democracy 
replaced with third way neoliberalism, and socialism a non-entity within the United States, the 
right's boogie man disappeared in the early '90s. As Thomas Frank presents in his seminal work 
What is the Matter with Kansas? the once reliably left-wing pro-democratic regions of industrial 
America adopted a focused cultural politics based on religious identity and cultural resentment.345 
The erosion of unions and the role of labour within the Democratic party between 1972 and 1992 
effectively eroded the role of economic policy as a wedge issue for the American electorate. The 
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result was a move towards a non-political space where elections were determined by cultural 
preferences rather than on questions of political economy.  
The ideological project of the Alternative Right emerged during the dual political events 
of the election of Obama and the financial crisis of 2008. Both events are devoid of catharsis, with 
Obama there was no Camelot of racial equality, only an intensification of racial animosity. For the 
financial crisis, no one was arrested, and the wealth inequality which existed before the crisis only 
accelerated in the face of an incompetent left-wing resistance movement against global finance 
capital. Even though economics was becoming political again, it had spent the previous two 
decades as a political non-starter for anyone outside of the technocratic discipline of finance and 
economics.  The economic crisis was a joke without a punch line and a tragedy without a cathartic 
moment of relief. For the philosopher Henri Bergson, laughter emerges when the unexpected 
happens, but what if nothing happens after the setup?346 The result is the environment which 
allowed for the nihilistic radicalism of the Alt-Right to gain popularity. 
While the collective anger was building up on the left against the political and economic 
injustices of the Obama years, it had the familiar targets of institutional violence, a young activist 
could blame a racist cop, a rapist politician or a transphobic professor, but what can the young 
white male do when they are angry at their state of affairs? Either they accept that straight white 
men are on average more privileged within Western societies and focus on a Marxist, feminist or 
post-colonial inspired path to express their anger, seeing societal failures as an issue of class 
conflict, race or gender, or they could adopt a more reactionary project to fuel their anger. Given 
the collapse of an economic left within American and Anglosphere communities, the right became 
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a far more popular path for this cultural resentment. These young men began to target the usual 
suspects, who had emerged from two decades of right-wing media influence; including 
immigrants, progressive activists (Queer, feminist and non-white/post-colonialists), liberal elites 
and the non-military/police state.  
The loss of a small amount of social privilege and economic position reverberated strongly 
within these typically right-wing left-behind communities just as many minority groups gained 
greater access to human rights during the Obama years. The consequence of this development is a 
conspiracy. Life is slowly getting worse with less stability, less privilege and less material success. 
“What is holding you back?" If you reject the empirical reality of stagnating wages, climate change 
and rising inequality, then the emotional and cultural assumption that there is some group actively 
suppressing you and attempting to replace you appears increasingly attractive. Conspiracy creates 
an unfalsifiable emotional outlet for nihilism; you are unable to engage in social change because a 
small cadre of elites dictates politics, you cannot get into a great university because you are not 
“left-wing” or “non-white.” The result is a radically undemocratic and individualist mindset, where 
only true believers can be trusted. 
The conspiracy culture which fostered and incubated the ideas of the Alternative Right 
while they were in the proverbial wilderness is fundamentally attached to the political theory of 
the Alternative Right. The literature of the Alternative Right must be either, to some degree taboo, 
for it to be evoked by the Alt-Right’s conspiracy fixated followers, otherwise it must adopt the 
pretext of a broader culture war. Which is why what English language literature that exists outside 
of this conspiratorial and sensationalist tradition comes from the Paleoconservative tradition of 
traditional academics who pre-existed the Alt-Right and cut its teeth on the culture war debate of 
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the 1990s. Authors and influences from this paleoconservative tradition include Samuel Francis 
and Patrick Buchanan.347  
While the scapegoat of a conspiratorial other has been a persistent idea within politics, it 
has exploded with the internet and the removal of the media gatekeepers. It took billionaires and 
millionaires and sometimes widespread fraud to fund movements like the LeRouchians of the 
1970s and 1980s.348 These groups needed extensive funding to mail physical pamphlets and 
purchase airtime on local or national radio and television stations. The conspiracies of the 1990s 
and beyond were accelerated by the internet and expressed and shared both by the faithful and 
those laughing at the absurdity. One could share an idea with no time delay, and no financial 
commitment, so sensationalist ideas propagated themselves, and little is less sensationalist than a 
good conspiracy theory. Perhaps the two most prominent examples in the age of the Alt-Right 
have been Alex Jones,349 who rose to prominence through his digital platform of Info Wars, and 
the QAnon conspiracy that emerged to justify the inability of the Trump administration to arrest 
the Clintons and other prominent pro-globalization liberals.350 
Earlier political ideologies and radical movements have adopted elements of conspiracy, 
targeting free-masons or embracing anti-Semitic conspiracies. The political theory of the Alt-Right 
is defined and unified by its conspiratorial and sensationalist dimension. Julius Evola, a significant 
influence on Alt-Right ideology, was a prominent occult fascist, arguing we are living through a 
mythical dark age.351 He is one of the key influencers of Steve Bannon.352 The entire canon of 
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Curtis Yarvin, another major thinker within the Alternative Right, is one of conspiracy, fixated on 
Harvard and the political-cultural-intellectual institution of the Cathedral, a conspiracy that 
cultural Marxism maintains a stronghold on American political discourse and policies.353 
Guillaume Faye, one of the most prominent French New Right thinkers, fixates on the 
sensationalist theory that Muslims will defy demographic realities and dominate Europe through 
massive immigration.354 Nick Land, a once left-wing now NeoReactionary thinker, attracts readers 
with his cult-like conspiracy of technological cyber-punk dystopia.355 Even the peripheral authors 
that provide a gateway for the neophytes entering the Alt-Right such as Jordan Peterson provide a 
biological conspiracy and religious scripture to function as a quasi-cult leader for groups of young 
men.356 These theorists are presented as cool or taboo. It should come as no surprise that this Alt-
Right movement has repeatedly called themselves Sith lords and invoked the Red Pill imagery of 
the Matrix in order to present themselves as radical “edgelords” in on the conspiracy to “cuckold” 
the white race, men, or western civilization.357  
As the documentarian Adam Curtis explores within his work Hypernormalization,358 the 
left was decimated by the double wedge of individualization through the economic system which 
eroded class solidarity, and with the cultural politics of neoliberalism which fixated on hyper-
specificity within intersectional politics. Economically the burdens of self-sufficiency means-
testing and the erosion of welfare through austerity forced the individual in the Anglosphere to 
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accept their position as individual deprived of any market power. An individual was to be 
conceived as a firm within a competitive free market, able to accept prices and contribute, but 
unable to dictate the price or quantity of their labour. The only way to leverage themselves within 
an economic market was to hyper-specialize their output and human capital. Through this hyper-
competitive practice of specialization, the individual could gain economically if successful, but 
abandon a broader understanding of solidarity with fellow workers within their industry. This 
process became the default for those working in the tech sector who dominate the Grey Tribe, as 
they are proficient in programming languages and work independently and often remotely. As 
cultural politics rose to center stage within American politics, it manifested in an artificial binary 
between red state and blue state America. On a fundamental level, the divide between red state 
and blue state America is one of faith and race. The so-called Red Tribe culture is one of protestant 
evangelical faith and a shared sense of whiteness, while the Blue Tribe culture is one of liberal 
multiculturalism and secularism.  
The Grey Tribe 
 
The Grey tribe is a term coined by Scott Alexander to describe the emergence of a political 
community of “non-political” independents who opposed both the affirmative action and 
redistribution of left-wing movements and the traditionalism and community-centric moralism of 
the American social conservative right.359 The group more accurately applies to the internet natives 
who developed an identity of hyper-individualism through online communities; which due to the 
capitalist nature of the internet, means that the Grey Tribe’s culture and communities are centred 
around the consumption of a product, media property or lifestyle; for example, Apple products, 
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Marvel Movies, Anime, pornography or Minimalist lifestyles. The result is that the Grey Tribe is 
inherently capitalist, compared with later centre/left-wing communities found on Tumblr which 
were critical of the capitalist media they defined themselves by,360 or the much later anti-capitalist 
dirtbag left. 
For those affluent enough to not view politics as a life and death struggle for immediate 
survival within neoliberalism, it develops into a cultural identity in which the performance of 
identity and politics serves as a cultural fixation for establishing an in-group to belong with. One 
follows a campaign like a sports team, wearing the franchise clothing of their favourite candidates. 
One picks the candidate that most identifies with their aesthetic preference rather than their 
ideological platform, resulting in representation as politics. Not politics for representation.  
Much of the Grey Tribe ethos can be encapsulated in the legacy of the Californian Ideology, 
a loose movement from the 1980s. The Californian Ideology is the anti-statist utopian political 
system of free-market libertarianism found within the Silicon Valley tech sector;361 while the 
libertarianism of the mountain states represents a cowboy America of the lone man fighting against 
nature to carve out a home removed from society. The Californian Ideology draws upon the image 
of the digital cowboy, an anti-hero figure out of a cyberpunk novel, who embraces the alienation 
of existence in the face of a crowded world. It is fundamentally a cultural preference which 
manifests in political ideology. The ideal cultural image is placed at the forefront, with political 
and economic choices emerging to transform oneself into that cultural image of the individualistic 
cyberpunk character. 
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There are two substantial cultural subgroups within the Grey Tribe, the Techno-libertarians 
and the South Park Libertarians. The techno-libertarian is a subgroup of libertarianism which is 
premised less on political theory and more on the relationship between individualism and 
technology. They tend to view themselves as techno-utopians who are aware of climate change 
but seek to fix the problem through new technology rather than social change. The example par 
excellence would be Elon Musk and his various speculative capitalist companies like Tesla or 
SpaceX which seek to address climate problems through technological innovation. The South Park 
libertarian moniker describes the typically younger male libertarian community that emerged 
alongside the TV show South Park. The critical position of these individuals was their both-side-
ism, lampooning both sides of American politics as absurd and calling out the religious fervour of 
the Republican base and the moralistic crusades by left-wing progressives as equivalents. By 
rejecting the mainstream views of both parties, they understood themselves as apolitical and non-
partisan. This thinking only works in a society devoid of politics, as implied by the end of history 
thesis, and one where the two parties are equally cartoonish. With the rightward push of the 
Republican party the a-political space of the South Park libertarian moved to the right culturally 
while maintaining its fundamentally far-right economic positions. Since the South Park libertarians 
culturally distance themselves from fundamentalist Christians, they spent much of the Bush years 
within the same cultural communities as Democrats, but began to wholly separate from these 
communities with the emergence of the Tea Party and the rise of Silicon Valley culture. Due to 
their proximity to traditional left-cultural communities, they often presented themselves as 
Democrats.362 
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As we see within the work of Curtis Yarvin, who has constructed a philosophy based on 
libertarianism taken to its logical authoritarian conclusion, the goal of many libertarians is to centre 
the political spectrum to a the hierarchical political and quantifiable metric of economic state-
power.363 The non-mappable space of politics is eroded for a single spectrum or 2D graph. It is no 
surprise that the rise of political spectrum quizzes, which has become a meme in itself, favoured 
libertarian ideology by measuring everything on the two axioms of the libertarian ideological 
spectrum (political and economic freedom). If a 16-year-old takes a pop-political quiz online and 
finds that they map onto libertarian ideology, the result will be little more than a generalizable 
horoscope or Harry Potter sorting hat of ideology but may result in a new political identity for the 
uninformed 16-year-old. The nuanced political examination takes a backseat to easily digestible 
ideological positions which erase political diversity. The results are a group of libertarians in love 
with capitalism, individualism and consumer culture imagining themselves as apolitical.  
For the Grey Tribe, the idea of social privilege is fundamentally incompatible with their 
attempts to impose hyperrationality with the goal of peak efficiency on social, cultural and 
economic issues. For example, for the Grey Tribe, gay people should be allowed to marry because 
it is irrational to deny them negative freedom; it is an artificial inefficiency. The Grey Tribe sees 
negative freedoms as an ideal for political rights but refuses to go further. Due to a low level of 
historical and sociological analysis within most Grey Tribe literature, with little acknowledgement 
of inequalities, either racial, gendered or political, inequalities are an irrational abnormality in the 
system rather than the result of systemic structural violence. If an analysis completely removes 
structural violence and the lasting impact of inequalities, then any existing inequalities will be 
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eliminated over time due to convergence or persist due to fundamental and irreconcilable 
differences. From the Grey Tribe’s libertarian inclinations inequality between black and white 
people within the United States should decline over time and result in an equal society once legal 
barriers are removed; therefore, affirmative action policies are unnecessary and inefficient. If this 
is not the case, then the Grey Tribe would argue that we are either not looking at the issue on a 
long enough time scale, or that there is a fundamental genetic difference between blacks and 
whites. Even those who critique the more racist elements of the Grey Tribe, such as Scott 
Alexander, are still tolerant of racial theories arguing that “the people who dismiss the biological 
hypothesis as obviously stupid and totally discredited (by which I mean everyone) are doing it a 
disservice.”364 
The Grey Tribe has adopted an atheistic bent, with a strong preference for science, which at 
times becomes a dogmatic belief structure that emerged out of opposition to the creationist and 
anti-science dogmatism by the United States Christian fundamentalists.365 Initially, this was akin 
to the enlightenment’s anti-religious project to confront superstition but has subsequently 
developed into a cultural practice fixated on replacing not only religious thought but all modes of 
thinking within the humanities and non-mathematic social sciences.  As with other online 
communities, the Grey Tribe’s echo chamber began to crowd out what non-STEM perspectives 
remained within these digital communities. As non-STEM fields were dismissed and ostracised 
from the Grey Tribe’s social media and online communities, it left a void to be filled.  
As the libertarian movement bifurcated itself into the mainstream Christian conservative 
movement and the atheistic libertarian dogmatists, libertarianism became wedded to evolutionary 
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principles. Individual freedom and biological determinism became merged into a new synthesis. 
For them, if all humans are not equal, and we have evolutionary pressures rather than religious 
ones, without external morality, those in a position of privilege can embrace an unequal society as 
natural, and forced or social equality as unnatural. This biological determinism is how many 
libertarians embraced the Alternative Right. The acceptance of genetic research into intelligence 
may at first be a simple curiosity as the individual wishes for a metric of comparison, a justification 
for social success, or a validation of personal intellectual ability. This research, which is one factor 
of many, is supported by white supremacists, who since the era of phrenology have articulated 
racial-pseudo science to justify systemic racism and excuse other forms of inequality (such as 
sexual/gender). As with the liberal arguing for free speech on campus, the libertarian advocating 
genetic/biological determinism partners up with the far-right due to a fixation on scientific truth 
claims. 
When exposed to these biological determinists and libertarian arguments, those on the Alt-
Right suggest that there are only three choices: the Blue Pill, the Red Pill and the Black Pill. The 
Blue Pill is the acceptance of the existing social order, the default choice when times are good. To 
take the Blue Pill is to accept the status quo and reject politics through inaction, enjoy the culture 
of consumerism and embrace mainstream liberalism with limited reservations. The Red Pill is the 
rejection of the existing social order, a call to action against the cultural elites and any force 
attempting to limit individualism.366 The conspiratorial theme dominates the conflict between those 
who know and those who follow, immediately creating a hierarchy of the human and the non-
human. This path is echoed time and again by the biological determinists and right-wing 
libertarians within the Grey Tribe. The final option is the Black Pill which is a death wish, the 
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realization that nothing can be done to oppose the forces of the status quo.367 The Black Pill is 
understood as the path for Incel suicide attacks, self-destruction and nihilism, and the final step for 
the radicalized youth who sees no option short of suicide. As Zack Beauchamp from Vox describes 
it:  
The blackpill bundles the incel sense of personal failure with a sense of social 
entitlement: the notion that the world owes them sex, and that there is something 
wrong with a society in which women don’t have to give it to them.368 
 It becomes a vicious cycle which perpetuates nihilistic misogyny that reinforces itself through 
isolation from women out of fear of further rejection and failure. 
The Path to Radicalization 
 
While it is easy to point at Klan members in the American South, aristocratic Europeans 
and billionaires as members of the far-right, it is far more difficult for the public to read internet 
libertarians as these far-right pseudo-fascists. While the Grey Tribe is popular online, with 
communities growing around providing a space for them to socialize such as Reddit or 4Chan, and 
others such as Tumblr providing a space away from these groups, they have limited cross over into 
the lives of non-internet natives. Outside of the occasional late night talk show bit on Gamergate,369 
a funny viral meme, or hearing about a Grey Tribe celebrity like Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg or 
Ron Paul,370 they blurred into the background of popular culture, occupying a separate space as the 
group was defined by its "apolitical" behaviour, which does not mean a non-political existence. 
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Around 2008 biological determinism and evolutionary psychology start to appear within the 
Grey Tribe’s lexicon.371  This started a radical break in the trajectory of the movement, which 
would result in an ever-increasing Far-Right contingent within the Grey Tribe. The new Atheist 
movement was fixated on the evolutionary development of humanity and used evolutionary 
psychology to justify it. Unlike the racist ideas of the KKK or blood and soil white supremacists 
which required a high initial level of commitment to the concept and community, the emergence 
of scientific racism through the rhetoric of new atheism, biological determinism and evolutionary 
psychology was much more benign.372 
Some of the Grey Tribe has embraced the eugenic and biological elements of contemporary 
Neoreactionary and white nationalist thought, not due to openly racial hatred but rather due to an 
ahistorical understanding of human development and inequality. As human evolution has failed to 
match our technological development, our “software” has outpaced our “hardware.” The 
construction of new ways of understanding the world is applied to hardware that is 50000 years 
out of date. For the a-historical libertarian, there are only two prominent ways of resolving the 
biological incompatibility with modern culture; the first is transhumanism and the digital 
augmentation of the self through mechanical, digital and bioengineered technologies, which are 
discussed at length in texts focusing on artificial intelligence such as Nick Bostrom’s 
Superintelligence.373 The second is to take a biological deterministic position within politics, which 
leads to eugenics and "Umwertung aller Werte" (Revaluation of all values). As Park MacDougald 
describes them this group is filled with the Neoreactionaries which “combines all of the awful 
things you always suspected about libertarianism with odds and ends from  PUA (pick up artist) 
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culture, Victorian Social Darwinism, and an only semi-ironic attachment to absolutism.”374 While 
19th and 20th century social Darwinism relied on pseudoscientific advancements that proved to be 
overwhelmingly incorrect,  the contemporary eugenicists can draw upon a much more specific 
genetic research for their policies.  The bioengineered human or the transhumanistic development 
of humanity is furthered with little to no reflection for the existing inequalities within humanity. 
The result is a hypercompetitive world view, which stands in contrast with egalitarian 
transhumanism which is focused on overcoming the existing inequalities of imperialism, 
capitalism and physical disability.  
The justification for equity and egalitarian practices will become harder to justify when 
there are widely accepted and practiced forms of biologically constructed and maintained 
physical/intellectual hierarchy. The tabula rasa argument that is a cornerstone for liberal thought 
going back to Locke is bypassed by this evolutionary conception of humanity. If no two people 
are genetically the same, and genetics set the bounds of human potential, the biological determinist 
sees little value in the call for universal equality. Taken to its logical conclusion, human rights 
becomes a non-entity within the eyes of biological determinists, who simultaneously reject any 
framework of political thought based on universal equality and replace the existing libertarian 
conception of universal freedom with a survival of the fittest telos which places the will to power 
as the universal maximum for justifying any action. 
The radicalization from a position of non-religious belief to outright white supremacist race 
science can roughly follow this trajectory. At first, a young man is exposed to an initial YouTube 
video, podcast or web post that explains a sophisticated social science phenomenon through some 
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(often pseudo) scientific solution. For example, the question “Why do pretty women reject average 
looking men on tinder?” is explained through the Pareto principle, implying that the 20% most 
attractive men date the 80% most attractive women and the 80% least attractive men date the 20% 
least attractive women. The solution is overly simplistic, relying on many generalities and easily 
challenged assumptions, but it is an easy answer to meme and therefore spreads across the internet. 
The experience of being rejected through online dating is almost universal for young men, so a 
video like this can have millions of views and find itself shared on many/non-political digital 
communities. Once they have watched the video, they are more likely to be exposed to similar 
videos on YouTube through algorithmic recommendations. It follows this up with a video on how 
to be more masculine and assertive, suppressing your feminine traits. While this raises red flags 
for those aware of toxic masculinity, a 16-year-old who is still in high school is unlikely to be fully 
exposed to these critiques of gender norms. Which means that when the next video it recommends 
is a video on “sneaker fish”375 the viewer might not clue into the fact that this is used to justify 
transphobic arguments. The video, which was presented as a harmless animal documentary is a 
way of indoctrinating a young man into the conspiracy that transwomen are secretly cuckolding 
them and having sex with their female friends and girlfriends. From there he might watch a video 
that is explaining racial cuckolding, then subsequently how white people do not have as many 
children as minorities, before long, he is unironically watching videos on white genocide. Over 
time the young boy who innocently enough wanted to know why he is single and how to get a 
girlfriend will be pulled into increasingly radical communities.  
Peter Thiel 
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Peter Thiel is easily one of the most well known and wealthiest members of the Alternative 
Right, and the most indicative of the Grey Tribe. His rise in Silicon Valley comes from founding 
PayPal and then subsequently being an early investor in Facebook. While many members of 
Silicon Valley support the Alternative Right, Peter Thiel is the best example for exploring the 
attraction to the ideology. Thiel set up a law firm to fund legal battles with the website Gawker 
until it was bankrupt, in order to punish the site for outing him as gay in 2007.376 Thiel is also a 
well-known backer and employer of prominent Neoreactionary authors such as Curtis Yarvin.377 
In 2016 he publicly donated over a million dollars to the Trump Campaign in October after the 
infamous "grab them by the pussy" tape was released.378 Outside of the public eye he has also 
influenced and hired the top conservative and far-right graduates of Stanford University through 
his connections to the student journal he founded, the Stanford Review.379 
Peter Thiel’s most infamous political proclamation is in his article for Cato-Unbound, "...I 
no longer believe that freedom and democracy are compatible."380  While private admonishment 
with democracy has been hand in hand with wealthy elites, this statement would herald the 
following decade change within the libertarian community from Jeffersonian democracy 
individualists to libertarian-authoritarianism. Published two months after the start of the Tea Party 
movement, Thiel's proclamation reframed how libertarian policy would be forwarded, and more 
specifically how the Grey Tribe in Silicon Valley would move to the far-right. 
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 Peter Thiel and Norman Book founded the conservative and libertarian campus publication 
the Stanford Review in the late 1980s, where Thiel published dozens of articles.381 Thiel has 
consistently both published political essays and maintained a connection with the members of the 
Stanford Review as a dedicated and connected alumnus. While not managing the organization, 
Thiel maintains his connections partially to influence, network with and hire the skilled editors of 
the Review. As Andrew Granato points out in his article for Stanford Politics, Peter Thiel is aware 
of a significant number of non-public supporters of Trump who hide their political beliefs due to 
the "California culture." These hidden or silent voices are part of the unmeasurable Alt-Right, who 
do not wear MAGA hats but may post online through anonymous screen names.382  
Thiel has spent much of the past 30 years attempting to radicalize the Grey Tribe of Silicon 
Valley. Rather than attempt to change opinions through discourse, it became necessary to find an 
alternative:  
I started a student newspaper to challenge the prevailing campus orthodoxies; 
we scored some limited victories, most notably in undoing speech codes 
instituted by the university. However, in a broader sense, we did not achieve all 
that much for all the effort expended. Much of it felt like trench warfare on the 
Western Front in World War I; there was much carnage, but we did not move 
the center of the debate.383 
Before the cultural shift with the rise of the Tea Party, the Grey Tribe and the dark money of the 
Koch Brothers, the libertarian movement felt maligned within intellectual and social networks; the 
ideas of libertarians were always on the outside. This culture of isolation in Thiel's view leads to 
substance abuse, for him the smartest conservatives in Manhattan were alcoholics and the smartest 
libertarians "escaped not only to alcohol but beyond it."384 This insight helps explain the fixation 
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with escape and alienation within libertarian communities, one which would dominate the even 
more right-wing movements which emerged from it. 
For Thiel, the only reasonable solution for the libertarian is escape/exit, which is where 
Thiel in 2009 starts to echo the NeoReactionary Curtis Yarvin. As the other prominent 
NeoReactionary Nick Land argues, NeoReactionary thought is defined by the ability to escape the 
system.385 For Thiel in 2009, he sees three ways out: cyberspace, outer space and seasteading. In 
turn, he sees cyberspace as an opportunity to expand what he did at PayPal and implement digital 
currencies removed from the eyes of government surveillance and control.386 Outer space indulges 
the shared libertarian sci-fi tradition from authors such as Robert H. Heinlein who championed 
libertarianism in space in novels such as The Moon is a Harsh Mistress.387 The more outlandish 
idea, seasteading, is another libertarian fantasy where man-made islands are created out off the 
coast of California in international waters without government control and low to no taxation. The 
critique of this libertarian fantasy was exemplified in the dystopian video game BioShock which 
depicts an underwater sea steading community, based on Ayn Rand’s objectivism, as a dystopian 
horror bound for failure and social unrest. These paths to escape are fundamentally absurd, while 
socialists joke about “fully automated gay space communism” it is always presented as an absurd 
utopia and never as a project to waste money on, when Peter Thiel and the Libertarians argue for 
this complete retreat from society it is presented as a serious solution that they spend millions to 
implement. The ideology of NeoReaction and libertarianism is fundamentally a nihilistic 
abandonment of humanist principles, which is exemplified by their understanding of society 
through culture.  
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The Incels 
 
Before examining Jordan Peterson, a brief explanation of a subset of the Grey Tribe needs 
to be explained, that of the Incel, or involuntary celibate. The Incel community emerged as an 
online community sharing the same disheartening experience of romantic and sexual failure, 
sharing memes and posts that express how they would be “forever alone.” The presence of single 
men pining over their lack of dates, girlfriends or wives is nothing new in human history, what is 
new is the emergence of a community around this largely self-imposed state of social isolation and 
that some of them commit hate crimes and terrorist attacks against women.388 While it may be easy 
to suggest that this phenomenon is merely the result of internet culture and online dating, it has 
much more to do with the economic and social conditions of younger Millennials and Zoomers 
which fuels their toxic masculinity. The declining and stagnating white middle class, the rise of 
internet culture and economic precarity has, for the first time in decades, failed to provide white 
men widespread access or belief in the American dream. A young person with a university degree 
who is underemployed is resentful of a system that has betrayed the perceived social contract, not 
merely because of precarious economic conditions, but due to the loss of privilege within the 
system.  
While many people in American society have less sex than they would like, typically as 
the American journalist, Jia Tolentino discovered when interviewing virgins, the lack of sex was 
due to widely accepted structural barriers, such as being poor, fat, trans or disabled.389 This 
appropriation of sexual alienation is what makes the self-described Incel movement so 
disheartening, as with other labels used by the Alternative Right such as "Gamer" or "Identitarian" 
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the term attempts to whitewash an actual issue or group identity for their exclusionary purposes. 
Incels marry the (mostly) white-privilege of presumed rewards with the misogyny and violence of 
masculine identity within a patriarchal society. The result is a group of young men who feel that 
they are owed sex from female partners, with the onus on consent reversed.390 While other groups 
who have less sex than they want are often viewed externally as undesirable due to social-structural 
barriers, the Incel community that attacks and threatens women for not having sex with them are 
mostly young and able-bodied. While self-described Incels may call themselves socially inept, 
subhuman391 and are often NEETs (Not in education, employment or training), that does not make 
them structurally oppressed or marginalized groups within American society. A trans, black or 
disabled person faces widespread systemic oppression, a young (white) man who is awkward and 
underemployed does not face the same level of systemic oppression, even if they feel that they are 
being oppressed and define themselves by this identity. 
Incels fit into the recurring story of the Grey Tribe, as they are a digital community of anti-
feminist young men who reject the realities of other groups within North American society as 
legitimate. Incels both reject the "Red Tribe's" red-blooded-American culture which values 
traditional American masculinity and sex within the confines of marriage, and the "Blue Tribe's" 
progressive feminism that they decry as "white-knighting" (as if respecting the consent and 
humanity of women was a trick to sleep with them). This is not to say that these views or that incel 
are dominant within the Grey Tribe writ large, the problem is that these views and followers are 
not actively removed from larger internet communities and violently attack women in terrorist 
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acts. Even a small group of “peaceful” Incels can drive women out of digital spaces leading to 
further radicalization, further fueling the internal narratives of these groups.  
While the 2017 attack in Toronto would popularize the term Incel within the public 
imagination, the recent Right-Wing manosphere has been responsible for terrorist attacks since at 
least 2014.392 Earlier misogynist attacks have targeted women but were not part of a broader online 
community. The American scholar on the Far-Right Matthew Lyons correctly links the rise of 
these public attacks with the subsequent fall out of the gamergate movement. Though Lyons also 
points out that this misogynist wing of the broader Alternative Right often clashes with the white 
nationalist element of the Alternative Right, typically when the manosphere/Men’s Right advocate 
is non-white.393 As the manosphere includes non-whites, this is often at odds with the racial purity 
demanded by many within the white-nationalist wing of the Alternative Right. Under a strict 
definition of the Alternative Right which is limited to the Alt-Right radical core centred around 
the white nationalism of Richard Spencer, these non-white manosphere members would be 
excluded from the definition, rather than being included as members of the broader Alternative 
Right. 
For the Incel, NEET or alienated young person, the desire for an influential authority figure 
to force them out of their misery is attractive. The materially successful member of the Grey Tribe 
can look at Peter Thiel or Elon Musk and try their hand at some form of venture capitalism or tech 
entrepreneurialism, but most people, especially young Zoomers cannot go to Stanford or make 
millions farming cryptocurrency. For them, the solution to their problems often come in the form 
of right-wing self-help and conspiracy vloggers. 
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Jordan Peterson 
 
Despite Jordan Peterson's outward appearance as a soft-spoken Canadian academic, he 
functions as a gatekeeper who brings disappointed young men into the Alternative Right. Peterson 
has rejected the claim that he is a member of the Alt-Right, true he is not a member of Richard 
Spencer's organization.394 It is unlikely that he reads Far-Right theorists like Nick Land, Alain de 
Benoist, Julius Evola or Curtis Yarvin in his spare time, but it is easy to see how his advice serves 
as a thinly veiled guide to a "softened" philosophy of the Alternative Right. Breaking down Jordan 
Peterson's ideological positions presents an accessible outline of a NeoReactionary or Fascist-
libertarian “self-help” book for Grey Tribe members. His ideas evoke misogyny395, biological 
determinism396, selfish individualism397, traditionalism398, submission to hierarchy399 and the 
rejection of cooperative community.400  
His first objective is to break the world into Chaos and Order, which he denotes as female 
and male.401 Unsurprisingly he consistently places masculinity as the objective state to strive for, 
with chaos/nature/women as an evil out to destroy. One does not need more than a superficial 
understanding of feminism to realize that this is a thin veil for a sexist hierarchy and the promotion 
of gender norms. There is no room for the breaking of gender-norms or transgender people within 
Peterson's framework. This opposition to transgender people is what first provided Peterson with 
international media attention when he refused to address his students by their gender identity as 
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per Canadian law.402  All it takes for Peterson is a single study, anecdote or book to dismiss another 
perspective, as he repeatedly does throughout his book, suggesting that the book Gulag 
Archipelago disproves the entirety of communism.403 During his public debate with Slavoj Zizek 
in April 2019, he admitted to only having just recently read the Communist Manifesto and had no 
familiarity outside that singular text of Marxist theory before critiquing the ideology at the 
debate.404 For Peterson this is not merely a campaign to retain male authority in one’s personal life. 
Instead it is an ideological drive to return to the status quo of evolutionary development in which 
women are defined by their ability to have children and to serve as rewards for high performing 
males. 
This second objective, the promotion of biological determinism is the key to much of 
Peterson's success. Rather than rely on debatable social science theories or be forced to respond to 
social science critiques, Peterson's use of evolutionary science and biological determinism allows 
him to use non-sequitur analogies and suggest that anything found in nature is the constant norm. 
In addition to this evolutionary psychological theory, Peterson also draws heavily upon biblical 
exegesis to further his arguments, marrying biblical passages with quasi-scientific anecdotes. The 
result of this theory is an ethics absolving maximum that survival of the fittest and the passing 
down of one's genes can absolve social inequality filled with biblical justifications which provide 
a degree of moral absolution.405 This admiration for evolution is attractive to those North 
Americans who find themselves isolated in communities where evolution is rejected. As with 
much of the New Atheist movement, many reddit-atheists in his audience feel persecuted for their 
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lack of faith. As with the Grey Tribe as a whole, the isolation and feeling of persecution, even if 
there are few systemic pressures against atheists in the Western world, feels real and is magnified 
by online communities. 
Peterson's ideology is akin to Randian Objectivism when it comes to the role of the 
individual. Peterson actively tells his reader to abandon friends and family members with problems 
that one might not be able to fix, to instead focus on providing self-care and self-improvement. 
While Ayn Rand sees everyone as a hero waiting to arise from the oppression of society, Peterson 
sees everyone as a sinner and a worthless person who has to improve themselves to be worthy of 
respect.406 For Peterson systemic pressures absolve the individual of self-worth and agency, his 
audience is the young (white) male who is lazy, with low self-esteem and resentful of their inability 
or lack of skills.407 Since he can draw upon evolutionary theory and not, hundreds of years of social 
science research into the impact of systemic oppression and inequality, the goal is always the 
improvement of the under-developed individual. The result is a synthesis of Catholic absolution 
and guilt mixed with the individualism found within a protestant work ethic, as Peterson shows 
little knowledge of or experience citing secondary literature within his arguments this may be an 
incidental rather than intentional synthesis. 
What separates Peterson from the other New Atheists such as Sam Harris or Richard 
Dawkins, is his traditionalism. As much of Peterson's book 12 Rules for Life is devoted to Christian 
scripture as it is fixated on scientism and evolution.408 Repeatedly cultural and evolutionary 
developments are linked directly to passages in the Bible through an autodidactic hermeneutic 
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approach. While not fixated on a racial theory like Guillaume Faye,409 the two-share great praise 
for the mixture of evolutionary science and a traditionalist framework, which is, in turn, shared 
across the entirety of the Alternative Right from career opportunists within the Alt-Lite to the 
terrorist white Nationalists who murder minorities. 
Peterson also repeatedly suggests that self-realization concludes with the realization that 
one is marginal in the social hierarchy and that the best thing one can do is accept it rather than 
rock the boat. Due to his reliance on questionable statistics about the Pareto principle as a universal 
norm, commonly known as the 80/20 principle, in which 80% of something is owned by 20% of 
the population, Peterson typically makes broad claims about inequality and the acceptability of 
inequality.410 Because there is no freedom within the system, the individual must embrace their 
position and enjoy their space and make the most of it. The conclusion to this logic is at odds with 
the constant idea of progress that Peterson is fixated on. This train of thought is partially due to his 
fixation on pre-modern ways of thought justified by a dogmatic belief in evolutionary development 
and by extension biological determinism with extensive Jungian psychology. 
The final element to Peterson's ideology is his abandonment of the community and the 
social. Due to his radical individualism and his fixation on the survival of the fittest, he sees 
compassion and charity as destructive. In what is either a paper thin allegory for his views on 
immigration or a carefully thought out anecdote, Peterson suggests that a well functioning group 
should be exclusive and refuse to include anyone who is "a neglected/poor worker" into the group, 
doing so will always destroy the group's ability to work. People who are unsuccessful in their 
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current situation should not be added to another group. If one cannot help oneself one should not 
help someone else.411 
Even if Jordan Peterson does not believe that he is a member of the Alt-Right,412 does he 
fit the three axioms for the Alternative Right? Does he argue for the right to difference? Yes, he 
forcefully argues this for gender relations and norms, and actively invokes racial stereotypes within 
his book.413 Does he argue for cultural Metapolitics? Yes, rather than focus on policy he almost 
universally focuses on maintaining cultural traditions against "identity politics" and "cultural 
Marxists."414 Does he argue for an individualistic hierarchy? Yes, he actively promotes a social 
hierarchy in which only the strongest deserve respect and that those weaker or less intelligent 
should suffer and die off according to a logic of social Darwinism. His followers have revealed 
themselves to be young white men, who match the demographics for the Alternative Right.415 Does 
this mean that all his readers or followers are members of the Alt-Right? No, but it does mean that 
he is sufficiently linked with the Alternative Right to be examined with apprehension and not as a 
"liberal" or "apolitical" figure, but as a political demagogue who radicalizes young men into 
Alternative Right politics, even if he disagrees with White Nationalism. 
The Christchurch attack and radicalization 
 
On March 15th, 2019 a white nationalist killed 49 Muslims in Christchurch New Zealand 
on a public live stream. The stream started with the internet meme of “subscribe to Pewdiepie.” 
Tarrant calling out to subscribe to Pewdiepie before starting his livestreamed mass shooting is not 
merely a throwaway joke but fundamentally one that defines the behaviour of the Grey Tribe. 
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Pewdiepie, an "independent" youtuber has the highest or second highest subscriber count on 
Youtube as of March 2019, he began a "subscribe to pewdiepie" campaign when his position as 
the most subscribed YouTuber was challenged by an Indian Youtube channel.416 The campaign to 
maintain his position was initially presented as a personal form of self-promotion, while Pewdiepie 
is known for making pro-Nazi remarks this is less of an embracing of nazi or neo-nazi ideology, 
but rather a shock politics as one finds on the internet among digital communities. The campaign 
was supported by the Alternative Right to keep the number one youtube channel in the hands of a 
white YouTuber rather than a non-white Indian media network. 4chan and other internet 
communities with significant white nationalist and Alt-Right presence continued and furthered the 
campaign. This less than subtle white supremacy is one of the reasons why it should come as no 
surprise for a White Nationalist extremist like Brenton Tarrant to quote him before committing an 
act of mass murder. The act is a self-aware joke, pointing out to the mass media his absurdity, 
sharing an internet meme right before he commits an act of serious white nationalist terrorism. 
Tarrant and like-minded white nationalist extremists communicate on, and through memes and 
popular culture, unlike the blood and soil white nationalists of the 1990s who were serious in words 
and deeds, these newer terrorists see no contradiction between “ironic” jokes and mass violence. 
It is not merely the shared enjoyment of an element of popular culture, but the active attempt to 
control and subvert online spaces to transform seemingly innocent memes like Pepe the Frog into 
a symbol for hate that defines the radicalization process of the Far-Right within the Grey Tribe.417 
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As with the other authors of the Far-Right such as Guillaume Faye, a French New Right 
Identitarian, the most crucial issue for their white nationalist campaign is one of demographics.418 
For the White Nationalist, their greatest fear is the future in which the white race, is subjected to 
the dominance of non-whites. The fear is a psycho-sexual one in which they are left impotent and 
abandoned by their fellow white men. They fear the demographic replacement of the white 
population due to low birth rates in contrast to the non-white population. Despite these trends being 
fundamentally material rather than racial, the fear of a non-white America or non-white dominated 
world is enough for these theorists to advocate for violence against non-whites. For the White 
Nationalist like Brenton Tarrant there is an overwhelming fear of replacement, from the French 
New Right to the Alt-Right in Charlottesville, the fear of demographic displacement rallies the 
White Nationalist Identitarians.419 Unlike the ideology of the far-right in the 1960s or 1980s, 
supremacy is not enough; the only way out is isolation and complete segregation from the non-
white population. As expressed by Peter Thiel, this is an escape, and from Jordan Peterson, this is 
the removal of undesirables from the community.  
Tarrant's manifesto is less influenced by the American Alternative Right than it is by the 
transnational Alternative Right literature of the French New Right which embraces both an anti-
capitalist and environmental argument. The argument of Tarrant is far less economic than one 
would find in America: "Millions of people pour across our borders, legally. Invited by the state 
and corporate entities to replace White people who have failed to reproduce, failed to create the 
cheap labour, new consumers and tax base that the corporations and states need to thrive."420  At 
first, to those unfamiliar with the broader international Far-Right literature of the New Right this 
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seems contradictory, how can it both be anti-capitalist and anti-immigrant, but this is precisely the 
literature that dominates the European Fascist thinkers of the French New Right, the mantra of 
anti-cuck Alt-Right sentiment since the summer of 2015. For Tarrant, the impatience of the 
demographic and environmental catastrophe is like that of Guillaume Faye, an ecological and 
political crisis that will emerge over the next 20 years that will accelerate to the point of complete 
collapse. 421 
The concept of "white genocide" does a discredit to the real tragedies of genocide, but the 
term was never intended initially to elicit sympathy with the victims of actual genocidal 
campaigns, but rather to evoke fear into those with white supremacist leanings. Genocide and Nazi 
imagery have been evoked since the early 90's online and have accelerated into its modern 
conception within the Alternative Right. Rather than adopt either volkish, blood and soil or 
economic justification for white supremacy, the ideological justification from Tarrant and other 
members of the Alternative Right is one of scientific racism. For the Alternative Right drawing 
upon the evolutionary deterministic ideas allows the problem to become quantified and 
legitimated, both because it embraces STEM authority and because it sidesteps any literature on 
race by social science and humanities that would discredit them.  
Tarrant's conspiracies are commonplace on the Alt-Right, whether they be the unfounded 
suspicion that Marxists not so secretly control the education system (Ben Shapiro, Jordan Peterson 
and Curtis Yarvin) or the belief that the state is exclusively controlled by corporate backers, which 
is ironically similar to a Marxist conception of the state. Tarrant is also consistent within the Alt-
Right for despising democracy.422 
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As with the other attacks, the lone-wolf terrorism of White Nationalists since Dylann Roof 
is nominally independent of the larger Alternative Right groups like American Renaissance, or the 
Proud Boys.423 The isolation is indicative of the Far-Right online communities on 4chan or reddit, 
which are communities for the dissemination of ideas but not for organization, in contrast to earlier 
political groups on the Far-Right like the John Birch Society or the KKK. A telling passage from 
Tarrant's manifesto is his declaration that his actions constitute a terrorist attack. "Do you consider 
it a terrorist attack? By definition, then yes. It is a terrorist attack. However, I believe it is a partisan 
action against an occupying force."424 In the immediate aftermath of the attack many figures in the 
Alternative Right including Lauren Southern, a Canadian Alt-Lite vlogger who infamously shot at 
North African refugee boats in the Mediterranean with a flare gun, quickly made moves to distance 
themselves from the Christchurch terrorist attack, even when it was unquestionable that they were 
partially responsible for the radicalization of white nationalists online.425 
Despite the abundance of memes within the manifesto, Tarrant makes it crystal clear where 
he stands ideologically within the Far-Right. The following passage from Tarrant’s manifesto 
demonstrates the awareness of the ideological and political debates within the Alternative Right, 
as Tarrant demonstrates precisely how and where he exists within the broader Alternative Right. 
Were/are you a nazi? 
No, actual nazis do not exist. They haven’t been a political or social force 
anywhere in the world for more than 60 years. 
 
Were/are you an anti-semite? 
No. A jew living in Israel is no enemy of mine, so long as they do not seek to 
subvert or harm my people. 
 
Were/are you a neo-nazi? 
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That is a very broad category of people, and the definition is fuzzy at best. So 
no, I don’t believe so. 
 
Were/are you a conservative? 
No, conservatism is corporatism in disguise, I want no part of it. 
 
Were/are you a christian? 
That is complicated. 
When I know, I will tell you. 
 
Were/are you a fascist? 
Yes. For once, the person that will be called a fascist, is an actual fascist. I am 
sure the journalists will love that. 
I mostly agree with Sir Oswald Mosley’s views and consider myself an Eco-
fascist by nature. 
The nation with the closest political and social values to my own is the 
People’s Republic of China. 
 
Was there a political figure or party in history you most associate yourself 
with? 
Sir Oswald Mosley is the person from history closest to my own beliefs. 
 
Were/are you a “homophobe”? 
No, I simply do not care all that much what gay people do. As long as they are 
loyal to their people and place their peoples well being first, then I have no 
issues. 
 
Were/are you “right wing”? 
Depending on the definition, sure. 
 
Were/are you “left wing”? 
Depending on the definition, sure. 
 
Were/are you a socialist? 
Depending on the definition. Worker ownership of the means of production? It 
depends on who those workers are, their intents, who currently owns the means 
of production, their intents and who currently owns the state, and its intents. 
 
Were/are you a supporter of Donald Trump? 
As a symbol of renewed white identity and common purpose? Sure. As a 
policy maker and leader? Dear god no..426 
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Despite Tarrant adopting a smug comedic tone throughout his manifesto, making references to 
Spyro the Dragon and Fortnite, his work is inline with other digital Far-Right reactionaries who 
mix humour into their texts, often creating absurd reactionary memes. 427 Almost every anglophone 
text among the Alt-Right's radicalized digital members is filled with ironic memes and comedic 
asides for those “in the know.” 
Tarrant's attack while localized to New Zealand, is intended to motivate and radicalize 
Americans. Throughout the manifesto, he focuses on how American media culture will represent 
him and his ideological positions in the aftermath of the event, to accelerate violence in the United 
States.428 The document is written explicitly for journalists with poor literacy or awareness of the 
Far-Right’s ideology to stumble through passages and amplify his message. The document and the 
attack focus on a concentrated effort to radicalize young men, both as an explicit call to action to 
the already radicalized and to weaponize and exploit the popular culture of the Grey Tribe to 
radicalize them. 
Conclusion 
 
The radicalization that is occurring within the Grey Tribe is the culmination of a decade of 
radicalization within digital spaces. The Far-Right uses its existing presence within a “non-
political” space to radicalize young men through “scientific” theories, pop culture memes and self-
selecting resentment towards the inclusion of identity politics and minorities within their social, 
work and digital spaces.  The initial apolitical identity of the Grey Tribe’s membership was an 
active rejection of the binary political divide of American Politics, one which itself was understood 
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through the meme of Blue States and Red States. Without adequate political infrastructure or 
education, these apolitical communities were easy targets for radicalization by extremist cells.  
While the initial edgelord memes on 4chan, reddit or twitter were presented innocently to 
separate the digital community from normies, it was exploited by Far-Right groups. The comedic 
elements of the memes were slowly replaced with a reactionary politics that was hidden behind 
claims of ignorance. The great difficulty is that until an online figure engages in criminal acts or 
outright terrorism, they can claim ignorance, even as the obvious imagery of misogyny, hatred and 
intolerance becomes ever-present. Which leaves those attempting to expose these posts, 
individuals and hate groups for what they are with the unfortunate position, like  Justice Potter 
Stewart, of knowing it when they see it but being unable to give a universal definition or 
description to separate an innocent meme from an Alt-Right meme. 
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Chapter 5: The NeoReactionaries: Nick Land and Curtis Yarvin 
Introduction 
 
 Without a doubt, the most bizarre group to influence the Alternative Right are the 
NeoReactionaries of the Dark Enlightenment. As earlier chapters have demonstrated, the most 
popular and visible members of the Alt-Right are not the intellectuals of the movement, but rather 
the public faces, such as Milo Yiannopolous or Steve Bannon.429 While it is easy to point to White 
Nationalist figures like Richard Spencer or French New Right authors like Alain de Benoist and 
find official think tanks and public rallies, the NeoReactionaries are hidden on the internet removed 
from the public demonstrations and mainstream reporting that has made the Alternative Right 
infamous. This chapter will examine the influence of the two most significant NeoReactionary 
thinkers, Curtis Yarvin and Nick Land, and will explore how the six key ideas of NeoReaction are 
introduced or incorporated into the political theory of the Alternative Right. 
Yarvin is a computer scientist and founder of Urbit, a tech start-up backed by Peter Thiel, 
though he is more infamous online through his pseudonym, Mencius Moldbug.430 Yarvin used his 
screen name Mencius Moldbug between 2007 and 2013 to prolifically blog his ruminations on 
politics, which would lead to the construction of his political theory tradition which would be 
known as NeoReaction or NRx. In line with the broader Alternative Right, Yarvin presents his 
NeoReactionary ideas as a rejection of both liberal and conservative ideologies.431  Yarvin’s work 
is a revolutionary rather than reformist project to replace democratic governance in the United 
States. He rejects the reformist policies of democratic and technocratic institutionalism that 
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dominates Silicon Valley and their California Ideology. The technocratic ideas of Yarvin are 
fundamentally accelerationist in nature, fixated on the long durée and the inevitability of 
technological development of human society, which will render the existing political structures 
ineffective. For Yarvin both liberalism and the social democratic system of the past hundred years 
were based on the technological limitations of the early industrial era, with advances in computer 
science, such as the internet, political structures which were once impossible are now logistical 
possibilities.  
His ideas caught the attention of many online, including Steve Bannon, who cited him as a 
significant political influence.432 While Yarvin lacks significant training in the social sciences or 
humanities, (only five undergraduate courses), he exploited his doctorate in computer science to 
great success through the dot-com bubble, which allowed him to purchase a massive number of 
rare reactionary texts from the 18th and 19th centuries.433 Yarvin prides himself as an autodidact; in 
contrast, his most crucial intellectual supporter is the philosopher Nick Land, who is a 
distinguished academic in his own right. 
 Nick Land is arguably one of the most significant British philosophers of the post-modern 
period due to his highly influential work on accelerationism while working with the Cybernetic 
Culture Research Unit (CCRU) at the University of Warwick in the 1990s.434 While his work has 
had limited publication, as one will not find his texts in a local bookstore; he was foundational for 
bridging the gap between traditional academic spaces and the digital media environment. His 
theories blended fiction and philosophy in a way that would come to define the political theory of 
online space, which exploits the pop culture obsession and visibility provided by many internet 
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natives to provide commentary on philosophical ideas. Then to the surprise of the academic 
community, he wrote a book-length commentary on Yarvin’s political theory on his blog called 
The Dark Enlightenment.435  
The Six Key Ideas of NeoReaction 
As an ideology, NeoReaction is premised on six key ideas. The first is a rejection of the 
typical academic format of journal articles and published books. Instead, they rely on blog posts 
and other multimedia texts to present their ideas, both of which have come to dominate the 
rhetorical style of the Alternative Right. The second is the concept of the Cathedral, which is a 
right-wing Gramscian-Foucauldian structural framework to express cultural metapolitics and the 
dominance of public discourse through managerial politics. Third is the concept of Exit, rather 
than the libertarian or liberal conception of negative freedom, for the NeoReactionaries freedom 
is fundamentally one of exiting, the ability to leave political contracts. The fourth idea is that of 
Monarchy, and more specifically, NeoCameralism and the CEO as head of state. The fifth is a 
social Darwinist theory of biological determinism. The sixth idea is the articulation of the future, 
one based on the accelerationist and dystopian realities of hyper-capitalism and the end of modern 
liberal-democratic nation-states. 
 While not the first or only political tradition to marry political theory and discourse to the 
free form media of the internet, the NeoReactionary tradition has been one of the more successful 
political movements to attempt it. When reading the texts of NeoReaction, the reader is engaged 
through humour, pop culture references and cyberculture in-jokes. The texts are more akin to a 
Reddit thread than an academic article. The literature bridges the gap between the serious White 
Nationalist texts of the 1990s with the comedic and ironic texts of the Alt-Right’s radical cores in 
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the wake of Trump’s election. One reads the texts of Yarvin or Land carefully but not necessarily 
seriously or literally. 
NeoReaction’s fundamental idea is that of the Cathedral. The Cathedral is a conceptual 
framework to explain a Gramscian or Foucauldian structural analysis of cultural hegemony 
without relying on materialist or critical theorist genealogies. The Cathedral, for Yarvin, is the 
liberal academic-state-media superstructure, it polices the expression of radical ideas and 
maintains a managerial state through interconnected think tanks, universities, news outlets and 
government agencies.436 Which is why a libertarian government could never be successful on its 
own, it would compete with a superstructure which would actively subvert any significant changes 
to the structure of society. This conclusion is one that NeoReaction shares with the White 
Nationalists such as Samuel Francis.437 
While in theory, small local democratic governments could support a libertarian political 
framework, this would only be possible if a vast majority of the voting population agreed with 
these libertarian ideas. In practice, there are no geographic communities comprised 
overwhelmingly of libertarians, therefore for their political identity to be realized they must form 
separate communities. This desire for separation is where Land articulates the fundamental idea of 
exit. For NeoReactionary ideas to gain a fertile soil their followers must have the ability to exit 
from their society and re-establish themselves elsewhere through a process of deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization.438 For the NeoReactionary, this is one of the fundamental breaks with 
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libertarian values; one must be able to exit society to be free. To be free one must have the ability 
to exit the existing society and end their engagement with the social contract.  
NeoReaction is an ideology that emerged out of a monarchist, anti-democratic and 
racialized interpretation of libertarian political philosophy. NeoReaction distinguishes itself from 
libertarianism through its rejection of democracy. As Peter Thiel suggested in Cato Unbound, there 
is a fundamental incompatibility between democracy and negative freedoms.439 A democratic 
government is set up to respond to the needs of minority interests who compete over limited 
resources. The dispersion of state resources will therefore always be influenced by political 
calculus rather than a utilitarian one. For a state to be the most efficient and therefore least 
burdensome on the public it requires, according to NeoReactionaries, a figure who can engage in 
near absolutist control over the allocation of resources. For Yarvin this could be a monarch, but he 
assumes that the more likely and preferable system would be one in which a CEO governs the state 
through a NeoCameralist structure based on the legal structure of joint-stock companies. 
NeoReaction is an ideology of biological determinism. While NeoReactionaries are not 
White Nationalists, at least not in the anti-Semitic tradition of White Nationalism, they do hold to 
a racially based understanding of the world. For NeoReactionaries ethnic groups have divergent 
and inequal intelligence and physical capacity. The NeoReactionaries go to great length to prove 
that whites are not the most intelligent racial group, to not appear to be white supremacists. 
NeoReactionaries justify their racially based theory of humanity by arguing that Ashkenazi Jews 
and northeast Asians are smarter on average than white northern Europeans, and therefore all other 
racial groups.440 Therefore, in the eyes of some in the movement, they are not White Nationalists 
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or white supremacists, just followers of race science and eugenics. This justification is flimsy as 
some within the movement use it as an after the fact technique to justify their hatred.441 
The NeoReactionaries see the future much like Guillaume Faye, one filled with crisis and 
accelerated catastrophes.442 While factually incorrect about many of their claims, rising crime rates 
or military conflicts,443 the NeoReactionaries are fixated on the nihilistic malaise of late capitalism. 
Land and Yarvin reject utopian views of history and see the future of liberal society as one of 
increasing authoritarian capitalism. For Land, he sees a future of capitalist accelerationism and the 
eventual singularity when biological, technological and capitalist progress merge into a system 
solely for itself. Land accepts capitalist acceleration not because he values it from personal 
preference but because there is no alternative to the system which is driven to self-replicate itself: 
“Because it (capitalism) appeals to nothing beyond itself, it is inherently nihilistic. It has no 
conceivable meaning beside self-amplification. It grows in order to grow. Mankind is its temporary 
host, not its master. Its only purpose is itself.”444  
The Form of NeoReactionary Writing 
NeoReactionary thought represents a fundamental break in the expression and form of 
political theory, not just within the Alternative Right or Far-Right theory. While political theory 
has not been relegated solely to the academic library, it would be generous to assume that 
contemporary political theory literature was widely accessible. These traditional texts are primarily 
essays in academic journals or book-length monographs on the subject, with the target audience 
of graduate students and professors rather than the general public. NeoReactionary literature 
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transitions between the formalistic language of the academic political theory text into something 
more accessibly written, filled with jokes and pop culture references with the more difficult 
terminology explained through hyperlink text footnotes.  
This change from formalistic prose to semi-sarcastic monologue was precipitated by the 
conscious choice by Yarvin and then Land to write for a general audience of those who posted 
online and were active in the blogging culture of the late 2000s and early 2010s. The gatekeeping 
of academic presses and journals was replaced by the moderator on larger forums or the author of 
the piece themselves when self-publishing. Without this academic gatekeeping the texts could 
present unpopular opinions (based on racist ideas), factually incorrect theories based on 
intellectually dubious claims,445 satirical jokes446 and ramble on for thousands of words. These 
ideas would be presented as cool and edgy; this was not your liberal professor’s political theory. 
It would be unfair to claim that the NeoReactionaries invented cool or edgy political theory. 
Instead, they are adopting many of the same stylistic and rhetorical techniques of the postmodernist 
tradition. What Postmodernism did to leftist thought is what NeoReactionaries were trying to do 
to the Right, challenging the primary philosophical elements of political thought by challenging 
the role of technology, the media, truth and culture within modernity.447 As Land is well aware, as 
a former professor of critical theory, the literature within postmodern contemporary political 
theory is written to be transgressive to the status quo.  
A key reason for the success of the NeoReactionary authors was the transition from 
physical to digital media. One of the more profound shifts between the right-wing educational 
spaces of the 20th century and the 21st is the ability to access radical texts regardless of one’s 
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physical location. No longer do right-wing radicals and by extension, left-wing radicals, need to 
create mailing lists to disseminate books and pamphlets to every club or branch across the United 
States. Yarvin’s overwhelming reliance on google books throughout both his “Open Letter” and 
“Gentle Introduction” established a precedence for the Far-Right, one can site an article, figure or 
book with a hyperlink to the exact text one wishes to share with the public.448 A free PDF of a book 
that is available after one click will gain significantly greater readership than one available through 
one’s local bookstore given that the reader faces almost no barriers to access; this technique, which 
would become standard practice online, of citing texts and arguments through hyperlinks paid off. 
Not only did it provide ease of access to his sources for budding NeoReactionaries, but it also 
provided a legitimating effect to his arguments, as he had primary sources readily available to 
provide his NeoReactionary movement with legitimate texts from the 18th and 19th centuries. As 
online discourse often relies on definitive proof, these primary sources gave Yarvin legitimacy that 
his contemporaries lacked.  
 The NeoReactionaries only went so far, most of their writings would link to lengthy 
sources including poorly scanned book chapters. For the younger reader, these ideas were still 
isolating and inaccessible. Since the texts were produced while Twitter, YouTube and Facebook 
were in their relative infancy, they were still predominantly texts and blog posts rather than 
multimedia presentations. When the Alternative Right subsumed the NeoReactionary movement, 
it did so with more engaging social media techniques including memes, vlogs and live streams. 
The NeoReactionary texts should be understood as transitional rather than entirely separate from 
the existing forms used by the canon of political theory.  
 
448 Yarvin, “An Open Letter to Open-Minded Progressives Chapter 1: A Horizon Made of Canvas”; Yarvin, “A 
Gentle Introduction to Unqualifed Reservations: Chapter 1: The Red Pill.” 
173 
 
What is the Cathedral? 
Curtis Yarvin’s central idea is the Cathedral. The Cathedral is Yarvin’s conceptual 
breakdown of political power within society, specifically the role of knowledge-power, i.e. 
nonfinancial and non-military power, through administrative, judicial, media, legislative and 
academic institutions; effectively those elements of society which run and guide society, instead 
of the legal rules of who controls the state.449 The trinity that composes the Cathedral are the liberal 
university structure, which he labels as synonymous with Harvard, the mainstream media and their 
liberal journalists and finally the state department and the NGO’s that share funding resources and 
objectives with the United States government. 
In chapter four of the “Open Letter to Open-Minded Progressives”, Yarvin creates the 
Cathedral as a thought experiment to explain his version of manufactured consent.450 Yarvin 
suggests that there are three broad types of society when it comes to intellectual freedom, the first 
type is where there is little to no intellectual freedom, the state decides what good ideas are and 
which are bad. Yarvin suggests Elizabethan England, Contemporary China or North Korea are 
examples of this type.451 The second type of society is based on spontaneous coordination, a 
consensus society.452 Rather than the state dictating intellectual freedom, it is the universities and 
media which dictate the terms for the state. Yarvin proceeds to argue that a society in which the 
most prestigious universities agree with each other and the major media outlets agree with each 
other would be a type two society, and the most indicative of Western society. The third type is 
the Popperian Open Society premised on a market place of ideas in which the best ideas win out 
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over the worse.453 This open society is the idealized understanding of society based on reason, and 
the least likely to exist due to the steady creep of state and bureaucratic power, as expressed within 
James Burnham’s Managerial Revolution.454 The Cathedral is the conceptual framework to explain 
this spontaneous coordination found within the consensus society of type two. 
Yarvin is fixated on the role of non-state institutions which generate knowledge, which 
emerges out of his apprehension towards organized Christian faith and their ability to generate 
truth claims.455 While a traditional religious institution would abide by a truth claim for centuries, 
making only moderate variations to the canon, a university, according to Yarvin, changes their 
truth claims quickly, typically at an accelerating rate. The Cathedral is Yarvin’s attempt to answer 
the question of rapid ideological and social-technological change within universities; why does the 
“truth” at Harvard synchronize with the “truth” at Stanford almost immediately? For Yarvin, they 
must either both come to the same truth claim concurrently through semi-independent research 
consistently, or there must be some interlocking system in which most universities agree with each 
other. Yarvin ignores the literature on the academic culture within sociology, and the literature on 
the transmission of ideas within communications and media studies and instead recreates the wheel 
from a reactionary perspective.  
The Cathedral is a superstructure without authorial or conspiratorial agency; it is a political 
structure that is constructed historically. Over time this Cathedral has constructed a regime of truth, 
which has normalized surveillance and disciplinary practices. While Foucault highlighted the use 
of disciplinary practices to marginalize the oppressed and those on the fringe, Curtis Yarvin has 
no such politics of emancipation. While Foucadians will understand this as a form of pastoral 
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power, to explain the role of surveillance as a method of governance within modernity,456 the right 
and precisely the reactionary right has lacked a definitive non-conspiratorial understanding of 
these relations. The Cathedral is not a conspiratorial structure, which is one of the definitive breaks 
that it makes from other online radical right-wing ideologies and theories, and places it more in 
line with Samuel Francis and James Burnham.457 There is no actual cabal of Jewish financiers; 
there is no free-mason conspiracy, there is no Illuminati controlling America. Instead, there is a 
superstructure that reproduces itself with each generation of intellectual thought, always expanding 
its bureaucracy and in turn corruption. In Yarvin's own words:  
Certainly, the synchronization is not coordinated by any human hierarchical 
authority. ... The system may be Orwellian, but it has no Goebbels. It produces 
Gleichschaltung without a Gestapo. It has a Party line without a Party. A neat 
trick.458 
What Yarvin’s politics share with someone like Foucault are clear; the study of politics is the study 
of creating truth.  
Those who function within the Cathedral have always shared the same spaces and culture. 
Rather than suggesting that the social media bubble created the echo chamber, Yarvin extends it 
back much farther, arguing that the functionaries of the system since the emergence of liberalism 
have shared the same culture and campaigns for humanistic doctrines.459 Take this understanding 
of culture with the biological determinism that has emerged out of libertarianism and one gets the 
Memeplex. The Memeplex is a self-reinforcing system that furthers the Cathedral and its values, 
through a process of normalizing respectable views and ostracizing others. While Yarvin is not the 
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only author to argue for hegemonic normality within modernism, his concept of the Cathedral 
provided a rationalist rather than a moralistic justification for anti-modernity.  
For Yarvin the Cathedral maintains a system of liberal moral and cultural norms.460 While 
other superstructures fixated on the economic systems of control, Yarvin is focusing on the 
maintenance of the rhetorical and media control of equality. For Yarvin the promotion and 
maintenance of equality are authoritarian because it rejects any theory not predicated on those 
moral axioms, therefore it limits the plurality of perspective and freedom of thought essential to a 
free society. The Cathedral prevents the freedom of non-liberal thought in practice, even though 
legal documents allow for freedom of speech; liberals can have their free-speech cake and eat it 
too. Non-cosmopolitan thought is rejected, and those who put it forward are ostracized and often 
re-educated.461 This insight, if it focused on the role of hegemonic society to marginalize oppressed 
groups would be emancipatory. Unfortunately, Yarvin focuses on those traditionally in hegemonic 
positions within society. Instead of discussing how pastoral power normalizes heterosexuality at 
the cost of homosexuality like Foucault,462 Yarvin sees how the Cathedral prevents biological 
research into eugenics or biology.  
The Cathedral as a framework provides members and supporters of the Alternative Right 
with a useful rhetorical scapegoat to separate themselves from liberal and left-wing critiques of 
university spaces. The maintenance of the Cathedral enforced orthodoxy results in intellectual 
witch hunts at university campuses targeting, typically right-wing and "politically incorrect" 
language. These “witch hunts” are where a figure like Jordan Peterson comes in. Peterson a 
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University of Toronto professor who argues against tolerance in the classroom by refusing to use 
a student's preferred gendered pronouns.463  
Despite this framework’s appeal, as a way to justify the inability of reactionary ideas to 
populate the public imagination, the power of academics is relatively limited, due to widespread 
distrust for professionals and academics within American political culture, as Hofstadter has 
written about extensively.464 What power academics have can be better encapsulated by a  
Gramscian framework of public intellectuals, as the French New Right attempts. As organic 
intellectuals in a Gramscian framework, the academic shifts public discourse over time, yet lacks 
the almost conspiratorial power that Yarvin ascribes to them. 
Yarvin is partially right when he says: “No one tells journalists and professors what to 
say.”465 both groups can get away with pointing out the hypocrisies and corruption of the State and 
major corporations. However, Yarvin ignores the role of the state and major corporations to fire 
transgressive journalists, blacklist professors and deny them income until they adopt the party line. 
As with most of Yarvin’s work, the power of corporations is presented as a good not to be 
questioned, or it is something that is lacking significance. Yarvin’s pro-corporate position stands 
in contrast to the White Nationalist and European New Right literature which questions the role of 
large corporations within capitalism.  
Exit - How to Resist like a Reactionary 
If Yarvin’s primary contribution to NeoReactionary thought was the structure of the 
Cathedral, then Land’s significant contribution was the theory of Exit. The primary function of the 
Dark Enlightenment is for Land to translate the ideas of Yarvin into something that is both more 
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philosophically rigorous and less transparently racist. While the Cathedral and NeoCameralism 
are valuable ideas, they are at best a reactionary reinterpretation of existing ideas and an 
aspirational objective for reactionaries if given carte blanc. The key idea for Land is exit, which 
he reinterprets through accelerationism and deterritorialization.466  
NeoReactionaries do not understand freedom as the liberal ideas of free speech, assembly 
or religion; these are the freedoms within a system. Within a specific space, one has permission 
from the state to express views critical of the state. Within the confines of the state, one can 
assemble with like-minded people. Within the state, one can express one’s religious views. With 
each of these, one is limited by what the state permits as a right, and the state can use legal methods 
to delineate acceptable expression, assembly or religion without individual consent. If the 
government states that one is no longer allowed to yell fire in a crowded room, then the individual 
is forced and coerced into accepting the new contract with the government, regardless of the type 
of government, monarchy or democracy. The state is, therefore, able to, through democracy or 
otherwise, force an individual into a contractual arrangement without their consent. 
For Land, the solution to this lack of consent is a new framework to conceptualize freedom. 
Drawing upon Thiel and by extension Albert Hirschman, freedom is defined by the ability to exit 
a system that one disagrees with.467 Protesting a disagreeable law can collectively change the law 
over time, but it does not end the coercion of the state to dictate the conditions of the social contract. 
Rather than fixating on the right to dissent within a system, freedom is the ability to leave a system, 
i.e. to exit.468  Essentially this system of politics replaces the freedom of voice and expression with 
the ability for free exit from the system which they disagree with, to quote Land: "No Voice, free 
 
466 Land, “The Dark Enlightenment,” pt. 1. 
467 Thiel, “The Education of a Libertarian.” 
468 Land, “The Dark Enlightenment,” pt. 1. 
179 
 
exit."469 The project of the Dark Enlightenment and NeoReactionary organization is effectively to 
organize an exit from the system. While a literal exit from the system may be difficult, as sea-
steading and space travel appear to be out of reach within the near future,470 Yarvin imagines a 
political praxis for the NeoReactionaries to leave the system which he calls passivism.  
Passivism is akin to a Marxist conception of heightening the contradictions within the 
system rather than adopting reformist measures, or like Julius Evola’s suggestion to ride the tiger 
of modernity, which he labels apolieta.471 Those on the Alternative Right like Yarvin imagined the 
need to rebuild the political structure from scratch, because any successful NeoReactionary or 
White Nationalist party would only be able to attempt half measures rather than complete systemic 
change, due to structural limitations imposed by democratic and modern state bureaucracies. This 
idea is shared by Samuel Francis when it comes to White Nationalism’s impossibility under 
neoliberal capitalism,472 Alexander Dugin’s dream of a fourth political theory to transcend 
postliberalism473 and by Guillaume Faye’s dream of Archeofuturism emerging only after the crisis 
of Western Civilization.474 The goal of passivism is, therefore, to establish the framework for an 
alternative to be imagined.  This means that the first step is to create a plan b.475 Yarvin compares 
plan b to an eject button on an airplane, without one the pilot will do everything they possibly can 
to save the plane as there is no alternative, but once you include the eject button the pilot can 
abandon the plane when all hope is lost. When there is no alternative, the responsibility is on the 
disaffected party to create an alternative from the ground up, then create that perfect and practical 
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image in the eyes of the other party. Yarvin argues that it was because the Soviet people had the 
example of American democracy that they knew that they could transition to a different system of 
government and allow the Soviet Union to collapse.476 There was no alternative for the American 
population in 2009, but by 2016, new ideas and alternatives had started to emerge, but there was 
nowhere else to go. Under a TINA (There is no alternative) reality, the public is left with a nihilistic 
acceptance of the status quo, no matter how much they despise it. 
For Yarvin, the immediate goal of NeoReactionary political action is passivism, in which 
the best way to act as a NeoReactionary is to, effectively, leave the system. The official policy of 
NeoReactionaries is what Yarvin calls the Steel Rule, which argues for isolating oneself from the 
system while existing within it. As he says in the ninth chapter of his “Gentle Introduction” “the 
steel rule precludes in no particular order: demonstrations, press releases, suicide bombs … and 
any other activist technique, violent or harmless, legal or illegal, fashionable or despicable.”477 The 
most that one should do is vote for the status quo or call a representative of the government because 
both actions submit to the state without challenging it. Only in acts of self-defence does the non-
action break. This politics of passivism stands in stark contrast to the politics of the Alt-Right 
which saw street protest and rabble-rousing as a capable political praxis for drawing awareness, 
but it also resulted in every group from the New York Times to Antifa publicly opposing them. 
NeoReaction is isolationist in an age of globalization; there is no humanitarian intervention or 
domino theory for the NeoReactionaries to oppose or support, as Michael Perilloux claims when 
discussing what NeoReactionary interventionist policy would look like: "NeoReaction does not 
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care about Tibetan sovereignty, which is an internal political issue in someone else’s empire, on 
the other side of the world."478  
 The advantages to passivism for Yarvin are fourfold; the first is the advantage that it 
disappears from state surveillance.479 In the 21st century, there is no public space in which to 
communicate politically without corporate or government surveillance, therefore leaving the 
“radar” without actively leaving society provides active camouflage. The state’s security apparatus 
must label a NeoReactionary as a threat before they can engage in counter-extremism and anti-
radicalization initiatives. Yarvin was right about flying under the radar, the Alt-Right effectively 
formed and maintained its unified political voice so long as it flew under the radar of most forms 
of censorship and no-platforming. As the significant Far-Right blogs and activists are no-
platformed, they lose their ability to disseminate ideas;480 in contrast, the NeoReactionaries, who 
have influenced many of the Alternative Right bloggers have adequately maintained their blogs 
and networks as they maintain a small group of dedicated followers. As Yarvin points out, he 
received almost no negative emails during his early period,481 as his work was mostly discussed on 
sites like Less Wrong, not over Twitter or YouTube which contain dissenting opposition. 
The second argument for passivism for NeoReactionaries is that going out of the way to 
challenge the left only stimulates it.482 As the liberal institution is decentralized, it does not matter 
if one takes down one of their thinkers or blogs with “logic and reason,” liberal academics are a 
hydra, critique one and two more will respond to one’s critique. Therefore this active refusal to 
participate and challenge the left on their own field is, broadly speaking, the reason why outside 
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of those who went looking for them, almost no one on the centre to left-wing political landscape 
noticed the rise of the Alt-Right internet community until they made the populist shift during 2014 
with the advent of Gamergate.483 Even centrist and anti-extremist organizations tasked with 
tracking the rise of Right-Wing extremist organizations were limited in their ability to directly 
confront these groups due to their lack of violence, even if the NeoReactionaries were radicalizing 
young men into a racist political project.484 
The third argument for passivism for NeoReactionaries is that it stops a Hitler-like figure 
from emerging from within the movement. The elitist nature of reactionary thought when 
presented as a populist campaign, creates fascism, as it promises to share power through the 
democratic institution of voting and democracy, even if it campaigns on and eventually ends 
democracy.485 As Yarvin predicted in 2009, a right-wing demagogue who latches onto the ideas of 
NeoReaction, such as Bannon or Donald Trump (indirectly) could quickly sabotage the movement, 
and destroy it in the long run. As Evola suggested, decades earlier, the populism of the Nazi Party 
was the downfall of fascist and reactionary politics for decades.486 
The fourth argument for passivism is that it allows for the recruitment of progressives and 
conservative members.487 Seeing as Land, coming from a left-wing academic background, 
embraced Yarvin’s framework, it seemed to be successful. For Yarvin, this is how he connects the 
movement with the broader Grey Tribe readership that he is writing for in his early blog posts. By 
adopting the veil of neutrality on contemporary issues, the movement did not get the door slammed 
in their face right off the bat and could coalesce and get passed around without the immediate 
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response of left-wing and liberal groups. Those in the know were able to share and transmit the 
ideas of the NeoReactionaries without censorship; they could further a politics of exit and 
reactionary thought without being fired.488 
Monarchy and NeoCameralism  
Almost the entirety of NeoReactionary thought is to some degree absurd, speculative and 
verging on science fiction. Perhaps the most outlandish idea of the NeoReactionaries is the 
reintroduction of the monarchy through a NeoCameralist framework. As Eleanor Lockhart tried to 
explain in her review of NeoReaction A Basilisk, any analysis of NeoReaction that accepts that 
there are flesh and blood followers arguing for monarchy in the 21st century must conclude that 
one is living in an increasingly absurd world.489 It is unlikely that one will find a majority of rank 
and file members of the Alternative Right arguing for the monarchy, even if they hail Trump as 
their leader and maintain a cult-like following of him online. The underlying idea that the 
representative state should be replaced with a centralized non-democratic leadership is more 
enticing than an explicit monarchy, and one which is broadly shared by Alternative Right 
followers. 
Yarvin despises democracy but also sees that it lacks the inertia to maintain itself. He sees 
the 21st century as the end of democracy because the social energy needed to maintain a democracy 
is drying up, the democratic deficit is increasing, and there is little to maintain the democratic 
institutions.490 Land's reading of democracy also shares this concern that democracy will be unable 
to sustain itself, for Land democracy is fundamentally accelerationist in nature as it increases the 
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speed of its collapse.491 The fundamental flaw of the democratic system, according to Yarvin, is 
the rapid turnover of leadership. If the state is held by a monarchy, there is a hereditary compulsion 
to maintain the system for future generations thus to maximize long term profit. Under a 
democratic system with fast turnover the system unsustainably exploits society and the economy 
for profit and corruption on an increasingly short-term cycle.492 Each democratic government is 
fixated on the immediate time horizon of the next election cycle. While this fixation on the next 
election has always been the case, the time horizon has shrunk even faster as the head of the 
political party is no longer thinking about just the next election, but must face the constant barrage 
of public opinion polls and the quarterly reports on the economic situation. The head of state is 
liable to the immediate results of popularity polls, not just the results of polling booths. 
The existing system(s) are designed not for the utilitarian long-term governance of the state 
but the maintenance of the governing party for as long as possible, which is rarely more than 
several decades, in contrast to states which survive for hundreds of years. Yarvin prefers the term 
demotism to democracy, as it covers not only liberal democracy, but also Soviet Communism, 
National Socialism and fascism.493 Rather than reflect the will of the people, the goal of governance 
for NeoReactionaries is to govern well, i.e. through a system of utilitarian efficiency. Democratic 
governance sets too many conditions on ruling and too many incentives for corruption as the 
government has a tenuous grasp on power, based on the legitimacy of public support and opinion. 
Yarvin, who condemns the Nazis, sees that fascism emerges out of failed democracies through the 
merger of populism and reactionary thought, which dilutes the reactionary aristocracy and 
maintains the failures of demotism, therefore corrupting the movement, while he sees the 
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conservative governments of liberal-capitalist democracies as a failure because they despise the 
masses that they rely on for governance.494 This critique of populist reactionary politics is one that 
Yarvin shares with Evola, who devotes the entirety of his book, Notes on the Third Reich to 
explain.495 
The NeoReactionary solution to democracy is NeoCameralism. NeoCameralism is the 
literal transformation of the state, its citizens, capital, institutions and resources into a corporation, 
in effect attempting to reimagine the cameralism of the 19th century Prussian state. All the 
resources and assets within the confines of the state are redistributed to their owners as shares in 
the NeoCameralist state based on a technocratic census of all the social, intellectual and physical 
capital.496 Each member of the state is given voting rights based on their share of the state, which 
they can then use to appoint a board and a CEO. Unlike a democracy, which cannot typically 
remove the head of state quickly, the shareholders within the state could dismiss the current ruling 
board of directors if they mismanage the state; though Yarvin did not explain how they would 
remove a CEO who just ignored the will of the shareholders and becomes a tyrant.497  It is likely 
that Yarvin has ignored the role of the state to enforce corporate legal structures and forgets that a 
CEO can be arrested by regulatory bodies. Nor does this justification prevent the CEO from being 
concerned with quarterly reports any more than a democratically elected leader. This system 
intends to remove all the soft power and social relationships, which constitute the norms of society, 
and replace them with a mathematically determined political structure. NeoReactionaries embrace 
this CEO as king not because free markets are somehow effective, but rather that a CEO-
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Shareholder dynamic enforces a Mandate of Heaven system of legitimacy, in which a highly 
technocratic and bureaucratic state would gain from a leviathan wielding absolute control and the 
ability to depose the CEO through shareholder leverage.498 For Yarvin this is an attempt to 
“uninstall the cathedral” and make long term government policy possible.499 
The central figure within this new NeoCameralist framework is the CEO. For Yarvin this 
is a half-way point between the hereditary monarch who is inconsistently capable and the short-
term president within a democracy. The ideal CEO to run the state is a Steve Jobs or Elon Musk 
figure according to Yarvin.500 While Yarvin does not articulate this, the CEO can function as a 
symbolic representation of the state, as an active force in the lives of the public. The CEO 
represents both the individual within a libertarian ethos and the corporation as a monolithic entity 
of capital accumulation. The CEO is the only figure who exists within contemporary society who 
can run the state and represent the state simultaneously, being both a technocratic figure and a 
public persona.  
  NeoCameralism is the rejection of an idealized anarchistic or communist post-state 
society, one which fundamentally rejects the utopian understandings of anarcho-capitalism and 
anarcho-syndicalism.501 Land argues that NeoCameralism is the natural conclusion for the 
libertarian thought process, where the entire structure of the state is understood through the 
hierarchy and structure of the corporation. If one removes democracy from Libertarian thought, 
i.e. to remove the liberalism from the tradition, this NeoCameralist structure would be the result. 
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Rather than run the government as if it were a business, the NeoCameralist structure turns the state 
into a corporation so that it must be run as one.  
The foreign interventions by the US government to spread democracy during the Bush 
administration ring increasingly hollow for the post-Trump American Right. As Melissa Ryan, 
writing for Ctrl Alt Right Delete, pointed out, even though many right-wing elected officials do 
not agree with or are aware of NeoReactionary thought, anti-democratic sentiments are becoming 
even more popular with their constituencies. 502 Even if the idea of NeoCameralism is outlandish 
and unlikely to ever to be implemented, the anti-democratic rhetoric that the movement expresses 
helps legitimate the erosion of democratic norms, all the while laying the blame at the Cathedral. 
This theory will further justify the erosion of independent journalism, academic research and 
government regulation in the name of a reactionary counter “cultural Marxist” crusade.  
Biological Determinism 
While the Grey Tribe is the least outwardly racist group within the Alternative Right, it 
would be fair to say that NeoReactionaries have the most technical justification for their racial 
politics. The elephant in the room for the NeoReactionary movement is racism. Their ideas 
predominately function with an implicit level of racism that would be generally considered 
acceptable within North American life, an implicit acceptance of the existing structure of white 
supremacy and institutionalized racism. The exception comes when Yarvin or any of his racially 
focused followers begin to include biological determinism and racial statistics.503 Land, who is a 
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eugenicist, finds the racism to be the red flag that draws the attention of those who oppose 
NeoReaction faster than anything else.504 
There are two elements to the racist theory of the NeoReactionaries; the first is a eugenics 
argument based on semi-closeted racial antagonism and scientific tests of racial differences. The 
second is a racial logic of white supremacy and white nationalism which is justified by this race 
science. The NeoReactionary arguments which focus on eugenics disconnected from race, are 
more akin to Evola's rejection of the nationalistic racism, where the genetic capacity of peasants 
and nobility are of equal value.505 For the NeoReactionaries, there is an obligation for those with 
high intelligence to pass on their genetic ability to their children. The purpose of evolutionary 
thought is, therefore, to double as a quasi-religion to provide emancipatory progress for 
humanity.506 The result is a more advanced form of Social Darwinism that draws upon genetic 
testing that was impossible a hundred years earlier.  
 While the policy choices for White Nationalists are relatively obvious: genocide and anti-
immigration policies, the eugenics arguments are perhaps less obvious. Looking at humanity over 
a long-term time scale means that the long-term success of society requires those with high IQs to 
have more children. For Land, this system of biological determinism is undone by what he calls 
“IQ shredders,” which pose a threat to the viability of city-states like Singapore and Hong Kong, 
and in the long run, the development of human society.507 Significant world class cities like 
Singapore or San Francisco are home to millions of highly educated individuals with very high 
IQs, but they are also so expensive that individuals are placed in a position where they cannot 
afford to live in the city and have children. As a result, the best and brightest from around the 
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world, according to Land, are funneled into hyper-capitalist cites only to have a non-replacement 
rate of children. The result is the most valuable genetic stock being burned out by the capitalist 
system for their labour with no possibility for replacement. The intellectual capacity of humanity 
will therefore collapse and decline so long as these cities produce families with few to no children. 
By contrast, the racial theory is much more fixated in the traditional White Nationalist 
sentiments of racial purity. Scientific racism based on the Human Biodiversity concept is used to 
justify the racial pseudo-science that entered mainstream discourse after the publishing of the Bell 
Curve in the 1990s.508 The inclusion or at the very least, friendly harbour for White Nationalism 
within NeoReactionary communities should be seen as the connective tissue which allowed the 
Alternative Right and the Alt-Right to germinate around NeoReactionary ideas. As Yarvin 
admitted early on in his writings: “It should be obvious that, although I am not a white nationalist, 
I am not exactly allergic to the stuff. Maybe this doesn’t need defending. But I feel the urge to 
defend it anyway.”509 So long as they shared the common enemy of the liberal multi-cultural 
progressive dream of equality, the White Nationalists could use Yarvin’s ideas with only minimal 
changes.  
The focus on a eugenics system which is based on IQ tests rather than racial identity also 
helps explain how the NeoReactionaries are largely pro-Jewish without being Zionists. For figures 
like Yarvin, the success of Jewish intellectuals and business leaders over hundreds of years is an 
example of genetic breeding for intelligence and other successful traits. This also extends to 
Northeast Asians who are also positively received and welcomed into NeoReaction, as the 
Chinese, Korean and Japanese do well on standardized tests and other "racial tests."510 However, 
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this is also why the movement is derided by other groups on the Alt-Right, with the website the 
Right Stuff using the term NeoReaction as a pseudonym for Jews.511 The problem for the 
NeoReactionary movement with White Nationalists was that their anti-Semitic members levied 
insults against the Jewish members of the NeoReactionary movement. Without a centralized 
influential figure to control the anti-Semitism of the NeoReactionary movement, Yarvin predicted 
that the movement would become highly anti-Semitic and creep towards neo-Nazi fascism.512 This 
fear would be proven valid as the Alt-Right take over of the NeoReactionary movement in 2014, 
and 2015 occurred just as Land and Yarvin began to take a secondary role within the movement 
and the vocally anti-Semitic Alt-Right leaders like Richard Spencer gained increasing prominence 
online. 
The Future for a Western Renaissance 
While Yarvin’s ideas of a NeoCameralist future are the work of science fiction, Land has 
a much more complex and nuanced understanding of the future based on the current inertia of 
socio-economic structures of late capitalism. For Land, there are only three realistic paths forward 
for humanity: Postmodernity, Modernity 2.0 and a Western Renaissance.513  
Postmodernity is the continuation of the existing liberal-democratic structure of western 
society. Land does not discount the continuation of the status quo as a reality for the near future, 
but he predicts that it will buckle under its internal contradictions eventually. Western democracies 
will collapse due to the dual pressures to maintain profits and to maintain the aesthetics of 
democracy. The quest for continual profits will require a further lowering of taxes, expansion 
government subsidies and support for large corporations and the entrenchment of political elites 
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within the Cathedral. The affectation of democracy will require the state to promote ineffective 
and partial welfare policies domestically and human rights abroad. Land sees the postmodern 
system as it currently exists as a slow suicide into oblivion, just as Burnham did in the 1960s in 
his commentary on liberalism.514 
In contrast to the decline of Western postmodernity, Land sees Modernity 2.0 as the likely 
alternative.515 Modernity 2.0 is the non-Eurocentric modernity, which is emerging outside of the 
West. Drawing upon his time in China, Land argues that the authoritarian capitalist system of 
China will likely emerge as the dominant political and economic force of the 21st century. Unlike 
the postmodernity of liberal-democracy, authoritarian capitalism possesses the capacity to address 
the crises of climate change and economic inequality through a highly technocratic form of 
authoritarianism which will merge into a totalitarian system as capitalist acceleration erodes 
human rights and the liberal values of privacy and self-expression.  
Land suggests that the third solution is another Western Renaissance.516 The first step for a 
Western Renaissance would be a series of crises within modernity which would require a “hard 
reboot” of society. Just like Faye’s Archeofuturism or Dugin’s theory of postliberal world order517, 
the existing system would need to be thoroughly discredited. Out of the crisis, the new system 
would require four significant changes according to Land. First, a system based on constitutional 
republicanism like neo-Cameralism would need to replace the existing system of representational 
democracy, which would prevent the political foundations laid by liberalism to reappear. The 
second change would be a drastic minimizing of government to a night-watchman state, which 
would be significantly more possible and attainable if the state is also reduced in size to that of 
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city-states rather than the size of continental empires. The third step would be the restoration of 
hard currency and the end of central banking, which would likely be facilitated through 
cryptocurrencies, as the libertarians have argued for years.518 This last step would, in turn, assist 
with the final step, the dismantling of the macroeconomic stabilizers found within most 
economies.519 For a Western Renaissance, to exist the new system would be a non-democratic 
libertarian state based on Austrian Economics while at the same time distancing itself from the 
liberalism that inspired it.520 
As Nick Land surmised, Yarvin’s initial purpose for NeoReaction was to respond to the 
failure of the Austro-libertarian movement to create a realistic set of policies that could be 
implemented on a national level, as there is a push and pull found within a democratic system that 
prevents libertarian policies from being implemented in the long run.521 This Western Renaissance 
is the attempt to provide a political framework for libertarian ideas that are removed from the 
incompatible liberal structures which would prevent a libertarian society from existing. Land 
argues that this Western Renaissance just so happens to be the only alternative to a totalitarian 
capitalist system which would emerge out of the collapse of the existing postmodern system. 
The significant difference between Land and his fellow NeoReactionaries is that he 
acknowledges that capitalism is horrific, but unlike a leftist, he takes this conclusion not as a call 
to arms but with a nihilistic acceptance.522 Land is not obsessed with Austrian economic 
libertarianism; he does not come to the Far-Right as a libertarian, but rather despite it. For Land 
capitalism is an almost unspeakable horror which lurches ahead without agency, devouring all that 
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it consumes. Park MacDouglad describes Land’s understanding as fundamentally Marxist, 
summarizing Land’s logic as follows:  
If one capitalist doesn’t want to build smarter, better machines, he’ll be out-
competed by one who does. If Apple doesn’t make you an asshole, Google will. 
If America doesn’t breed genetically modified super-babies, China will. The 
market doesn’t run on “greed,” or any intentionality at all. Its beauty — or 
horror — is its impersonality. Either you adapt, or you die.523 
 For Land, he sees NeoReaction and authoritarian capitalism as one of the only ways to succeed 
within the capitalist system. It is not a moral one or even one that Land would probably wish for. 
Instead it is an inevitable progression that capitalist acceleration requires.  
 Whereas Land views the future as one of capitalism, the racists within the NeoReactionary 
movement embrace the collapse as an opportunity for White Nationalism and the return to 
traditionalist values. For Land the return to traditionalism after the collapse is absurd, it is a 
classical fascist dream of a rejection of modernity into the world of peasant farmers, it is entirely 
unappealing and counterintuitive. The populist desire for a return to the existing order is the 
undoing of Reactionary ideas, as it is the merger of populism and aristocratic elitism, which is 
inherently contradictory. Any attempt to merge these elements in a rejection of capitalist 
accelerationism will lead to a populist project that will ultimately fail according to Land.524 
Why did NRx fall out of fashion? 
The NeoReactionary movement, which was popular within a tiny group on the internet, 
could not widely address public discourse or mainstream media. The movement failed to reach 
outside of itself before the rise of the Alt-Right in 2014.525 In 2008 the Right-wing anti-American 
American population was highly limited, the dissenters within the Right were so low in number 
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that Yarvin jokes about how he is probably the only one under the age of 60.526 Ten years later the 
right-wing critiques of contemporary America has drastically increased.  
The NeoReactionary movement lasted between 2007 and 2015, before subsequently being 
eaten up by the Alt-Right's more populist readings of Right-Wing thought. The Alt-Right and their 
more fascist impulses were easier to share with the general public, in contrast to the more 
intellectual and elitist aspects of the Alternative Right that the NeoReactionaries favoured.527 The 
NeoReactionary ideology served as a gateway for Right-Wing thought removed from the 
mainstream conservative stigma associated with their politics. The critical difference between the 
Alt-Right and NeoReactionaries, according to Matthew Lyons, is the populist/elitist divide 
between the two groups.528 This divide between populists and elites is less a distinction 
intentionally crafted and more the consequence of the Alt-Right's ideology finding a home among 
those whom they did not expect, the rural and suburban voting block. The populist elements of the 
Alt-Right are disdained by the NeoReactionary movement for obvious reasons; one cannot have a 
popular movement with a broad base that argues for highly elitist frameworks. Aristocratic systems 
such as NeoReaction are desirable for aristocrats and those who perceive themselves as elites, but 
widespread faith in neo-feudalism requires populism. 
 As the NeoReactionary thinker Michael Anissimov pointed out in 2016: 
In the NeoReactionary circles of 2014 or 2015, you could reasonably expect that 
any random person being involved was probably a voracious reader, with a sense 
of political perspective built up carefully over years of reading old books. Today, 
any random person you meet on the alt right is more likely to be a troll whose 
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ideological background is limited to statements of the sort that Trump is a cool 
guy and that mass immigration is destroying America.529 
The kernel of the NeoReactionary movement has been transplanted into the heart of the Alt-Right 
but removed of its elitist reading of 200-year-old texts to justify contemporary political thought. 
This cultural shift is how the Alt-Right is more fascist than the NeoReactionaries, who maintained 
a nineteenth century understanding of reactionary politics, not merely conservative or fascist.530 
Anissimov's insider perspective suggests that through meme diffusion the ideas of the 
relatively small number of NeoReactionaries could have their ideas reach a much larger 
audience.531 As Anissimov suggests:  
 What makes the alt right more effective and adaptive is that it is tied to populist 
sentiments. It leaves openings for esoteric ideas like anti-democracy to spread, 
but its basis is on nativism with which normal Americans identify. The alt right 
is more of a family of loosely allied but also internally competing ideas, making 
it more of a memetic ecosystem in a way that a movement based around the 
writings of one person, namely Curtis Yarvin, cannot be.532 
While the ideas of the movement's political theorists are complex, the memes tend to distill the 
ideas to their broadest appeal. There is a clear division between the intellectual core of the 
movement and the general membership, which favours a softer form of the Alternative Right, 
which is more nostalgic than revanchist.533 The NeoReactionary movement has transitioned from 
a small group of intellectuals, in effect a vanguard party, to a much larger social movement that 
has lost much of its intellectual and cultural elitism.534 As Anisimov again states: 
Theoretical political movements like neoreaction are interesting, but the fact that 
they refuse to engage with the public and opposing journalists shows that the 
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movement lacked vigor all along. Thus while neoreaction was an interesting 
precursor to the alt right, that is all it is — a precursor.535 
In 2015 Park MacDougald described the Alternative Right, from the NeoReactionaries to 
the White Nationalists, as a constellation of thought rather than a firmly defined ideology; after 
the movements entered the mainstream this still holds, no single author has defined the ideology 
of the movement without facing almost immediate backlash.536 As is the case with most reports on 
the Alternative Right, the most sensationalist figures rise to the top while the more obscure and 
influential thinkers and members of the Alternative Right take a Machiavellian position as the men 
behind the throne. Brett Stevens’ views that the long-term outcome of the Alt-Right is that it will 
eventually be replaced with an organic non-ideological politics focused on hyper-efficient 
methodology.537  
 While the NeoReactionary movement has been subsumed by the broader Alternative Right, 
it provides a foundation for the internet natives to latch on. Unlike the White Nationalist tradition 
or earlier Far-Right groups, the NeoReactionary project was fundamentally one that emerged from 
the internet. Even if not all of the NeoReactionary ideas have transitioned into the Alternative 
Right with ease, i.e. Monarchial government, they will continue to provide the foundation of the 
movement parallel to the ones proposed by the European New Right and the American White 
Nationalists.  
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Chapter 6: The European Political Theorists of the American Alternative Right: 
Julius Evola, Guillaume Faye, Alain de Benoist and Alexander Dugin 
 
The evocative image of the white American male at a Donald Trump rally wearing a 
“MAGA” hat (Make America Great Again) chanting nationalist slogans seems at odds with one 
of the primary influences of the American Alternative Right, the work of the Anti-American 
European New Right. While the Alternative Right has grown increasingly prominent within 
American political discourse with its fervent America First nationalism, the movement has an 
ironic influence from anti-American political theorists in Europe. Steve Bannon, Trump’s former 
chief political strategist, has regularly cited the Italian fascist Julius Evola as one of his primary 
influences, and Richard Spencer, the founder of the Alt-Right, attempted to organize a conference 
with many of the contemporary European fascist thinkers in Budapest in 2014.538 Why does a 
group of American nationalists draw upon anti-American theorists from Europe? 
The Alternative Right is a new reactionary political ideology that combines white-
supremacy and White Nationalism, anti-democratic and anti-equality politics, stressing a 
hierarchical system of political organization. While the capitalist conservatives, known as 
“Cuckservatives” by the Alternative Right see no problem with globalization and unfettered free-
market Neoliberalism, the Alt-Right fundamentally rejects these values. The Alternative Right is 
not a unified entity with a set dogma or canonical body of work, but the movement is flush with 
anti-globalization sentiment popularized by European theorists. The Alternative Right draws upon 
several post-war European Fascists, which will be labelled Eurofascists or Identitarians in this 
chapter, to separate themselves from the nationalist fascists of classical fascism. While the 
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National Socialists or Fascists of the 1920s and 30s fixated on the creation of ethnically 
homogeneous nation-states, the contemporary fascist thinkers Alexander Dugin and Guillaume 
Faye are more interested in pan-European and Eurasian fascist projects. The most infamous post-
war fascist, Julius Evola even stressed that the failure of the Fascist project in Germany was due 
to the fixation on racial purity rather than civilizational politics. The internal and external enemies 
of a Fascist state still exist, but they have changed, primarily focusing on the perceived internal 
threat posed by non-European refugees and Muslims, and the global capitalists of the American 
based neoliberal project of globalization rather than Jews or communists, who are secondary 
within Far-Right discourse. 
The Eurofascist influence on the Alternative Right is particularly interesting because the 
Alternative Right draws upon authors who are fundamentally anti-American. The work of Faye 
and Dugin place the decline of European and Eurasian civilization in the hands of American global 
hegemony, while Evola evokes a strong anti-bourgeois and anti-American politics during his post-
war writings. Throughout this chapter this paradox will be explored as the Alt-Right’s nationalism 
can and should be understood as a rejection of Americanism on a global stage, one which places 
the project of neoliberalism and the Washington consensus in the hands of globalists, rather than 
as an American project. Fundamentally, the Alternative Right is rejecting the synonymity of 
liberalism and America. By drawing upon right-wing critiques of globalization from European 
theorists, the Alternative Right can reject globalization without relying on the left-wing writings 
of the anti-globalization and anti-neoliberal left.  
One of the fundamental differences between the European New Right and the American 
Alternative Right is the faith in democracy, both critique the existing structures as unfair and 
corrupt, but those on the American side of the Atlantic view Democracy with contempt. The 
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Jeffersonian idea of a democracy of small landholders is the most favourable light that the Alt-
Right takes, and even then those who adopt this view are more likely to be older white 
supremacists. The younger members of the Alt-Right are mostly in contempt of the system seeing 
little to be gained under liberal democracy. 
Arktos 
 
 These European theorists have existed outside of the anglophone community and 
maintained significant readership in their respective countries for decades, but it was not until the 
publishing house Arktos began to circulate translations of these texts that their ideas became more 
pronounced and influential with an anglophone audience.539 Earlier right-wing groups in America 
relied on mailing lists to disseminate ideas across an existing community. The white-supremacist 
text such as Imperium by Yockey was not typically found in a local bookstore.540 Therefore, only 
those people living within or connected to existing right-wing groups could access right-wing 
radical political theory. This all changed with the advent of two essential pieces of technology, the 
first was the internet and the second was e-readers. Hate groups could not set up camp on college 
campuses because they lacked a critical mass to start the movements. After all, how many students 
would be able to find Evola’s fascist texts or French language copies of Archeofuturism or any 
other major work of the European New Right, let alone find another classmate who has read these 
obscure texts at their liberal arts college? 
This norm of isolated groups would all change during the early 2000s with websites such 
as Daily Stormer and groups like the KKK disseminating ideas on message boards and forums, 
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reaching audiences outside of their geographical community.541 The success of the NeoReactionary 
community in the late 2000s can at least partially be linked to the movements focus on creating 
reading lists with links to digital copies of the critical texts or links to online stores to purchase the 
texts. The key publisher of the non-English texts is Arktos publishing based out of London. A 
quick look at their authors, translators and those providing introductions and forwards provides 
the most comprehensive list of Alt-Right theorists and influencers available. Between Arktos, 
Washington Summit Publishing and Counter-Currents it is easy to find eBooks of every significant 
text in the Alternative Right, excluding the NeoReactionary authors who publish digitally on open 
access blogs and authors so famous that they do not need a unique publishing house, such as 
Nietzsche or Heidegger.   
The European New Right 
 
 While the American right has been long dominated by the competing ideologies or 
libertarian and conservative-liberal thought, this is not the case for Europe. The libertarian project 
of the Austrian economists and the libertarian thinkers such as Murray Rothbard held less sway 
within the right-wing politics of Europe, which after centuries of aristocratic governance were not 
as fixated on a capitalistic right-wing politics as their American counterparts.542 The left was a real 
issue rather than a paper tiger as it was in the United States, therefore serious consideration for anti 
or non-capitalist ideas were given the time of day. The result was a thoughtful analysis of 
contemporary left-wing thought, rather than lip service. Evola’s primary object of critique within 
Ride the Tiger was existentialism and the armchair socialists in Parisian salons,543 whereas 
American right-wing theorists targeted liberal institutions. One only need to look at God and Man 
 
541 O’Brien, “The Making of an American Nazi.” 
542 Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America: Since 1945. 
543 Evola, Ride the Tiger: A Survival Manual for the Aristocrats of the Soul. 
201 
 
at Yale by William F. Buckley to see how the object of critique was centrist liberalism rather than 
what would be understood as left-wing politics in Europe.544 
 In the immediate aftermath of 1968, European theorists on the right, particularly in France 
began to form an intellectual coalition of the European New Right (ENR). Founded as a critique 
of existing right-wing groups, ENR stressed cultural politics and the right to difference, rather than 
capitalist and imperial projects that were heartily embraced by free-market liberals and 
conservatives alike.545 The key foundational political, philosophical condition of the ENR is the 
“right to difference” and a focus on cultural conflict. Right to the difference is identity politics for 
the majority or as Land articulated for the Anglosphere, the right to exit 546. For the ENR its politics 
is a war of position, drawing upon Gramsci, the role of the ENR intellectual is to be an organic 
intellectual shaping politics through a war of ideas. In this way, the ENR is very similar to the 
American libertarian tradition of the post-war era. The European New Right culturally positioned 
themselves a hairbreadth away from the more violent paramilitary wings of other Far-Right 
groups, both party politics and street protests are outdated forms of the political organization 
according to the leading ENR thinker, Alain de Benoist.547   
Due to their heavy reliance on positive media presentations, the ENR embrace non-violent 
protest and professionalism rather than direct anger and aggression.548 De Benoist takes Gramsci’s 
idea of the organic intellectual in opposition to the academic or traditional intellectual, stressing 
that the most effective platforms are the ones normalized and depoliticized, rather than the 
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intellectual avenues.549 This strategy dominates the YouTube, twitter and blog rhetoric which 
avoids the peer-reviewed and disciplinary practices of the academy relying on the marketplace of 
ideas. While the ENR found some success in the 20th century, the movement made little electoral 
ground outside of several “summers” of success in the late ’70s and early ’90s. Since the early 
2000s ENR politics would find significant support across western Europe due to the shift towards 
anti-immigrant, cultural fundamentalism and anti-globalization sentiments targeting the EU and 
American Hegemony. One which was made possible by the increasing technological access to 
non-state and non-university spaces for the ideas of the ENR. 
The key ideas of ENR are brought over to the Alternative Right through a shared distaste 
for liberalism and the American cultural hegemony which eradicates the differences and “true-
American” culture of the rural heartland. As with the Europeans responding to globalization, the 
Americans like Samuel Francis or Richard Spencer adopt pastoralism and a fixation on historical 
conflict.550 The project of liberal elites, that of a globalized “flat world” is fundamentally at odds 
with an American traditionalism which draws upon a romanticized past that never happened with 
a “white America.” The threat to Europe is internalized as a McDonald-ification of American 
cuisine and the dominance of American media within Europe; the transitioned is personified as a 
feminization of the once proud European culture. This fear of feminization is the same that 
dominates the fears of the American heartland through the Alternative Right language of racial 
cuckholding and “soy boy” culture emanating from the coastal liberal elites. 
Within the rest of this chapter, the three primary schools of continental European Far-Right 
influences will be examined. The connective tissue between these authors is a shared distaste for 
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the American liberal hegemony, both culturally and economically which is typified by the process 
of globalization. 
Evola 
 
The first of these traditions discussed in this chapter is Julius Evola. Evola was an Italian 
Aristocrat who was an active theorist and philosopher of traditionalism and fascism from the 1930s 
to his death in the 1970s. While the German intellectuals who were members of the Nazi party, 
such as Heidegger and Schmitt, were re-appraised by critical scholars for their academic works 
and insight,551 the Italian Fascists have been largely forgotten by mainstream and critical academic 
investigation. Evola has never seriously been included within anglophone academic spaces as a 
theorist of note, but he has found a home within radical right-wing thinkers. Evola and his works 
may be fringe, but his works have a much more significant influence than his name recognition 
implies, just like the Velvet Underground, everyone who bought a copy of his book started a radical 
right-wing movement. His most significant American follower is Steven Bannon, the former chief 
strategist for Trump’s administration.552  
Evola despite his reputation as the post-war fascist theorist is misplaced, not because he is 
not a right-wing theorist connected to fascism and writing on fascism, but because his works are 
mostly critiques of the mass populist action and modernist elements of fascist thought. Two of his 
more political works: Fascism Viewed from the Right and Notes on the Third Reich provide 
critiques of the populist mass action of Italian Fascism and National Socialism respectively.553 He 
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sees the fascist system, like Alexander Dugin, as a failure, attempting to replace modernism and 
liberal democratic capitalism with something equally populist and anti-aristocratic.554 
If Evola is not some secret Fascist theorist with a master plan for making Fascism rise 
again, why is he on everyone’s short list of most significant post-war fascist authors?555 Evola 
functions as the Far-Right Marcuse,556 his works, chiefly Revolt Against the Modern World, Ride 
the Tiger and Men Among the Ruins are not blueprints for mass action but guidebooks for the new 
aristocratic elite to find meaning during the period of chaos that is western modernity.557 Evola 
does not see an end to the American hegemony of the post-war period. He openly suggests that 
rejecting and resisting American globalization is hallow; one should ride the tiger and embrace an 
accelerationist praxis of hyper-modernism to bring about its collapse. Evola sees his own one-
dimensional man living within an oppressive world dominated by the faults of bourgeois culture 
and the threat of Soviet Marxism. Which is why the most consistent theme within his works is not 
the mass political action of Fascism, but rather the aristocratic individual succeeding within the 
hierarchical world of a neo-feudalist order, a mantra embraced by the Grey Tribe, 
NeoReactionaries, most of the later European New Right and many anti-democratic white 
nationalists. The goal of Evola’s texts is to provide a framework for young fascist men to find 
meaning in a world filled with the chaos and disorder of modernity, something that another 
intellectual self-help guru of the Alternative Right provides.558 
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Right-wing radicals have been drawn towards Evola for decades for his politics of critique 
targeting liberals and western Marxists, as well as his justification for elitism in the face of liberal-
democratic meritocracy. Just as the individualism of Ayn Rand draws in libertarian youth into the 
self-delusion of importance, Evola spins a narrative of the heroic individual calling out against the 
entrenched system of modernity.559 This narrative is not the straightforward individualism and self-
responsibility peddled by members of the Grey Tribe’s psychology,560 but a mythological 
understanding of reality focused on the self-construction of elite morality. Drawing upon Nietzsche 
Evola pushes for individual morality predicated on a rejection of slave morality, embracing the 
master morality of individual virtu.  
It is not simply the conservative party line that morality is being eroded by bourgeois 
decadence, it is not the youth engaging in “free love” and drugs, but rather the system’s corruption 
and failures that manifest in the cultural change. Evola rejects the conservative assumption that lax 
morals are eroding the system, rather the corruption in the system itself results in “the canary in 
the coal mine” of morality:  
Not even the so-called corruption of morals, in its most profane and 
moralistically bourgeois sense, may be considered the cause of the collapse of 
civilizations, the corruption of morals is at most may be an effect, but it is not 
the real cause. In almost every instance we have to agree with Nietzsche, who 
claimed that whatever the preoccupation with “morals” arises is an indication 
that a process of decadence is already at work.561 
 Ethical and moral concerns are thus socially constructed norms that one responds to and 
must be overcome by those strong enough, i.e. aristocratic enough to suffer the outrage of social 
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criticism.562 For Evola, the primacy of cultural metapolitics is one of strategy to rebel against the 
bourgeois system of modernity, a first stepping stone rather than where victory can be achieved 
for right-wing literature. For Evola, good and evil are social constructs that create a sensible 
understanding of the world through a unity of purpose for the masses, and the moral failures are 
understood as the blemishes on an already rotten and hollowed out apple. The individual who 
violates these rules of good and evil is bound to suffer from ignoring selections of these rules. For 
the individual, a morality constructed which fixates on good/evil will attempt to de-individualize 
the individual through a negation of their existence. For an individual's morality to function on its 
own, it must establish its positive/negative balance that applies to the self rather than to society at 
large.563 The heroic individual transcends the knowledge of one’s self and extends further by 
rupturing that understanding of their reality, returning to the core tenants of “western civilization” 
according to Alternative Right figures such as Samuel Francis.564 The transgressive individual 
breaking the social norms of political correctness is a hero for suffering the slings and arrows of 
outrageous fortune. This individualism in the face of public pressure attracts American readers 
who reject the multicultural and humanistic project of neoliberal/American globalization.   
For Evola the old motto of the Assassins "Nothing exists, everything is permitted" was 
indicative of the ideal social order, one which only functioned for those within the higher ranks of 
the organization, while those of lower strata obeyed the heed of the enlightened elites. For Evola 
true freedom is not an abstract right, but integration through the hierarchical order of the state.565 
It is no surprise that the Alternative Right reader who thinks that liberal culture is personally 
victimizing them would latch on to these principles and assume that they are part of the aristocratic 
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elite and therefore above the existing system of legal norms. For Evola, the people who can act 
beyond the sensible social reality of existing morality need to be entrenched with the system 
enough to support that system despite having the power and awareness to end it,566 not the NEETs 
(Not in employment, education or training) who populate much of the American Alt-Right.  
It is possible to altogether reject the existing moral system and replace it with something 
new on a societal level rather than that of the individual, but only with a new totalizing moral 
framework constructed to replace it, which is what Guillaume Faye intends to create within his 
Archeofuturism.567 This requirement for a new totality is where the critique of the liberal media 
elite comes into full force within Evola’s work. Evola calls out the emancipatory existentialist 
professor sitting within some university office, preaching freedoms and emancipation, as a 
fundamentally selfish and individualistic figure with no imagination for a new social order, only 
incremental reforms.568  
The failure to imagine a new world with radically different politics is where the Alternative 
Right’s fixation on cultural metapolitics can draw upon Evola’s work, which is itself a right-wing 
reading of Nietzsche's conception of aesthetics. For Evola modernity has pushed for neutralization 
and objectivity within the creation of art. The political work of art is pushed to the fringe or given 
to the state in the form of propaganda. Art in the mid 20th century according to Evola sits either so 
removed from acceptable politics to be functionally apolitical  or is the work of ideological 
suppression by the state (or both as the work of the CIA funded Jackson Pollack was intended to 
do).569  As with the NeoReactionary authors, the object of critique is the mundane art of modernism 
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and  late-capitalism which merely maintains a status quo or is so removed from the acceptable that 
it is alien.570 For the art to be political in the 21st century, it has to be therefore so low, crass and 
accessible that it rejects the previous hundred years of art history. The political art par excellence 
is, therefore, the internet meme, a form of poetry so crass and unsophisticated that it cannot be 
policed through neutralization and forced objectivity in a claim for universalism. There is nothing 
bourgeois about the shit-posting internet meme; it mocks the very institution of bourgeois taste or 
morality. While the aristocratic Evola would have been disinterested in the Alt-Right meme, its 
function would be appreciated. 
Evola and Fascism 
 
As A. James Gregor makes painfully clear Evola's claim to fascism is very problematic, he 
is a traditionalist, he is right wing, and he is aristocratic.571 He critiques fascist ideology repeatedly 
and is one of the few links between it and the traditionalist paganism that emerged in the post-war 
period. Evola was an anti-materialist, who rejected modernity and favoured an elitist 
individualistic ethos, which stands in stark contrast to the materialist, hyper-modern and populist 
elements of fascism. Even though Evola does not fit with the textbook fascist minimum, his 
influence on later fascist thought has not been overhyped, just that his ideology better captures the 
transition towards the Alt-Right and New Right, rather than the fascism of the first half of the 20th 
century. It was Evola's obsession with the occult that gained him favour among the pagan and 
occult fixated leaders of the Third Reich, his fixation on the Holy Grail had as much to do with his 
popularity as his understanding of race and right-wing politics. Gregor goes so far to suggest that 
the only reason Evola is labelled as a fascist is due to poor scholarship, relying on the reputation 
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of Evola's ideas and his self-promotion rather than actual scholarship and critical readings of his 
texts to categorize his thought.572 
Above all Evola is an elitist, his worldview is predicated on aristocratic and traditionalist 
political ideology. He is one of the figures most responsible for the conflated image of the Fascist 
obsession with the occult, as his work on the grail myth catapulted him into the elite social circles 
of the Nazi party during the war.573 For Evola, the modern age lacks a mythological grounding to 
motivate action, the rationalization of society results in a society of Nietzsche’s last man, an 
isolating end of history. Evola calls this life Apoleteia, a state in which the inner self is unassailable 
by this society and its values; it does not accept being bound by anything spiritual or moral.574 This 
is a far-right description of alienation and the disconnection from both society and metaphysics. 
Evola’s path, that of the occult, paganism and mysticism has been embraced by the French New 
Right thinkers such as Guillaume Faye and Alain de Benoist, and the hyper-traditionalist catholic 
faith of Steven Bannon.575 The function of the fascist or traditionalist system is partially to provide 
a sense of purpose to a capitalist system to resolve the alienation and nihilism inherent within 
capitalism. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that the occult behaviour of the 20th century 
fascists has been replaced with the conspiracy centric QAnon community in post-2016 America.576 
The quest for an unknowable truth provides meaning when the material conditions of modernity 
prove to be soul crushing. 
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Evola, like the NeoReactionary author Nick Land, argued for a racialized politics 
predicated on structural White Supremacy but condemned the petty racism fixated on racial blood 
purity by the far-right.577 Evola points out that the racism of Italian Fascism is no worse than that 
of liberalism’s racist colonialism.578 Evola is still a racial thinker, but more in line with the white 
supremacy of John C. Calhoun and the “civilizing” liberal theories on the subject than the Nazi 
party’s blood-based racism.579 Evola is a racist thinker motivated by eugenics, decrying particular 
people as primitives with inferior stock, yet his aristocratic mentality does not connect the racism 
of the mob, i.e. that of race with the "pure" stock of the aristocracy. Evola would argue that 
peasants cannot claim the legitimacy to genetic purity of aristocratic elites.580 What Evola and 
many NeoReactionaries argue is an aristocratic and hereditary system based on traditional 
monarchical government.581 This multilayered racism and eugenics is centred not on 
cosmopolitanism or multiculturalism but segregation of cultures from interaction, accepting, oddly 
enough, a relativistic mantra for various claims to legitimacy, Evola’s work births into existence 
one of the central ideas motivating the Alt-Right, that of the “right to difference.”  
For Evola, the leviathan of the state no longer exists, preferably the state shares and 
mediates power between groups. There is no longer an absolutist regime, even the leaders of states 
function in the interest of corporations, industries and interest groups.582 While liberalism is 
predicated on the balance of power against the absolutist figure ruling a state, the anti-democratic 
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theorists of the American Alternative Right and specifically the NeoReactionary community can 
use this fascist critique of the capitalist state to put forward absolutist and anti-democratic politics 
without relying on left-wing anti-capitalist political theory. Curtis Yarvin’s Cathedral mirrors 
Evola’s critique of the bureaucratic state hegemony which stifles the actions and freedom of 
talented individuals.583 Additionally, but drawing upon Evola’s aristocratic and monarchist stances, 
the Alternative Right can abandon the ne-touch-pas of a totalitarian state, the greatest boogieman 
of the American political psyche. Because one does not find the totalitarian conception of the states 
within the reactionary literature of Evola or the Alternative Right, one instead finds an absolutist 
framework akin to the early modern period. The assemblage of political power in modernity, with 
fluid and unstable governmentality, for the Alternative Right, needs to be replaced with a tactile 
and visualized hierarchy. When combined with the rejection of racial-nationalism in favour of 
eugenic human-biodiversity, the Alternative Right can take Evola’s fascist epistemology and reject 
the nation-state while justifying the entrenched aristocratic hierarchy.584 
This separation from fascism's collective politics would attract the Alt-Right's libertarian 
inclined radical individualists and their indulgence with conspiracy and quests for esoteric 
knowledge. The individualism of Evola's modern-day aristocracy finds a home in the legacy of 
neoliberal individualism and the elevation of individuals to elite status within the right. This 
aristocratic fixation partially explains the obsession within the Alternative Right to recreate 
something akin to the SS. The SS was envisioned as a new proto-aristocratic knightly order for 
long-term governance, where the ideal was not necessarily German, but rather a pan-European 
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ideal.585 The SS is then shifted from a racialized group of Aryans to a broader aristocracy of 
Europeanness, one that ignores the racial blood politics of Hitler that Evola dismisses.586 
Faye and de Benoist 
 
The second group examined within this chapter are the theorists Guillaume Faye and Alain 
de Benoist from the French New Right. While not a household name in the Anglosphere, many of 
the core tenants of the Alternative Right’s political platform, where it exists, are what Faye and de 
Benoist articulate in their political theory. This is more apparent when the connections between 
the American Alternative Right and the French New Right are examined on a personal level. 
Guillaume Faye, for example, is a friend and colleague of the prominent white nationalist Jared 
Taylor, who wrote the introduction to the English language translation of the Convergence of 
Catastrophes.587 While Evola argues against the bourgeois reality of American capitalism in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, his project was more anti-liberal than it is strictly 
speaking, anti-American. 
In contrast, Faye defines his political project of Archeofuturism as a rejection of American 
globalization without reservation, describing the purpose of GRECE, (the Groupement de 
Recherche et d’Études pour la Civilisation Européenne) the French New Right organization that 
emerged out of 1968, as “to resist the cancerous Americanisation of their homeland.”588  With the 
other pillars of his ideology being environmental collapse and anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim 
fearmongering.  Faye positions anti-Americanism as one of rivalry rather than as an enemy to 
Europe, in contrast to a radical Islamist understanding of America as the enemy. Europe or at least 
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the concept of Europe is separate from that of the West, not merely Europe and America against 
Russia and China, but instead Europe and Russia as part of a single political civilization which 
competes with America.589 The relationship between civilizations is akin to athletes competing 
against each other, not armies seeking to kill each other on the field of battle. 
One of the fundamental similarities between the Alternative Right and the ideas of Faye is 
the fixation on ethno-states and the reduction of multiculturalism, as a pretext for preventing 
immigration by migrants and refugees from the developing world. The influx of immigration is 
presented as a fifth column that will strike back against Europe in the coming ethnic wars of the 
21st century, just as the American Alternative Right rejects the immigration of Hispanics and 
Muslims when possible. Despite Faye’s anti-immigrant stance, this does not apply to white 
Europeans, which is like the acceptance of white immigrants into the US by white nationalist 
groups which find no problem with the Swedish or Norwegian immigrant but could not stand one 
from Nigeria or Iran.590  
Faye branches out from the traditionalist and conservative framework through his ideology 
of archaism. Archaism, much like the Dark Enlightenment, is the conception of a traditionalist 
framework of political thought fixated on curating traditions rather than blindly accepting the 
past.591 For Faye the purpose of his theory is to merge traditionist frameworks with an 
accelerationist ideology to explain the world “after-modernity,” “Modernity is backward-looking, 
whereas archaism is futurist.”592 A conservative politics argues maintenance of the status quo in 
the guise and rhetoric of conservation of traditions with a decided preference towards a separation 
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and submission of lower political class. While a true traditionalist theory is akin to constitutional 
originalists who derive their politics from a culturally significant but arbitrary collection of texts 
and see the maintenance of cultural traditions and social hierarchies as absolutely fundamental for 
the continued existence of society.593 However, these new reactionary traditionalists are actively 
articulating and imagining a new framework based on archaic values and practices. The Archaist 
mindset would see no problem with homosexual marriage, it does not pose a political threat to 
society and can and will be used to discredit those societies which reject it, but the Archaist may 
reject interracial marriage as it undermines the core ethnocentric beliefs of the society. This allows 
for the Alternative Right to justify picking and choosing which contemporary issues to support 
and which to oppose, which is how the movement justifies tolerance towards male homosexuality, 
but not the broader LGBTQ movement.  
As with Evola, Faye sees the project of modernity and by extension globalization as a 
precursor to the collapse of western civilization. While Faye shares some of the techno-utopianism 
of the Grey Tribe aficionados such as Peter Thiel or Elon Musk, he cannot imagine a world of 
billions living in that utopia and can see technological utopianism only emerging after the 
convergence of catastrophes.   Faye argues that there are seven factors which will lead precisely 
to the collapse of Europe: 1) The metastasis of the European social fabric, due to the cultural 
collapse of Europe due to immigration and society of the spectacle. 2) An economic and 
demographic crisis, caused by an increasing proportion of the population becoming elderly, 
leading to a strain on the welfare state, which is complimented by falling birth rates. 3) Increasing 
chaos of the global south which will lead to forced industrialization due to colonization, 
globalization and climate change.  4) A global economic crisis likely caused by a debt crisis fueled 
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by a speculation crisis.  5) Growing fundamentalist religious fanaticism, mostly Islamic civil wars 
and terrorist attacks. 6) The confrontation between global North and South, continuing the 
xenophobic attacks on immigrants and the conflict over natural resources. And 7) The unchecked 
pollution of the planet, which exacerbates all other factors due to the environmental collapse of 
industrial civilization.594  
In addition to these seven massive convergences, Faye also argues a laundry list of 
secondary factors, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, organized crime (mostly drug-related), 
disease, and technological problems connected to viruses. Written in 1999 Faye’s list provides a 
compelling outline of what would be the primary right-wing debates of European and American 
society during the first two decades of the 21st century. Even though Faye’s claims and 
consequences are incredibly over exaggerated, for example his preposterous claim suggesting that 
Europe would be mostly Muslim by 2020,595 it provides a compelling nightmare for the radical 
right which has embraced a conspiratorial logic which rejects dissenting facts which contradict 
their narrative. Faye’s suggestion is not to prevent these crises, as there is little to nothing that can 
be done to stop them, but rather what to do when the point of crisis occurs. The result is a justified 
nihilism where the elites can survive at the expense of the rest of the world. Given that his elites 
are Europeans or North American whites the reader of Faye’s text can adopt an almost voyeuristic 
position, seeing the end of the world like a disaster film. The consequences of centuries of 
industrialization and imperialism are non-entities to be discussed over drinks at dinner parties and 
imagined in Sci-Fi novels rather than issues to be addressed. The deaths of millions and perhaps 
billions of non-Europeans are of little to no concern to Faye and his followers. 
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While Evola provides an aesthetic theory to conceptualize the failure of left-wing discourse 
as armchair socialism in the post-war period, Faye faces the cultural rather than academic left of 
postmodernism and political correctness after the Cold War. Rather than fearing a totalitarian 
move by the materialist left, the outcome of political correctness for Faye is the internal self-
policing of radical thought, which opposes the hegemonic ideology of the existing framework.596 
This take is more akin to Curtis Yarvin's Cathedral than the more traditional American 
conservative take; the issue is the assemblage of interlocking media institutions rather than an 
absolutist state.597 This view by Faye is a more nuanced description of what we find in the 
contemporary free-speech movement within the Alt-lite. Faye and Yarvin suggest a more 
continental argument rejecting ideological reproduction, while the Alt-Lite takes firm legalistic 
constitutionalism which places it within the broader liberal tradition of free-speech movements.598 
Whereas the American Right lambasts a population without political education about censorship, 
Faye outs the painfully obvious; the state does not censor political correctness. Instead the State 
engages in distraction: “The system only makes use of brutal censorship in minimal areas: it 
generally resorts to intellectual diversion, i.e., distraction, by constantly focusing people’s 
attention on side issues.”599 The state censors wartime propaganda (through anti-espionage 
legislation or anti-terrorism acts) and particular threats to children (child pornography), but what 
the system of the state, academia and the media does well in a liberal democracy is the 
"concealment of essential political problems"600 rather than direct censorship. 
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 The western state provides propaganda through art and media, rather than relying on 
censorship. The western state is a Foucauldian panopticon, always watching but rarely shutting 
down dissenting voices.601 The state is excellent at ignoring the long-term crises of capitalism, 
demographics and ecology through a fixation on wedge issues (such as gay marriage, doping in 
sports and legalizing marijuana). The American system of government (which is institutionally 
imported to Europe) is one of Schmidtian decisionism rather than actual politics, ideological 
differences are secondary concerns to the well functioning technocratic state. The consequences 
are a professionalization of the upper management class at the expense of either efficiency or 
political action, which can be read as a continuation of Burnham’s theory of a controlling 
managerial class rather than a liberal inspired American understanding of censorship.602 The 
Alternative Right sees this approach as a refreshing change to the existing libertarian and moral 
conservative politics of the Right-wing American mainstream media.  
Faye refuses to adopt a simplistic understanding of censorship; the dismissal of the ND 
(Nouvelle Droite or French New Right) by reduced media coverage or being silenced under the 
threat of lawsuits is always written as a soft-totalitarianism of bureaucratic modernism rather than 
presented as gulag level oppression.603 These ideas are not the explicit work of the American Right, 
paranoid of censorship, but more akin to the NeoReactionary understanding of the cathedral, 
though less conspiratorial than the hyper-paranoid thought of Curtis Yarvin. The only objects of 
censorship are those of "mythical acts of provocation and ideological tactlessness,"604 such as the 
March on Charlottesville or the “Heil Trump!” incident by Spencer.605 Members of the Alt-right 
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are purposefully chosen to gain public censorship as they are tacky and clumsy, even if they are 
symbols of hate. The breeding grounds of the Alternative Right are not censored as a totalitarian 
state would censor, they are treated like a game of whack-a-mole, it is okay if the mole is in the 
hole, just so long as it does not come out of its hole and make too much noise. Additionally, the 
Alt-Right and its radical core are sheltered by the financial disincentives to isolate or censor these 
messages lest they ban mainstream conservative figures.606   
What Faye continuously drives home within the main text, Archeofuturism, is the reality 
that egalitarian materialism is impossible with the current population forecasts, the environmental 
cost is unsustainable, and thus the outcome will be a Malthusian catastrophe.607 He turns to Carl 
Schmitt's "emergency situation" or "Enstfall" as the theoretical tool for conceptualizing the future. 
As with the other thinkers used by the Alt-Right Faye rejects a progressive conception of human 
progress, and instead takes a nihilistic conception of Hegelian history. All civilizations must die, 
but unlike Hegel's Owl of Minerva, there is no beacon of progress leading the way. For Faye, there 
is no ideology beyond the current systems constructed around modernity, at least no global 
hegemonic ideology.608 Only the complete collapse of modernity and the chaos of interregnum can 
or will see the emergence of a new ideology. The ideology of the European New Right or the 
American Alternative Right is transitory rather than definitive. For the Alternative Right, this 
desire for the end is almost universal, with NeoReactionaries like Nick Land imagining a world 
with no future due to collapse and White Nationalists seeing no possibility for a “white 
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revolution.”609 The nihilistic desire to watch the end of the world enchants the ideology’s nihilistic 
compulsions.610 
 For Faye, the universalist humanist message of human rights fails to reflect reality and 
results in European cuckolding, which is identical to the North American Alt-Right’s use of 
cuckolding as a political framework to explain non-white immigration. After the collapse of the 
globalized neoliberal system liberal human rights will be abandoned and revert to older systems 
of governance and ethics, such as the placing of punishment over prevention and a focus on 
hierarchical social arrangements more akin to feudalism.611 Therefore, regionalism and isolation 
will return as a solution to the post-globalized world.612 Regional or civilizational power blocs will 
resolve conflicts and environmental concerns more effectively than global democracy. Faye's 
framework for international relations in a post-catastrophe age would establish a two-tiered system 
in which the developed technological states would insulate themselves from the neo-medieval 
states.613 The balance would be maintained by segregation rather than integration, colonialism and 
imperialism, which he acknowledges had led to the exploitation of people and resources in the 
past. Segregating the world into two tiers with little to no flow between the two allows traditional 
pre-modern economies and societies to exist, rejecting the colonialism which cannot be defended, 
and it reduces global consumption. The obvious flaw in this system is that there is no safeguard to 
prevent the domination of the technologically advanced states from invading and exploiting the 
less developed ones. While this segregated world may appear to Faye as the ideal solution, he 
presents no practical path forward nor does he provide anything substantial to justify why this 
 
609 Land, “The Dark Enlightenment”; Anissimov, “Why There Are No White Nationalists.” 
610 Anissimov, “Why There Are No White Nationalists”; Land, “IQ Shredders.” 
611 Faye, Archeofuturism: European Visions of Post-Catastrophic Age, 1553. 
612 Ibid., 1602. 
613 Ibid., 1632. 
220 
 
would happen. His understanding of International Relations is more akin to a science fiction novel 
than anything that would happen on Earth.  
De Benoist 
 
In addition to Faye, there is Alain de Benoist, who is even more influential within the 
European New Right, as the primary intellecual founder of the ND. De Benoist envisioned his 
New Right movement as an intellectual salon with think tanks and definitive schools of thought 
for the next generation of Right-wing intellectuals.614 What de Benoist imagined is closer to the 
NeoReactionary camp rather than the Alt-Right’s street violence and rallies, where the intellectual 
core of the movement can flourish without the widespread opposition on the street by anti-fascists 
groups. Modernity, which for de Benoist is understood as an individualistic, rationalistic, secular 
and universalizing project is reaching its conclusion.615 As modernity approaches its interregnum 
period in which it loses the legitimacy as the defining philosophical framework to envision the 
world, it will be replaced by the next iteration of a global philosophical framework.616 Therefore 
the goal of the intellectuals is to imagine the next world after the crisis, which is a mental 
framework that de Benoist shares with Nick Land and Curtis Yarvin.617 
As with the Alternative Right, de Benoist views Liberalism as the main enemy for the 
traditionalist cause.  
Liberalism embodies the dominant ideology of modernity. It was the first to appear and 
will be the last to disappear. In the beginning, liberal thought contraposed an autonomous 
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economy to the morality, politics and society in which it had been formerly embedded. 
Later, it turned commercial value into the essence of all communal life. 618 
For de Benoist, the American project of globalization and cultural hegemony is one of commercial 
erasure. For the Alternative Right, this unease with economic dominance represents a potential 
stumbling block as American political identity is wedded to capitalism. This is also the pathway 
for the paleoconservative elements of the Alternative Right such as Samuel Francis or Paul 
Gottfried to interject and present right-wing support for their ideas.619 
As with the other right-wing ideologies that have influenced the Alternative Right, the 
framework of Faye and de Benoist is trapped between a strong desire for a nostalgic past, 
reiterating the past conflicts into a neat history, and a simultaneous desire and fear for a new radical 
technological future. Which is, in turn, a dilemma facing the American Right, especially those in 
the deindustrialized regions. Modernity, for de Benoist, is bookended by the two 30-year wars, the 
first was from 1618 to 1648 and the second was 1914 to 1945, the rise and the disintegration of 
the nation-state.620 The modern state emerged out of an absolutist monarch and Jacobin framework. 
States are too big for small domestic issues and too small for global concerns. The contemporary 
state in the 21st century faces complexity and scale that was unthinkable when the modernist state 
system was crafted at the beginning of the age of modernity.  The centralized state structure which 
emerges in the face of globalization leaves local autonomy of regional governments negligible.621 
For de Benoist even the United States is forced to accept foreign interference and pressure, perhaps 
less so within geopolitics but most certainly culturally. The solution posed by NeoReactionaries, 
that of completely exiting global and domestic politics, is impractical for the French New Right, 
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one cannot retreat to an era of microstates and principalities in the 21st century which is defined 
by globalization and superpowers. 
In contrast to the American Alternative Right’s fixation with the amorphous nature of 
Western Civilization, which is presented as a monolithic entity within the minds of white 
supremacists where Notre Dame cathedral and pagan Ancient Greek statues are categorically the 
same, the French New Right rejects such a homogenizing conception of Europe. For de Benoist, 
the goal of the French New right is the right to difference for cultural and language groups within 
their geographical homelands.622 This should come as no surprise, the McDonalds-ification of 
French society through American led globalization has been a primary antagonist for the French 
New Right for decades. The conception of Western Civilization championed within Trump’s 
America is the exact opposite of the one imagined by de Benoist and Faye. These contradictory 
stances provide the primary source of confusion when examining the influence of the European 
New Right on the Alternative Right, one which Jared Taylor addresses in the introduction to Faye’s 
Convergence of Catastrophes.623  
Dugin 
 
In contrast to Evola, Faye and de Benoist, the Russian political theorist Alexander Dugin 
provides a substantial response to the claim that the Alternative Right is fascist. Evola plays with 
the term, critiquing iterations of fascist thought and specifically National Socialism, but his name 
is synonymous with the term Fascist. The French New Right is primarily a salon for thinkers to 
reject American hegemony without agreeing with either the non-aligned movement or Soviet 
communism, therefore providing a racially motived right-wing politics that shares the values of 
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fascism without explicitly stating that they are fascists. Dugin instead champions his fourth 
political theory as a break from fascism, liberalism and communism, but it would be more accurate 
to describe his ideology as effectively the 21st century fascism within Russia, i.e. Fascism with 
Russian characteristics. As with de Benoist and Faye, the failures of 20th century liberalism are not 
the prominent left-wing critiques popularized by Western Marxists since the 1960s, but rather 
culturally focused on the left-behinds and in Dugin’s case a fascist reading of Heidegger. 
As with Curtis Yarvin, Julius Evola and the other far-right political theorists that influence 
the Alternative Right, Dugin is primarily critiquing the Whig history of western civilization and 
the end of history narrative that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. For Dugin his 
theory is:  
The Fourth Political Theory is conceived as an alternative to postliberalism, but not as one 
ideological arrangement in relation to another. Instead, it is as an incorporeal idea opposed 
to corporeal matter; as a possibility entering into conflict with the actuality, as that which 
is yet to come into being attacking that which is already in existence.624 
Liberalism for Dugin became a depoliticized and naturalized default for post-modernity, 
one dominated by the American thalassocracy which allowed for the dominance of global politics 
through commerce, spectacle and consumer culture.625 For Dugin the 20th century should be 
understood as the century of ideological conflict between Fascism, Communism and Liberalism, 
all of which fought over their claim and legacy of the concept of modernity. For Dugin any of the 
three ideologies could have gained a hegemonic position over the world, in theory, we could be 
living through a planetary Reich or global communism, what matters to the political theories in 
the 21st century is that these ideas are not taboo. In this way, Dugin provides for a right-wing 
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Americans, who are unafraid of the anti-Russian baggage, an ideological framework for 
understanding politics and international relations without drawing upon the established 
neoconservative and neoliberal frameworks that dominate that literature. 
As Dugin opens his text “The fourth political theory is a ‘crusade’ against postmodernity, 
post-industrial society, liberal thought realized in practice and globalization as well as its logistical 
and technological basis.”626 The contemporary world order is a kingdom of the antichrist, just like 
with Evola, Dugin describes this as the Kali Yuga or dark ages.627 This crusade is one which unites 
race, class and the state into a unified political force in opposition to liberal individualism. Dugin 
knows that his ideological project must be one for a post-history after the end of history, opposing 
the ideology of globalization and neoliberalism rather than policy choices.628 The result is a crusade 
to move the Overton window of “reasonable” discourse, rather than trying to take on each structure 
within globalization independently.  
In contrast with the political theories of Evola, the NeoReactionaries and the Grey Tribe 
thinkers, Dugin positions his work as one of geography. Ideological conflict in the 21st century is 
not one of left-right, but rather centre-periphery.629 Dugin, like the other theorists who influence 
the Alternative Right, draws upon the taboo thinkers for the traditional liberal-conservative right, 
including interestingly enough, Karl Marx who is taken for his critiques of capitalism and the 
alienation of modernity – 
…as sociology, Marxism is tremendously useful in revealing those mechanisms 
of alienation and mystification that liberalism uses to justify its dominion, and 
as proof of its ‘correctness’. Being a myth itself, in its polemical, activist form, 
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Marxism serves as an excellent tool to expose the bourgeois ‘great stories’ in 
order to overthrow the credibility of liberal pathos.630  
Dugin argures for taking authors from the margins and pragmatically appropriating their 
ideas where possible and using immanent critiques of the material as a methodological warm-up 
for further research.631 For lack of a better word, Dugin’s pedagogy is one of making the political 
theory “cool” by introducing taboo and unorthodox ideas to a typically more conservative and 
reactionary audience. As with NeoReactionaries or the French New Right, the appropriation of 
post-modern and far left theories allows Dugin’s ideology to penetrate spaces that it would be 
unable to germinate in.  
Dugin’s fourth political theory and the broader Alternative Right attempt a re-introduction 
of history into the far-right/right wing through neo-traditionalist frameworks, where cultural values 
from the past are recreated in the present. Whereas the Silicon Valley groups of the 
NeoReactionaries and Grey Tribe thinkers tend to be less invested in the traditionalist framework, 
taking the idea of traditionalist symbols for their political use value rather than a nostalgic dream 
of past glories, excepting for Jordan Peterson whose work is filled with biblical and mythological 
references. Dugin’s work, like the White Nationalists, fixates on the imagined dream of a Eurasian 
empire, one which dominates the politics of Central Asia and Eastern Europe, in effect a 
reimagining of a Warsaw Pact, yet one devoted to the new fourth political theory rather than one 
based on class, race or economic liberties.632  
American hegemony is an enemy because it is a monolithic force which prevents other 
cultures and traditions from surviving. Dugin could even see an isolationist American empire as a 
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self contained “large space” where the liberal ideological project could maintain its current culture, 
economics and Christian values without dominating and erasing the other cultures around the 
world.633 If the American empire were willing to drop the liberalism, the Alternative Right would 
be happy to embrace this isolation from global politics. The globalization project for Dugin is a 
racist one of genocide as it functions as a monotonic process of annihilation which leads to the 
death of other cultures and values, where languages die out, and values are forgotten.634 The 
ideology of progress specifically is understood as “the moral genocide of past generations.”635 
Despite the forces of globalization emerging out of the United States, this cosmopolitan liberal 
culture is seen as a threat to the white exurban and rural whites who champion the white nationalist 
cause in the united states, who also understand this creep as a monotonic force erasing their culture. 
The entirety of why the American Alternative Right reads Dugin and the other European New 
Right texts and follow anti-Americanist/globalization scholars can be summed up by one Patrick 
Buchanan quote: "American acquired the whole world, but lost itself."636 
Conclusion 
 
 Before concluding there are two points of separation between these European theorists and 
the American Alternative Right that must be acknowledged. The first is the outright rejection of 
climate change by the American Right in comparison to the European theorists discussed in this 
chapter. None of these thinkers are climate change deniers, and they see the conflicts that arise out 
of climate change as a significant threat. Secondly, these European theorists do not embrace 
capitalism as their American counterparts do. The populist movements in Europe which draw upon 
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these theorists are often anti-growth and at times anti-capitalist. Both may agree that the continued 
exploitation of non-white labour may be seen as the downfall of western civilization due to 
demographic change, but the American Alternative Right is not going to argue for the end of 
capitalism or even moderate social democratic reforms to capitalism.  
The European thinkers who influence the Alt-Right are not members of the American Alt-
Right. While we see a cross-pollination of their ideas with Jared Taylor and Richard Spencer 
knowing many of these figures personally,637 Dugin, Evola, Faye and de Benoist were not 
dreaming of an American Alt-Right when they wrote their works of political theory. Instead, with 
the help of the publishing house Arktos, the increasing acceptance of Far-Right views within 
America and the rise of a nationalistic America First policy from Donald Trump, the seemingly 
contradictory values of the European Far-Right are influencing radical thinkers in North America. 
For both the American Alternative Right and the European New Right, the threat of globalization 
is a cultural one which challenges the very existence of their prized cultural homogeneity. Anti-
American policy by the European thinkers is not an attack on American people nor is it an attack 
on American culture per se, but rather the dominance of American culture on a global level, one 
which is made worse by the convergence of catastrophes as Faye predicts throughout his work of 
the same name.638  Subsequently, since the emergence of the Alt-Right, the connections between 
the European New Right and the American Alternative Right have grown in prominence with key 
members in both movements meeting to discuss a global system of Far-Right political parties 
working together just as the theorists have done for nearly a decade.639 
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Chapter 7: The White Nationalists: James Burnham, Jared Taylor, Samuel Francis 
and Richard Spencer 
The question of truth or falsity of an ideology is in any case of minor importance. 
Human beings believe an ideology, as a rule, not because they are convinced 
rationally that it is true but because it satisfies psychological and social needs 
and serves, or seems to serve, individual or group interests.640- James Burnham, 
Suicide of the West 
Introduction 
In the decades following the Second World War, it was difficult to find Far-Right 
extremist groups within the United States rallying around racial or religious hatred.641 While the 
American Right was known for racial resentment and dog whistle politics, with racial policies 
and an undercurrent of white supremacy, it was a far cry from the emergent White Nationalist 
ideology that started in the 1990s that continues to the present. The focus of this chapter is to 
highlight the intellectual traditions and political theorists that the Alternative Right’s White 
Nationalist tradition relies on to justify their claims philosophically.  
This chapter will not devote itself to refuting the logic of White Nationalism, as White 
Nationalism is an ideology of genocide. Proving that there is no such thing as the Great 
Replacement or substantial racial differences within this chapter will do little to convince those 
radicalized by White Nationalism to abandon their ways. Instead, this chapter will provide a 
brief summary of the political theory of White Nationalism as understood by a selection of the 
most significant thinkers within the Alternative Right and the American White Nationalist 
tradition. 
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For this chapter, I will be focusing on what George Hawley describes as high brow white 
nationalism.642 Taking Hawley's lead, as well as the work of other scholars on the Alt-Right 
including David Neiwert and Matthew Lyons, the White Nationalist tradition of the late 20th 
and early 21st century has a discontinuity with the emergent Alternative Right communities.643 
White Nationalism 1.0 as Hawley describes it is filled with groups such as the KKK (Ku Klux 
Klan) and the neo-Nazi groups attached to the website Stormfront.644 These movements 
primarily focused on street protest, electoral campaigns and traditional grassroots organizational 
structures of the American political system of the twentieth century. In contrast, the Alternative 
Right typically avoids street protests where possible, those which they have attempted have 
typically been suppressed by successful counter-protests. These movements also predominately 
refuse to put forward third-party candidates for election, instead trying to influence existing 
Republican figures into adopting pro-Alternative Right policies. The Alternative Right has also 
adopted 21st-century digital organization structures without clear hierarchies or a centralized 
command structure. The linkage between these two White Nationalist movements ideologically, 
that is the development of the ideas and values of the Alternative Right from these White 
Nationalists, comes from the high brow White Nationalists who focused on presenting an 
academic and professional face to the movement rather than the skinhead gangs or KKK cells.  
The skinhead gangs and Klansman rallies of the 20th century are easy targets for even 
the most gullible media figure to label as white supremacists, in contrast, the academic 
affectation of the "high brow White Nationalists" is given a pass by media figures seeking to 
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provide "balanced" programming. Works such as Blood and Politics by Leonard Zeskind or Rise 
of the Alt-Right by Thomas J. Main provide in depth analysis of these low brow White 
Nationalists and are ideal for those who wish to understand these movements in relation to the 
broader Alternative Right.645 
The key term to understand the logic of White Nationalism is Identitarianism, which refers 
to the French New Right conception of their white French identity as a form of identity politics. 
The idea was subsequently imported into the United States.646 Identitarianism is the smokescreen 
term used by White Nationalists such as Richard Spencer to hide the outright racism of their values 
by shielding themselves with the paper-thin veneer of identity politics.647 Though some also use 
the term “white separatism” rather than supremacist or White Nationalist for similar reasons, 
this chapter will use the term White Nationalist to avoid confusion.648 While neoliberalism erases 
the difference between cultures through the “McDonalds-ification” of global culture placing 
American values as the norm, and identity politics (post-modernism, feminism and post-
colonialism) addresses the validity of intersectional identities without enforcing a hierarchy, the 
Identitarian movement is an isolationist project attempting to remove and prevent the 
homogenizing elements of globalization for those already in positions of privilege. At its most 
basic Identitarian politics is the right to difference. First popularized by the French New Right, the 
idea stresses that existing cultural groups (in particular majority groups within nations) have the 
right to resist globalization and liberal equality legislation under the justification of cultural 
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preservation.649 Rather than adopt a hierarchical segregationist system predicated on cheap labour 
by minorities, the Identitarian movement implicitly acknowledges a new reality made possible by 
automation. Whereas the earlier apartheid states relied on a segregated society with a ruling class 
dominating the capital and specialized labour market, and an underclass of minorities, who take 
on undesirable jobs, marginalized by state and social structures, the Identitarian system is based 
on the exclusion of all minorities from the community. These new communities would be founded 
with the goal and mission for cultural and racial homogeneity. 
For the Alternative Right's Identitarian wing, the idea of racial exclusion comes in response 
to the decades of non-white colonial immigration from former colonies. The "purity" of the 
Metropole is replaced with reverse colonization from other communities according the White 
Nationalists. As with many elements of the Far-Right, the historical legacy and decades of 
economic exploitation by white majority powers, like the US, France, and the UK, are ignored. An 
Identitarian complains that London and Paris no longer contain supermajorities of white residence, 
pointing at Lagos or Beijing and saying that those cities can be all Black/Chinese and no one in 
the west complains, ignoring the contextual arguments for why London or Paris receive non-white 
immigrants and are multicultural cities.650 Instead, the Identitarians fixate on the fear that 
immigrants will overrun their country and do what their ancestors did to most of the developing 
world. 
The Foundations for White Nationalist Thought 
 While white supremacy was a dominant force during the Cold War, especially during the 
1950s and 1960s as a counter-revolution to the civil rights movement, the White Nationalist and 
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mainly Far-Right anti-American state theories were limited. The post-war period was a dark era 
for the White Nationalist cause in the West due to the horrors of the White Nationalist project of 
Nazi Germany. The movement was limited to terrorist networks and extremist cells without 
significant public support. The Far-Right project of white nationalism would find limited support, 
with only a handful of figures gaining significant prominence in the fifteen years after the war,651 
the most infamous would be Francis Yockey. While the Neo-Nazi movement would re-emerge in 
the 1960s, with George Lincoln Rockwell’s American Nazi Party, and David Duke’s re-emergent 
Klan in the 1970s, these movements were fringe, as Zeskind explains in his history of American 
White Nationalism.652 Until the late 1980s, they were relegated to the position of comedic villains 
in films such as the Blues Brothers, rather than prominent figures on the national stage.653 
 By contrast, American conservatism was reborn during this period with the emergence of 
the National Review and the rise of, what would become, neoclassical economic thought by Milton 
Friedman.654 This conservative movement, while harbouring racist views was not in-itself a racist 
project and not a white nationalist one. The Republican party would use the southern strategy to 
dog whistle to white supremacists, but they were not campaigning on White Nationalist policies. 
William F. Buckley even went so far as to make it his mission to drive the John Birch Society and 
Paleoconservative anti-Semites out of the Republican party in the 1960s and 1990s.655 The 
Republican party shifted from a party for Ivy league educated elites to one based on the marriage 
of libertarianism and social conservatism. The White Nationalists and anti-liberal thinkers within 
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the movement were primarily kept in check by the fear of the Soviet Union during this period and 
would only re-emerge in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union. 
 Francis Yockey is one of the few prominent figures during this period to provide a racial 
theory of politics for the Far-Right; though his influence was incredibly limited in North America 
during his life. Imperium, his magnum opus, provides a Far-Right theory for a unified European 
reactionary state to oppose American liberalism.656 While Yockey’s influence was most 
pronounced during the post-war wilderness of the Far-Right, when the legacy of National 
Socialism was fresh in the public’s imagination, he was still a fringe political figure during his 
life. He casts a long shadow over the Far Right and its Anti-American and Anti-Liberal legacy 
posthumously, though the actual significance of his ideas are less pronounced, as most 
Alternative Right theorists distance themselves from Nazi and Neo-Nazi literature. 
Within Europe, Yockey’s ideas found fertile soil with most of the European thinkers 
introduced in the previous chapter. Julius Evola was an early critic of Yockey’s Imperium, 
though his critiques were mostly levelled at Yockey for his theological positions on the age of 
darkness, fixated on the idea of Kali Yuga and Yockey’s slightly less aristocratic politics.657 
Alain de Benoist was also heavily inspired by Yockey’s work, with Kevin Coogan going so far 
as to suggest that the legacy of Yockey was picked up by de Benoist and his French New Right.658 
It was, in fact, the dream of a European Imperium which brought Alexander Dugin and Alain de 
Benoist together in 1992 to discuss the dream laid out by Yockey’s Imperium.659 
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James Burnham 
James Burnham, unlike almost everyone else mentioned in this text, should not be 
considered a founding father of the Alternative Right, though his theories lay the structural 
foundation for the works of Samuel Francis, Paul Gottfried and Curtis Yarvin. His status is more 
in line with figures like Martin Heidegger or Fredrich Nietzsche, who have widespread 
readership outside of the Alternative Right. Yet unlike those German thinkers, he is not so well 
known as to assume that a general audience would be familiar with his work, which is something 
that even the introduction to his book Suicide of the West jokes about.660  
Burnham started his public life as a Trotskyite in the 1930s before shifting to 
conservatism and a critique of Stalinism and communism in the 1940s, in the 1950s he co-
founded the National Review with William F. Buckley.661 Despite his influence on the 
movement, Burnham is not a White Nationalist, he was a conservative. Burnham was a 
conservative through and through, one who emerged before the Neoliberalization and market 
fixation of the conservative movement. Instead of providing a racial theory for the later White 
Nationalists, Burnham provides a foundation for the departure from Liberalism that the later 
White Nationalists use for inspiration. 
Burnham is one of the most influential thinkers on the Alternative Right due to his 
influence on the paleoconservatives, his critiques of liberalism and his conception of a 
managerial class. For Burnham, the inevitable march of economic life under capitalism or 
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socialism is the managerial totalitarian state, one which is doomed to oligarchy. George Orwell 
summarizes the work of Burnham as the prediction that there would be:  
The ever-increasing concentration of industrial and financial power; the 
diminishing importance of the individual capitalist or shareholder, and the 
growth of the new ‘managerial’ class of scientists, technicians, and bureaucrats; 
the weakness of the proletariat against the centralised state; the increasing 
helplessness of small countries against big ones; the decay of representative 
institutions and the appearance of one-party régimes based on police terrorism, 
faked plebiscites, etc: all these things seem to point in the same direction.662 
What Burnham argues is a critique of capitalism from the right, one which stresses the limitations 
of the libertarian dream of free market capitalism. Within the Alternative Right one can see this 
infiltrate the fixation on bureaucratic growth and managerialism within the NeoReactionaries like 
Yarvin,663 and one can see the hesitation with a managerial technocracy of global capitalism 
influencing Francis and the White Nationalists within the Alternative Right who question the 
centralization of power. Samuel Francis would go on to expound upon the theories of Burnham at 
length in his posthumously published magnum opus Leviathan and its Enemies.664  
 Despite the connection between James Burnham and the National Review consensus of 
American conservatism, he is indicative of the Leftist-turned-Conservative tradition of the post-
war period rather than the more contemporary Conservative-Liberal tradition of the late twentieth 
century. George Nash covers this trend in detail over the course of his comprehensive history of 
the Conservative movement during the post-war period.665 Whereas the Conservative-Liberal 
tradition is based on the idea of a socially conservative liberal-capitalist paradigm, one which saw 
capitalism as the foundation of the American order, Burnham rallies against the excesses of liberal-
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capitalism but sees it as a significantly better alternative to Stalinism. For Burnham and those who 
continue to draw upon him, the mass culture and the consumption found, within what Marcuse 
would call One-Dimensional life, was a significant issue worthy of concern, yet it was far better 
than living under Stalinism.666 Burnham denounced the consumerism of American pop culture, 
but said: "Coca-Cola might be bad... But ‘not quite in the same league with Kolyma,’ the Soviet 
labour camp."667 This rejection of American consumerism is part of why the Far-Right and anti-
capitalist right lacked a real foothold in American political and intellectual life, so long as the 
Soviet Union existed they had a mutual enemy with the Liberal consensus and were reluctant to 
undermine the American right in the face of communism.  
Burnham established that most of American Society is liberal, and it is evident that this has 
been the case since the 1930s.668 No significant political or intellectual change has occurred to 
deride that claim, at most some conservative and libertarian institutions have emerged since then 
but they are still a minority within the United States. An even smaller minority of those are non-
conservative, and many of those conservatives are effectively Neoliberal or Libertarian in outlook 
and practice. Only in the American South could one find substantial adherents of non-liberal or 
anti-liberal politics, at least as of Burnham’s writing in the aftermath of the Civil Rights 
movement.669 The politics of American liberalism has been one of bureaucratic decisions, it is no 
longer a political argument between ideology but one of policy: 
… nobody but a madman, fascist or crackpot would really question whether 
democracy is better than aristocracy and dictatorship, whether there ought to be 
universal education and universal suffrage, whether all races and creeds deserve 
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equal treatment, whether government has a duty to the unemployed, ill and aged, 
whether trade unions are a good thing, or peace better than war.670 
The non-liberal must couch their rhetoric and ideology in the guise of liberalism to be able to 
express themselves without being labelled madmen. From this position, all future high-brow White 
Nationalists would focus on building an intellectual space to discuss White Nationalism because 
they know that there is no space for their movement marching on the street. To advocate for a 
white aristocracy would be akin to being labelled a crackpot, which is why Taylor and Francis 
would make it their mission to provide an intellectual pedigree to their ideas.671 This fear of being 
labeled a political pariah is also why figures like Spencer would largely abandon the ideologically 
charged imagery and focus on shifting the Overton window of public opinion.672 When these 
figures failed to heed Burnham’s advice for how to exist within liberalism, they would face public 
scrutiny.  
 While Burnham was fixated on the threat posed by the managerial state, which Francis and 
Taylor would latch on to, his framework for critiquing liberalism would remain his legacy for the 
rank and file members of the Alternative Right. For Burnham the critical argument for opposing 
liberalism is centred on the fundamental liberal position of progress and change, and that, 
“liberalism is anti-traditional;” therefore to be a traditionalist/conservative one should be anti-
liberal.673 Burnham is not the first, nor the last author, to argue that the fundamental psyche of 
post-war liberalism is based on guilt.674 This is where the idea of racial or civilizational cuckolding 
occurs, in the eyes of the White Nationalist or supremacist the liberal value of justice and equality 
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results in white people artificially raising non-whites above their ability at the cost of their standing 
in society. This argument that affirmative action is a form of reverse racism is nothing new. What 
makes it so nefarious when expressed by Burnham is that he links it to the fundamental values of 
liberalism. White Nationalism takes this idea of the “suicide of the west” literally within texts such 
as The Camp of the Saints, where an emasculated Europe is unable to stop refugees from 
conquering Europe.675 To be a liberal is also to feel guilt for structural inequalities that one has 
social privilege such as racial ones, therefore in the eyes of White Nationalists, liberals feel guilty 
for being white. Burnham’s views would be echoed by thousands of conservatives in the 
subsequent decades, which laid the foundation for the idea that white people and especially liberals 
have a desire to be racially cuckolded.676 
  The Demographic Question and the Long Decline 
The 1990s saw the emergence of high brow White Nationalism. Unlike the earlier 
populist politics of racist white supremacy, the White Nationalists of the 1990s focused on 
providing an air of legitimacy for their movement. The essential White Nationalist thinkers 
during this period are Samuel Francis and Jared Taylor, though they should not be understood 
as the only major thinkers. Patrick Buchannan, Paul Gottfried and other Paleoconservatives 
thinkers dominate the White Nationalist tradition both intellectually and politically as well. 
These thinkers fixated on three initiatives: the scientific racism of demographics and racial IQ 
tests, the establishment of intellectual journals and the limited inclusion of Jews within White 
Nationalism, though this was a far from universal policy.  
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The first initiative is the fixation on the demographic question of the Great Replacement, 
where White Nationalists fear the end of a white majority state. The idea is premised on the dual 
trends of population decline in western capitalist countries and the increasing immigration of non-
whites into Western countries.677 To maintain a population without immigration, the total fertility 
rate (TFR) for women must be 2.1 over the entire population; this means that each woman needs 
to have, on average 2.1 children over their lifetime. If the TFR drops below 1.4, for example, the 
population will decline by 50% in 45 years.678 The US had a TFR of 2.0 in 2013, but this was 
primarily due to the Hispanic population's TFR of 2.35, which means that the white majority 
population will likely decline in number, while the non-white, mostly Hispanic, population will 
increase even without immigration.679 White supremacists see this not only as a decline in absolute 
terms for the white population but also a relative decline in white western populations. This 
demographic decline is one of the core ideas behind White Nationalism; it is not enough to end 
immigration and increase deportations as the non-white population will increase relative to the 
white population if current fertility trends persist.  
The focus of this Great Replacement argument is less about articulating racial superiority, 
but rather to present a scientific time bomb, the White Nationalist version of Climate Change. The 
result is an apocalyptic logic of collapse in which the white supremacist public is charged with a 
project: have significantly more children, end non-white immigration and force non-whites to 
leave the country through a genocidal policy. This logic would become the primary rationale for 
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the terrorist attacks of Brenton Tarrant in Christchurch New Zealand in 2019, and the central 
argument of Faye’s Convergence of Catastrophes.680 
The second initiative was to transition, in the public eye, from a group of radical racists 
synonymous with villainy as depicted in almost all mainstream media, and into an intellectual 
and political group without any of the intellectual baggage. The image of the Klansman as a 
bumbling moron kept the legitimacy of traditionalist and White Nationalist ideas in check. The 
ideas of White Nationalism were only for the racists in the backwaters of America or the bigots 
living in major cities drowned out by the voices of everyone else in their communities. For White 
Nationalism to be legitimated, it needed to transition from the ideology of illiterate bigots to the 
ideas of well-spoken intellectuals in the eyes of the American public. It is also why figures on 
the Right have devoted themselves to crafting a professional image. This lack of professionalism 
is why Spencer, Taylor and Greg Johnson have all focused on establishing intellectual journals 
and salons to express their ideas.681 The works of Alternative Right figures such as Gottfried are 
indicative of this change, rather than articulate a conspiratorial politics like Lyndon LaRouche 
or the John Birch Society; they articulate an intellectual politics which focuses on the ideological 
debate.682 For example, within his book After Liberalism, Gottfried focuses on providing a right-
wing critique of both liberalism and the managerial state through academic dialogue with liberal 
and conservative authors to provide articulate critiques of liberal democracy.683  
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The most significant transition in White Nationalism between the earlier Neo-Nazi 
groups of the post-war period and the post-cold war era was the creation of intellectual space for 
publishing the ideas of the Alternative Right and White Nationalism. As has been repeatedly 
expressed within this text and by the leaders of the Alternative Right, rallies, marches and 
murders lead to deplatforming and public opposition. Publishing journals, creating think tanks 
and releasing YouTube videos leads to financial and popular success, while street protests and 
harassment campaigns lead to isolation and bankruptcy. As Greg Johnson of Counter-Currents 
explained, “Today’s White Nationalist movement might work best on the model of a Montessori 
school, not a Hitler Youth rally.”684 
Anti-Semitism and White Nationalism 
A significant change within the White Nationalist community during the 1990s, one 
which mirrored the inclusion of Jewish figures into the Neoconservative movement, was the 
inclusion of Jewish members within Taylor’s American Renaissance. From its inception, 
American Renaissance has included orthodox Jews and explicitly ban David Duke and the 
KKK.685 For some White Nationalists, the Jewish community represents a shared ally within 
American culture. After the creation of Judeo-Christian values as a term in the 1980s, Jewish 
elites could now be incorporated into the Right-Wing community. The inclusion of Jews within 
American Renaissance is understood as a short term strategy by figures in the movement, such 
as Wilmot Robertson, so that the more pressing issue of opposing African Americans and 
Hispanics could be addressed.686  White Supremacists have mostly fixated on targeting Muslim 
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and Hispanic immigrants rather than Jews since the start of the 21st century, with anti-Semitism 
finding less public support within the United States than it used to.687 
On the surface, the inclusion of Jews within the Alternative Right appears to be 
contradictory or somewhat paradoxical, but it serves an effective political strategy for the 
Alternative Right. By including Jews within the movement and supporting Zionism or Israel, 
groups within the Alternative Right can maintain anti-Semitic ideas and values without being 
actively labeled Neo-Nazis. For many contemporary White Nationalists Israel is effectively an 
idealized ethno-state which adopts the isolationist and segregationist policies that they desire for 
White America or ethnically homogeneous European states.688 The pro-Palestinian values of 
Alain de Benoist and other anti-Israeli right wing groups has largely been abandoned.689 For 
much of the Alt-Right, especially internationally there is no disagreement between the Zionist 
Jewish right-wing figure and the anti-Semitic Far-Right political leader, so long as it leads to 
Zionism and the immigration of the Jewish population to Israel.690   
 Despite the uneasy truce between members of the Far-Right and the American and Israeli 
Jewish community, anti-Semitism is still an active element of the Alternative Right. The question 
of how anti-Semitic one should be is one of optics and temporary strategy rather than ideological 
for the contemporary Alternative Right activist, as the Alt-Right activist Millennial Woes said in 
Daniel Lombroso’s documentary on the Alternative Right for The Atlantic: "I didn't want to 
become an anti-Semitic, it's like the biggest cliché."691 On a fundamental level, anti-Semitism 
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becomes a question of metapolitics for the Alternative Right, as it will damage the movement’s 
public relations to “ask the Jewish Question,” but for many on the Alternative Right this is a 
fundamental element of their ideology, as we see with Spencer’s 20 points.692 When the 
Alternative Right embraces Zionism and downplays their anti-Semitism they can make in roads 
into mainstream conservative America, but when they publicly argue for anti-Semitic violence 
they face widespread opposition. After all it was the chant of “The Jews will not replace us” in 
August 2017, among other elements of the Unite the Right rally that fractured the movement, 
leading to many significant figures within the Alternative Right to lose public office.693 
The divide over anti-Semitism has resulted in significant division within the Alternative 
Right, with no other ideological position creating as visible of a divide within the movement. Even 
significant figures within the broader Alternative Right take umbrage with the Alt-Right for their 
use of anti-Semitism. The Jewish paleoconservative Alternative Right thinker Paul Gottfried says 
so much in his own words: “…any suggestion that I might be associated with what is depicted 
as a neo-Nazi movement is especially offensive. This association, moreover, has nothing to do 
with reality.”694 It would require a very generous reading of Gottfried’s work and his connection 
with both the French Identitarian movement and Spencer to absolve him of blame for influencing 
and outright establishing the Alt-Right. Gottfried shares a similar position to that of Nick Land, 
as a right-wing philosopher who demonstratively influenced and shaped the Alt-Right yet 
abandoned the movement that quotes his work the moment the movement turned populist and 
anti-Semitic.695 Gottfried made note of Hawley’s works on the American Right to show that he 
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differs from Spencer on some key ideological points, but these differences are minor.696 While 
Gottfried did not attend the Unite the Right rally, he is sympathetic to their cause, arguing for a 
both-sideism akin to Trump.697 What Gottfried and the other Jewish members of the Alternative 
Right indeed mean when they say that they are anti-Neo-Nazi, is that they are fundamentally in 
agreement with the Alternative Right but would like the category of white to include Jews, as 
per Taylor’s American Renaissance.  
Samuel Francis 
Samuel Francis was an American editorial columnist and white nationalist author of note 
during the 1980s and 1990s before his death in 2005.698 While working at prominent think tanks 
such as the Heritage Foundation, Francis rose to prominence during his time as a columnist for the 
Washington Times where he penned paleoconservative and White Nationalist articles for nearly a 
decade, before being fired in 1995. Francis declined in popularity until his book Leviathan and Its 
Enemies was published in the lead up to the 2016 election, when his work was revaluated as a 
major precursor to Trumpism.699 Over his career Francis was a confidant to the paleoconservative 
Pat Buchanan, editing his book The Death of the West700 and an inspiration for Jared Taylor 
suggesting he establish the journal and White Nationalist organization, American Renaissance.701 
Francis’s primary contributions to the Alternative Right’s intellectual foundations are his theories 
on how to further White Nationalism and his critique of the managerial state. 
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For Francis and the American Renaissance tradition, there are essentially three objectives 
for White Nationalists in the United States. The first is fostering a white racial identity; 
representing a break from the traditional structural white supremacy. The second is the limitation 
and halt to immigration and any form of social welfare for immigrants. The third is the end of 
minority civil rights and affirmative action legislation, which coincides with an agenda of limited 
government and federalism to reduce the power of the managerial state.702 These core principles 
are at the heart of the Alternative Right's fixation on the Overton window. It is impossible to end 
all immigration immediately or craft a White Nationalist state, as economic considerations and 
the importation of cheap non-white labour will lead to the same demographic change; therefore, 
a slower public relations campaign replaces the Klan rallies, lynching and "Unite the Right" 
protests. There can be no immediate violent revolution for the reactionary White Nationalist 
cause, as with the NeoReactionaries or European New-Right the objective is a cultural change 
which allows their ideas to become commonplace.  
For Francis, there can be no successful racial segregation with a unified economic system 
which desires cheap labour.703 For Francis capitalism, as it exists within the United States, is 
incompatible with the project of White Nationalism. Racialized low-wage labour will always be 
in demand in a hyper-capitalist system. Therefore, Francis believes that White Nationalists must 
reject global finance capital; fundamentally there is no possibility for white isolationism within 
a transnational capitalist system reliant on migrant labour. The exploitation of labour, which 
defines a capitalist system, is driven by a fundamental desire to suppress all labour costs/wages; 
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this is both the liberal economic and Marxist economic understanding of capitalist labour 
markets.  
The result of this anti-capitalist free trade argument is an easily manipulated image of the 
common ground of the Far Right and the anti-globalization Left. Within a system of no 
alternative, the hegemonic liberal position within the anglosphere paints all opposition as radical, 
racist, sexist or undemocratic. Ideologically the reactionary group of the Alternative Right 
represents a break from the Right's thirty plus years as the champions of unfettered capitalism. 
The idea that the Alternative Right would dismiss the interests of capital comes as a shock to 
those who conflate the Alternative Right with the Tea Party or the libertarian movement in the 
wake of the financial crisis. The pressure of libertarian think tanks on the Republican party and 
finance capital on the Democratic party has eroded the ability of American liberal hegemonic 
discourse to conceptualize two disparate ideas at the same time: anti-free trade and pro-white 
supremacy.704 Rather than understand this as a break from existing social trends, Francis’s 
position should be understood as the populist backlash against economic elites within the 
Republican party since the early 1990s, as documented by Thomas Frank’s seminal book What’s 
the Matter with Kansas.705 
According to Francis: "Racial separation, far more than ‘white supremacy,’ is today 
favored by most whites advocating white racial consciousness, but there appears to be little 
prospect of the larger white population embracing it in the near future."  706 For Francis, this is 
the key to understanding the failures of any racial consciousness in the post-civil rights period; 
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there is no substantial public desire to change one's life to be racially pure. Francis argues that 
this racial false consciousness is partially why the Alternative Right has fixated on changing 
public awareness and acceptance of white Identitarian politics. The prospect of a White 
Nationalist society is not tempting enough for most white supremacists, as they would have to 
abandon the exploitation of non-white labour, and as the NeoReactionary Michael Anissimov 
also points out, they rarely feel sufficiently ideologically committed to the movement.707 The 
goals of the Alternative Right are presented not by arguing inferiority of non-whites but by 
arguing for presenting whites as a separate entity, then from there presenting further evidence to 
justify their distinction. The end goal is the emergence of a racial consciousness, which can then 
be used to end the immigration of non-whites and begin genocidal campaigns of non-white 
citizens if possible. 
For Francis, any theory of white supremacy or White Nationalism will fail unless White 
Nationalists can respond to the state and civil structures of the managerial state. For Francis 
managerial control is in effect cultural hegemony, which he takes directly from Antonio 
Gramsci.708 In contrast to the totalitarian regimes of the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany, the 
United States is controlled through a system of soft-managerial control, where the public is 
convinced through civil society rather than martial force to maintain control over the population. 
Unlike the conspiratorial Far-Right theories of “deep state” control, with a cadre of Jewish 
figures pulling the strings puppet-like, Francis understands that: 
Elites… do not simply make up their ideologies or formulas out of whole cloth. 
The members of elites (excluding cynics and dissidents) generally believe in 
their own ideologies and try to behave consistently with their implications, and 
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the intellectual foundations of an ideology, whether scientific, religious, ethical 
or philosophical in character, must be both reasonably sophisticated in 
argumentation and reasonably honest and complete in the selection of 
evidence.709 
The project of managerialization that has occurred during the 20 th and 21st centuries was done 
out of noble intentions with sophistication, not based on some anti-Semitic conspiracy like the 
Elder Protocols of Zion.710 
For Francis, there was no way of establishing an alternative ideology so long as liberal 
institutions maintain a cultural hegemony over the education system. The ideology of a system 
is totalizing, with all terms of ideology being communicated within the language of the system.711 
For a White Nationalist to spread racial consciousness as Francis suggested they must find a way 
of expressing their ideology either within the system, such as rationalizing the value of White 
Nationalism within a liberal paradigm or by subverting the education system to integrate White 
Nationalism into the American consciousness. For Francis, the primary way of raising this 
consciousness would be by ending multicultural education and the progressive university space; 
just like the NeoReactionaries suggested.712 So long as the liberal managerial class correctly 
identifies White Nationalism and white racial consciousness as a threat to the liberal order, these 
Far-Right ideas will face significant opposition and be barred from inclusion within public life.  
Jared Taylor 
Jared Taylor, born to Christian missionaries in Japan, has dedicated the past 30 years of 
his life to the cause of White Nationalism and his White Nationalist organization American 
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Renaissance.713 Taylor’s White Nationalism is indicative of the scientific evolutionary racism 
that came to dominate the American White Nationalists after the Cold War. For Taylor, the 
evolutionary pressures of colder climates forced humans who settled in North East Asia and 
Northern Europe to adopt long term survival strategies, since food was not available for a quarter 
of the year they developed long term thinking abilities.714 In contrast, those humans who settled 
in less extreme climates faced less evolutionary pressures and produced less intelligent offspring 
over time than those in harsher climates. These claims are, of course, highly suspect and racist, 
but they provide White Nationalists with an excuse for racial superiority that does not fall back 
upon the Nazi tropes of Aryan superiority based on quasi-mythical histories.  
For Taylor and his White Nationalist supporters, the primary obstacle for their movement 
is how “radioactive”715 race and IQ differences are for the American public. Taylor is right to 
call it radioactive, any discussion of “race realism” will result in widespread opposition, as the 
public response to most racist rallies or terrorist attacks has demonstrated716. Even within 
Alternative Right texts like Land’s Dark Enlightenment, there is an active awareness of this 
taboo, where he imagines the reader’s inner monologue when he starts to explain Yarvin’s 
biological determinism and theory of evolutionary progress “… you’re probably already 
muttering under your breath, don’t mention race, don’t mention race, don’t mention race, please, 
oh please, in the name of the Zeitgeist and the dear sweet non-god of progress, don’t mention 
race …”717  
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Taylor, like Faye, writes extensive lists of anecdotal evidence for reverse-racism and the 
great replacement, spending dozens of pages covering every conceivable sensationalist argument 
that he can find.718 This should come as no surprise due to the significant influence that the 
French New Right has had on Taylor’s theory of white identity. As with Faye’s work 
Convergence of Catastrophes, one must parse through hundreds of racist remarks and comments 
to find the core ideological positions that justify his hatred.719 Rhetorically this is done to present 
the white supremacist underpinnings of his ideology as valid before moving on to the more 
radical and unacceptable, even for most racists, view that non-whites must be removed from 
white society completely. Taylor’s brand of white Identitarianism went hand in hand with Faye’s, 
which is why Taylor has promoted the Arktos translations of Faye’s works.720  
If Francis critiqued the influence of capitalism to justify immigration, which he saw as a 
central economic force opposing White Nationalism, then Taylor responds to the cultural 
defence of immigration. For Taylor:  
Real high culture crosses borders by itself, not in the back pockets of tomato 
pickers, refugees, or even the most accomplished immigrants. What has Yo-Yo 
Ma taught Americans about China? What have we learned from Seiji Ozawa or 
Ichiro about Japan? Immigration and transmission of culture are hardly the same 
thing. Nearly every good-sized American city has an opera company, but that 
does not require Italian Immigrants.721 
For Taylor and like-minded White Nationalists, there is no acceptable logic for immigration, 
especially not one based on importing non-white culture or non-white labour. Why should there 
be immigrants from other countries if the cultural benefits are separate? Taylor is right that one 
does not need a Thai person to make a pad thai at a Cheesecake Factory any more than a Japanese 
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person to manage the projection booth at a theatre playing an anime film, but he is wrong to 
believe that culture magically appears without immigration or cultural exchanges. 
What Taylor does is differentiate himself and the White Nationalists from the 
Conservative arguments of white supremacists and neoliberals. For Taylor, there is no such thing 
as the good/bad immigrant dichotomy. His argument breaks with the typical anti-immigrant 
rhetoric found within the Anglosphere. Liberal and conservative political figures can and have 
established an uneasy agreement for immigration, such as expanding the number of 
immigrants,722 opening up the nation to a more diverse population, while also introducing a point 
system based on utilitarian and economic calculus over economic productivity and the 
importation of skilled labour.723  
Taylor also rejects the liberal melting pot theory of diversity as adaptive and integral to 
American society. For Taylor, he states that what diversity has furthered in North America is 
cultural stereotypes rather than an actual mixture of cultural values.724 What Taylor fears is akin 
to the European New Right fear of a Disney-ification of culture. Taylor sees that immigration 
and integration have failed, and where it has been presented as a success it is merely a capitalist 
excess of crass consumerism. Cultures are reduced to pavilions at Folk-O-Ramas, or Disney 
Land rides where national dress, food and song is shared to the public for easy consumption and 
replication. Taylor sees the erasure of culture as the logical conclusion of this project of 
globalization and consumerism. The result will be an erasure of cultural identity, but one that 
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will be accelerated within predominantly white countries which have high rates of immigration. 
Non-native (i.e. non-White) immigration into Europe or North America is not matched by white 
immigration out of Europe or North America into the rest of the world, which results in white 
countries becoming less white while the rest of the world’s nation states can maintain their 
existing ethnic compositions.725  
While a consumerist critique of mass culture and especially the appropriation of culture 
for capitalist consumption is not without merit, the distinction between Taylor’s arguments and 
that of cultural critiques on the left is one of racial bigotry. Taylor’s argument is partially valid, 
but his conclusions and logic are morally unacceptable due to its inherent racism. Taylor’s 
argument mirrors Julius Evola’s critique of Theodore Adorno’s rejection of Jazz, which Evola 
argues is a fundamentally racist one, only for Evola to then suggest that Jazz would be better if 
Jazz was based on Bulgarian folk music (i.e. white European) rather than African folk music.726 
If the first argument by a liberal for Mexican immigration is the advantage of having good tacos 
or burrito joints, then Taylor’s argument, no matter how racist, rings true. The assumption tha t 
immigrants are fundamentally useful for the importation of cultural products, such as cheap 
“ethnic food,” then the logic for immigration is no different from the logic of international trade 
as a way of importing “foreign goods” to appease the palate of consumers. To critique the 
position of Taylor and the White Nationalists, a non-consumeristic justification for immigration, 
i.e. one based on humanism rather than capitalism becomes a necessity for the non-capitalist left.  
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The Contemporary Alt-Right and White Nationalism 
While the predominant goal of Taylor, Francis and the other intellectual figures of White 
Nationalism was the professionalization and intellectualization of the movement, this was always 
the first step towards a larger goal. As is common among members of the Alternative Right, the 
White Nationalists have been campaigning to open the Overton Window rather than get officials 
elected or passing reformist policies. The most significant change for the movement between the 
1990s and the present is the shift from journals and policy to active campaigning and public 
engagement. This is where Richard Spencer and the Alt-Right take centre stage, rather than 
produce new ideas for an echo chamber; they seek to engage the public.  
The Future of the Neo-Nazis 
The Alternative Right uses fascist iconography and aesthetics rather than adopt Nazi state 
theory or their explicit ideological positions. The result is a fascist ironic cool, where the 
performance of the aesthetic of Fascism allows for a case of plausible deniability, which is where 
the "conservative is the new punk" meme emerged.727 The Alternative Right has become defined 
by their sense of humour, explicitly articulating racist jokes for their “half-truths” to bring in 
moderates.728 Dressing up as a Nazi or posting images of the Nazi party both attempts to break 
the norm as a joke, while also instilling real fear/discomfort in the minority group targeted by 
the harassment campaign or rally. For the minority group, the “joke” inspires terror and is 
unquestionable hate speech, but for the officials in public office or the media, it is consistently 
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presented as a joke that went too far, with plausible deniability lest they are threatened with 
slander.  
Over time the fascist aesthetic or the hatred towards women becomes so commonplace 
that it becomes difficult to determine what is real belief and what is fake. The consequences of 
this double speak are clear, as Blaise Pascal said about the proud man’s belief in God,729 so long 
as one keeps going down on their knees and praying one will eventually find their belief in God. 
As is the case with the Alternative Right, if a young man keeps making jokes about being a Nazi, 
they are likely to start acting and identifying as a Nazi. The result is the normalization of Nazi 
iconography and hate speech within digital communities, as more and more members admit to 
holding fascistic views (even if they are not literal Nazis or Neo-Nazis). Whereas the readers of 
American Renaissance may have been devoted White Supremacists who joined the movement 
out of a conviction that was strengthened through the literature, the Alt-Right’s radicalization is 
akin to Pleasure Island from Pinocchio,730 where young men are lured in with jokes and a sense 
of community before becoming radicalized. No matter the personal story for their radicalization, 
there is no difference to the victim shot at ironically and one shot at due to a dogmatic belief in 
a Far-Right ideology.  
One of the most illustrative examples of this transition, other than Spencer is Andrew 
Anglin and his Neo-Nazi website the Daily-Stormer. While not specifically a member of the Alt-
Right, because he views the movement as too childish, Anglin draws upon many of the same ideas 
and strategies for his White Nationalist project. As Luke O'Brien in his Atlantic cover story on 
Anglin and the Daily-Stormer points out, members of the Alt-Right's most radical circles come 
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from diverse political and economic communities, albeit white ones.731 They are not just the sons 
of racists and extremists, but rather the product of less apparent radicalization. Anglin himself was 
a leftist, vegan, drug consuming hippie during his first years at high school before becoming one 
of the more widely read white supremacists in America. As with many members of the Alt-Right 
who were radicalized before Obama's election, Anglin listened to Right-Wing talk radio and was 
a fan of Alex Jones.732 Anglin, like many other Grey Tribe members of the Alternative Right, was 
an active poster on 4Chan.  
Anglin is one of the relatively few Alternative Right figures directly inspired by Hitler’s 
writings, at least openly, but he also adopts the Alternative Right’s ironic and internet-troll 
disposition which distances himself from the earlier Neo-Nazis. His project on the Daily-Stormer 
is separate from Stormfront and the more serious members of the Neo-Nazi movement because he 
lampoons the movement’s attempts to recreate the 1920s. Anglin’s work is motivated by the desire 
to attract younger members, who must consider White Nationalism a fun club to join rather than 
homework. The NeoReactionaries made a small movement out of the members who wished to do 
the homework, reading thousands of pages of reactionary tomes in the process, in contrast the Alt-
Right and Daily-Stormer attracted orders of magnitude more followers by telling jokes. By relying 
on ironic and comedic presentations of Nazi ideas and iconography, sites such as the Daily-Stormer 
provide an opportunity for potential members of the Alt-Right to wet their feet before diving 
headlong into unapologetic racial supremacy. As O'Brien writes on Anglin's techniques for 
political discourse:  
Anglin’s editorial approach, which he has explained in various podcasts, 
borrowed from both Mein Kampf and Saul Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals. From 
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Hitler, Anglin learned to dumb down his argument: Good guys versus bad guys. 
A few themes repeated over and over. From Alinsky, he learned counterculture 
tactics: Attack people instead of institutions. Isolate targets. Make threats. One 
Alinsky rule in particular stuck with Anglin: “Ridicule is man’s most potent 
weapon.”733 
The goal of this new White Nationalist wing is to bring in new members who would be otherwise 
alienated from the project, by first making them laugh. Drawing straight from the playbook of 
Breitbart during Gamergate, Anglin targets individuals that non-radicalized young men would find 
it easy to make jokes about, bully and harass.734  
In an inverse of the 18th Brumaire, first as farce, then as tragedy, Alternative Right figures 
like Anglin radicalize the public, once the jokes have been laid, the more violent behaviour 
expands. While initial propaganda is published to expand the space for White Nationalist discourse 
it is done to illicit a response rather than make a concrete policy.735 Anglin and the contemporary 
Alt-Right expand upon the ironic detachment of NeoReactionaries, but rather than make jokes and 
ironically engage the reader with pop culture references, the newer theory is fundamentally 
intertwined with shit-posting. Shit-posting is the process in which someone posts content online 
with bad faith so that it can be taken seriously by a third party, typically in such a way that those 
in the know can tell that it is ironic while the general public will take it seriously. While Anglin 
and company did not invent shit-posting, they have used it to greatly amplify the voice of White 
Nationalism. An example of shit-posting is the "March on Whitefish," a planned anti-Semitic 
march in rural Montana orchestrated by Anglin turned out to be a prank. 736 A little bit of online 
posting resulted in significantly more blowback and exposure than an actual protest or rally would 
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elicit for the same amount of effort. The media frenzy and threats of violence terrified the town for 
a month, with minimal effort or public demonstrations, the joke had become a reality. The 
objective was to sow panic and confusion rather than to cause harm, which can easily be prosecuted 
directly.  
The result of this application of White Nationalist shit-posting is a subdued form of 
terrorism and insurgency tactics. While most of these posts are insignificant, literally just half-
hearted tweets some of them may be a serious threat. So long as the public is afraid that these 
threats could be real the White Nationalists can achieve significant gains.  A terrorist attack without 
physical violence still causes trauma and provides a political rallying cry from the Alt-Right, and 
is difficult to prosecute, while the murder of a counter-protester or violent terrorist attack like in 
Christchurch New Zealand leads public backlash.737  
Richard Spencer and his Twenty points 
Richard Spencer is one of the better-known members of the Alt-Right and one of the 
most visible White Nationalists in the United States. Attending the University of Chicago for a 
master’s degree, Spencer’s thesis was an anti-Semitic critique of Adorno, which he followed up 
with a Ph.D. in political thought at Duke University before dropping out.738 Spencer became 
cynical of the mainstream conservative movement in the aftermath of 9/11. According to Spencer 
the focus of the Republican party was on democracy building abroad, multicultural patriotism and 
debt-fueled consumption spending.739 After dropping out of his doctorate he worked at the White 
Nationalist Taki-Mag where he would coin the term Alternative right with his mentor Paul 
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Gottfried.740 While working on the website Alternativeright.com Spencer gained some 
popularity within the White Nationalist community, but abandoned the project in 2012 when he 
moved to the National Policy Institute (NPI) and established the White Nationalist journal Radix. 
Taking Gottfried’s lead, Spencer spent much of the 2010s publishing the racist texts of 
the European New Right either through Arktos or through Washington Summit Publishers,741 
the influx of European thought expanded the movement beyond the existing American literature. 
The results of this expansion were initially modest to outright failures, with the 2014 NPI 
conference in Hungary being the most obvious. Though the subsequent attempted formation of 
a New-Right/Alt-Right international by Bannon since 2017 has demonstrated that there is far 
more to this than merely academic conferences and the publishing of Far-Right books, even if 
the political project has made limited gains.742 
The mainstream media only took substantial notice of Spencer in the aftermath of 
Trump's electoral success. Shortly after the election Spencer held the 2016 NPI meeting in 
Washington DC where he infamously called out “Heil Trump” before giving a Nazi salute. This 
is the moment when Spencer became a recognized face for the Alt-Right and the broader 
Alternative Right. In 2017 at the inauguration for Trump he was punched in the face by a member 
of Antifa, which became a viral sensation online, prompting many articles on the legitimacy of 
punching Nazis.743 This would not be the last time he would face opposition from left-wing 
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groups, as his appearance and organization efforts at Charlottesville later that year would 
demonstrate.744 
Spencer's definitive article “What it Means to be Alt-Right”, which he posted on the first 
day of the Unite the Right Rally, lists twenty values or principles for his specific branch of the 
Alternative Right.745 While they diverge from some of the earlier Alternative Right positions, it is 
fair to say that these views are the ones most linked with the radical core. Those who say "I am 
not Alt-Right" are saying: “I do not abide by all 20 points of Spencer's manifesto even if I agree 
with most or many of them, just not the first three points which are specifically an anti-Semitic 
form of White Nationalism.” Unlike the other texts covered within this chapter, and this text, which 
are too large or dense to examine in detail, Spencer's “What it Means to be Alt-Right” is both short 
and straightforward.746 Therefore, it is both possible and valuable to compare these twenty points 
with the ideas articulated earlier in this chapter and text to examine what political theory and 
ideology has coalesced into the Alternative Right and more specifically the Alt-Right. 
The first two points (Race and Jews) establish the Alt-Right as supporters of  white racial 
identity group based on European identity and heritage, "“European” refers to a core stock— 
Celtic, Germanic, Hellenic, Latin, Nordic, and Slavic"747 with the caveat that there is a fundamental 
distinction between Jews and Europeans. This places Spencer's contingent away from the Jewish 
inclusive American Renaissance and represents a break from the earlier Nordic-Aryan focused 
Neo-Nazi movements of the twentieth century which had no place for Slavic peoples. The pan-
European concept of a white race is relatively new and only possible from an American perspective 
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which downplays the centuries of hostility between the different European nations. Even 
Guillaume Faye, who imagines a pan-European state bases it off of the assumption that it would 
be highly federalized to maintain the divergent cultural traditions rather than establish a pan-
European identity.748 Both of these points are by far the most controversial within the article, as 
both outright anti-Semitism and White Nationalism are the most taboo ideas of the movement and 
the ones most likely to get the movement censored within the media (except outright terrorist 
attacks which would face even more repression, though these are motivated overwhelmingly by 
anti-Semitism, White Nationalism and misogyny). 
The third and fourth points (The Ethno-State and Metapolitics) in Spencer’s manifesto 
rephrase the two central values of the French New Right, and the definition of the Alternative 
Right used for this text, the right to difference and a focus on cultural metapolitics.749 These 
declarations are yet again substantial evidence that the Alternative Right emerged out of the 
intellectual traditions of the French New Right. While the American influences are addressed later 
in the article, they are policy positions rather than fundamental axioms of the movement.  Not only 
does Spencer draw upon the French New Right, but he also actively rejects the American liberal-
conservative synthesis of neoliberal Republicans when he says: "The decrepit values of Woodstock 
and Wall street mean nothing to us."750 For the Alternative Right, there is no place for liberalism, 
the conservative bourgeoise or multicultural pluralism. As has been stressed by every thinker 
within the Alternative Right, the goal of the political theory of the movement is to provide an 
ideological blueprint for a postliberal world. 
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With his seventh, eighth, ninth and twentieth points (Family, Human Nature, Women and 
Sex, and Personal Duties) Spencer establishes an individualistic hierarchical society, based on a 
patriarchal family structure, the submission of women into a submissive and nurturing role as 
"mothers and caregivers" and the biologically determined hierarchy of human beings based on 
their innate endowments at birth.751 What Spencer argues in these four points is identical to the 
values that Jordan Peterson lays out in his text 12 Rules for Life.752 Peterson is not the only one to 
argue these values, but he is one of the most vocal authors on the nature of family structure 
examined within this text. These domestic values are where the Alternative Right will continue to 
make inroads with the evangelical Republican base, as they share a unified anti-feminist and pro-
traditional family platform. It should also be noted that Spencer makes a point of denouncing the 
"lonely "porn culture"" of today's youth, calling for a "return to a sexuality that is fruitful and erotic 
in the truest sense of the word."753 While these views on pornography would have been implicit 
twenty or thirty years ago, they have now become essential characteristics of the community of 
online men within the Alternative Right. This move to de-sexualize fascism is also a significant 
departure from the highly sexualized definition of fascism for much of the post-war period, as 
films such as Salo and The Night Porter demonstrated.754 
Points five, six, ten and thirteen (White America, Europe, Foreign Affairs and 
Globalization) are merely a re-articulation of the International Relations policy of the 
Paleoconservative White Nationalists and the European New Right thinkers discussed earlier in 
this text.755 Spencer articulates an isolationist, non-interventionist and anti-globalization foreign 
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policy, which opposes the Republican platform for much of the 21st century. Spencer makes no 
surprising statements here; he calls for a non-interventionist pre-Great War America dominated by 
White Europeans and for a unified fortress Europe to oppose the influx of non-Europeans in recent 
decades. Richard Spencer favours a federalized white European state system at the exclusion of 
minorities, a view he shares with Faye, who expresses this as an alternative to the EU project.756 
Points eleven and twelve (Free Speech and Firearms) are shared with the majority of the 
American Right, as they articulate the values of the first and second amendment of the US 
constitution.757 There are also points that are limited to the United States, as no other Anglophone 
state has a comparable gun or free speech culture. Free speech has explicitly become a political 
strategy for the Alternative Right in the past half decade to counter de-platforming strategies by 
liberal and left-wing counter-protesters.758 Both free speech and the protection of the second 
amendment were presented as central to radicalizing the American right according to the 
Christchurch shooter's manifesto.759 While there is little doubt that the American Far-Right would 
be personally and ideologically committed to the second amendment, their choice to support free 
speech is unquestionably one of political strategy. There should be absolutely no doubt in any 
observer’s mind that the Alternative Right or their allies, once elected into office would begin to 
legislate against anti-hate speech legislation and significantly reduce the ability to express 
opposition to Alternative Right perspectives.  
Point fifteen (Economics) is a reminder that the Alternative Right and the Alt-Right are 
fundamentally critical of the existing economic structure of capitalism. While not all members of 
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the Alternative Right read or endorse the near 800-page text Leviathan and its Enemies by 
Francis,760 the sentiment that managerial and finance capitalism is eroding the freedom of 
American society is the generally accepted norm, even if the Alternative Right is split on how to 
resolve this crisis. The rejection of financial, managerial or globalization capitalism is one of the 
defining characteristics of the Alternative Right’s populist support and according to Bannon one 
of the primary reasons why Trump, who at least rhetorically positioned himself alongside this 
right-wing populist sentiment, found electoral success in both the 2016 general election and the 
Republican primaries.761 
 Points sixteen and seventeen (Urban Life and the Natural World) are both indicative of the 
French New Right's influence on Spencer and the Alternative Right as a whole.762 The earlier 
dreams of segregation from society into a rural community in Montana or New Hampshire are 
rejected as a retreat from the problems facing a White Nationalist project, one which can only 
result in further decline.763 The inclusion of the natural world is also indicative of a shift within 
the Alternative Right to address climate change and environmental collapse, both for the altruistic 
desire for a white homeland to live a pastoral life, and secondly to curb the inevitable fallout of 
climate change refugees. While the American Right is hesitant to support or accept the reality of 
climate change, the Alternative Right understands that coming environmental catastrophe will be 
an existential crisis that requires immediate political action. These climate change responses will 
likely focus on excluding climate change refugees from entering the United States rather than 
reducing CO2 levels. 
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Points fourteen, eighteen and nineteen (the Left, the 68'ers and Education) represent the 
three enemies of the Alternative Right in the United States.764 The Left and Education are the most 
apparent enemies, due to the Left’s opposition of the Alt-Right's Far-Right fascism through anti-
fascist organizations such as Antifa, and the relative dominance of liberal arts within the education 
system which leads to the reproduction of a liberal capitalist economy of individuals. The 
Alternative Right and its allies know that for their movement to be successful they must suppress 
the dissident voices within these spaces, which is why they will continue to legislate against their 
freedom of assembly and reduce the budgets for liberal arts and humanities programs wherever 
possible.765 The Alternative Right and its young members also reject the Baby Boomer generation, 
which they see as cuckservatives who sold out both the White Race and the future of America for 
temporary material gain. While they cannot legislate against wealthy conservatives, they can 
discredit them and isolate them from traditional conservative parties. Perhaps the most indicative 
moment in recent memory was seeing David Frum, a staunchly Right-Wing Conservative 
speechwriter for the second Bush Administration, representing the liberal cause of democracy at 
the 2018 Munk Debates in opposition to Bannon.766 The Alternative Right has been very successful 
at discrediting the economic conservatives within the Republican party, as the prospect of Frum 
representing the more progressive position at a Munk Debate would have been unthinkable even 
five years earlier.  
The most surprising elements of Spencer’s list are what he excludes; the two most notable 
exclusions from his list are democracy and religion. As was introduced in the first chapter and 
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touched upon during the chapters on the Grey Tribe, NeoReactionaries and the European Far-
Right, there is a contempt for democracy and mainstream protestant Christianity within the 
Alternative Right. Unlike Alain de Benoist who is a pagan, Yarvin who is an atheist and critical 
of religious belief, or the neo-pagan White Nationalist group the Wolves of Vinland,767 Spencer 
understands that these choices are too radical and alienating for the vast majority of the American 
Right. It is unlikely that any significant pagan community will emerge within the United States to 
replace the evangelical Christian demographic within the American Right. Additionally, Spencer 
is less critical of democracy in 2017 than most White Nationalists, and Alternative Right thinkers 
would be, as this was published less than a year after Trump’s election and two days before the 
Alternative Right would be excised from the White House to maintain some degree of popular 
democratic support for the President’s administration.768 Given the failures of the Far-Right 
electorally in 2018 it is likely that Spencer’s position on democracy will change if Trump loses the 
2020 election. 
Radicalization and the White Nationalist text 
As with the other texts of the Alternative Right, White Nationalist literature is predicated 
on radicalization rather than academic critique. If one looks at the structure of Taylor’s White 
Identity, one sees a path towards radicalizing the reader into a White Nationalist intellectual 
framework.769 At first, he presents the failures of integration,770 which, while racist, is focused on 
providing some statistics and anecdotes to justify reserved or subconscious bigotry. From there 
 
767 Gray, “A Former Alt-Right Member’s Message: ‘Get Out While You Can’”; de Benoist and Champetier, 
Manifesto For a European Renaissance; Curtis Yarvin, “Why Do Atheist Believe in Religon,” Unqualified 
Reservations, 2007, https://www.unqualified-reservations.org/2007/04/why-do-atheists-believe-in-religion/. 
768 Tatum, “Gorka: Bannon, Others ‘Systematically Undermined.’” 
769 Taylor, White Identity: Racial Consciousness in the 21st Century. 
770 Ibid., 290. 
266 
 
Taylor progresses through several chapters on “The Myth of Diversity,”771 where he highlights all 
the minor ways that White Christian Americans make accommodations to other cultures all the 
while being called racists. It is only after several chapters of mainstream conservative talking 
points that Taylor accelerates his arguments through a biological determinist framework,772 and 
from there elaborates on his project of establishing white racial consciousness. The literature of 
most White Nationalists is aimed at radicalization and ideological positioning, with few texts 
seriously engaging with the critiques of racism from the liberal or progressive left. 
The pathway is typically the same across the literature, first the dog whistle talking point, 
that is less racist or offensive than the subsequent arguments. Next is the presentation of failures, 
typically anecdotal examples of minor racial violence or government failure when it legislates 
some form of equality or broadly left-wing legislation. Then the Far-Right ideas are presented 
through scientific or historical rhetoric to cloud them from critiques.  From there on, the text is 
firmly radical and functioning within internal logical structures based on earlier assumptions. This 
development is essential to the movement’s literature, as the project of the movement has always 
been a reawakening of racial consciousness. It does not seek to convert the African American 
scholar or feminist activist to their ideology. Unlike the progressive identity politics movements, 
the white Identitarians have no domestic allies; you are either with them or against them. 
The serious scholarship of the American White Nationalists as expressed in the lengthy 
texts of Imperium,773 Leviathan and its Enemies774 and White Identity775 represent the dogmatic 
political theory texts of the movement, but they would find no fertile soil to grow if it was not for 
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the influx of more digestible theory and texts from the NeoReactionaries, Grey Tribe and Alt-Right 
theorists. As the European New Right theories have cross pollinated with the American White 
Nationalist thoughts of the 1990s it has resulted in a far more accessible and publicly acceptable 
extreme Far-Right theory than anytime in the post-war rights era. 
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Part 3: A New Reactionary Ideology 
Conclusion: The Path of Radicalization 
Introduction 
The central question of this text has been: how have the divergent political theory traditions 
of the Alternative Right coalesced into a new reactionary political ideology? At this point, the 
different theories have provided separate maps of the reactionary political world in the 21st century. 
These maps have provided a framework for the different reactionary groups to establish a 
somewhat coherent world view independent of the libertarian and conservative ideological 
consensus of the American Right. Each of these maps, despite showing a path forward is part of a 
more extensive collection, laying a blueprint for the imagined reactionary world of the 21st century. 
The map provided by the Grey Tribe shows a path towards radicalization into Reactionary 
ideological positions out of a seemingly non-partisan and apathetic population. The 
NeoReactionary map laid an incomplete picture of the world which ignores many of the day-to-
day policies of an Alternative Right government but crafted an aesthetic and an intellectual 
vanguard party identity that helped the early Alternative Right transform into a populist force. The 
European theorists filled in the edges of the map, showing what postliberalism looked like outside 
of the North American context, and provided a historical and geopolitical framework that would 
be either unthinkable or unpopular for the American centric theorists of the reactionary right. The 
final map, that of White Nationalism secures the picture, providing an activist network to the 
existing hubs of the Alternative Right so that the individuals on the Alternative Right can see a 
way forward together. 
The Alternative Right’s political theory is one of reactionary thought, fundamentally driven 
by a rejection of neoliberal culture, globalization and the waning of white male privilege. This text 
has shown that “it is nothing but a prejudice to assume that revolutionaries think while 
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reactionaries only react;”776 they have done a lot of thinking and writing. The Reactionaries of the 
Alternative Right represent a break in American liberal-conservative ideology. These authors have 
demonstrated an abandonment of liberal tradition that has defined American conservatism for 
centuries.777  
The literature examined throughout this text shares three common elements: shared 
reactionary values, a break with American Liberalism and the idea of a loyal opposition and that 
the texts are written for radicalization. The Alternative Right is a politics of rebirth and represents 
a political awakening for this non-liberal American political community. The Alternative Right is 
a new Ideology and it is a reactionary ideology. 
Katie McHugh and the Path of Radicalization 
The path to radicalization through White Nationalism is not an all or nothing campaign. 
As with the young NEET (not in education, employment or in training) who moves from a Grey 
Tribe edgelord repeating the jokes of South Park with his friends to an anti-democratic 
misogynist who attacks and doxes women in his spare time, the radicalization of White 
Nationalism often comes from relatively benign locations. One of the best outlines for this 
radicalization comes from Rosie Gray’s highly sympathetic article “A Former Alt-Right 
Member’s Message: ‘Get Out While You Still Can’”, where she tells the story of Katie McHugh 
and her path to Alternative Right radicalization.778 Gray’s article, while anecdotal evidence, 
provides an excellent example to demonstrate how the Alternative Right has coalesced into a 
new reactionary ideology. 
 
776 Mark Lilla, The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction, Kindle (New York: New York Review Books, 2016), 
6. 
777 Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America. 
778 Gray, “A Former Alt-Right Member’s Message: ‘Get Out While You Can.’” 
270 
 
Gray tells the story of how a young white woman from a wealthy family became 
radicalized. McHugh’s initial radicalization first started through the libertarian movement’s Joe 
Sobran and then the works on VDare and American Renaissance. Gray’s article is filled with 
examples of Alternative Right radicalization stories which fill this text: a mentor saying that he 
is “not a member of the ‘Alt-Right’” but supporting and furthering the ideas of Alternative Right 
intellectuals (like Paul Gottfried),779 the radicalization of a young person through libertarianism 
during the first years of the Obama administration (The Christchurch Shooter),780 and the quasi-
endorsement of white supremacy and right-wing ideas through super PAC money.781 Nothing 
within Rosie Gray’s article is a surprise or departure from the path to radicalization presented 
within this text. When Katie McHugh claims, “I was a white nationalist,… I wasn’t completely 
aligned with Irvings’s anti-Semitism,”782 this should come as no surprise, as she stated earlier, 
she was a follower of Jared Taylor who advocated for the inclusion of Jewish whites into his 
White Nationalist cause.783 Nor is it a surprise when she reveals that she is familiar with the 
NeoReactionary ideology of Curtis Yarvin and Nick Land during 2013, and reveals her boyfriend 
was practicing passivism.784 Her time at Breitbart, as one of Steve Bannon’s female reporters 
known as his Valkyries, is presented through the narrative of internal conflicts between the Alt-
Light and the more radical Alternative Right rather than an apology for her racism.785 Even her 
justifications for her White Supremacy come partially from the IQ focused readings of Kevin 
MacDonald and the subsequent biological determinism frameworks rather than older Civil 
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Rights era racism.786 While McHugh is a devoted Catholic, her boyfriend was a member of the 
Wolves of Vinland, which is an ultra-reactionary neopagan cult.787 
McHugh’s path through the movement is one of acceptability and radicalization. When 
she is confronted with her racism during her time at Breitbart, she was reminded that: “The 
important thing in the new conservative digital media, she had realized, was not to not be racist 
but to laugh at those who called you racist.”788 Her radicalization was indicative of the growing 
acceptability of the movement, and only when the movement pressed its luck did she face 
significant fallout. When the pressure against Breitbart and Bannon were at their all-time high 
in the summer of 2017, McHugh was removed, the very summer when the Alternative Right 
abandoned a quick path to the mainstream as a movement before switching to a campaign of 
normalization.789 McHugh’s timeline lines up perfectly with the movement’s ebbs and flows, 
with her transition from the devourer of political texts by Far-Right intellectuals between 2008 
to 2013 to public supporter for the populist movement between 2013 and 2017.  
McHugh’s story is not just useful as an anecdotal account of the progress from wealthy 
libertarian teen to Alternative Right White Nationalist, who was one or two degrees of separation 
from almost every significant figure within the movement;790 it helps explain how the path to 
radicalization and white supremacy is justified. Katie McHugh has no trauma with non-whites 
motivating her, nor does she come from an impoverished community. She came from a wealthy 
family and was successful at multiple major news outlets; her economic precarity comes from 
her lack of healthcare and her extensive publicly available racist remarks. McHugh is proof that 
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the ideology of the Alternative Right and specifically White Nationalism is not one of duping a 
gullible public through false consciousness. For McHugh, the politics of the Alternative Right 
was attractive because it provided a sense of community. 
Shared Reactionary Values 
The ideas within the Alternative Right are cross-pollinated with each other, while direct 
citations of each other’s work are less common, the movement does make use of the same logical 
systems and ideological positions. The Alternative Right, despite the initial appearance as a 
monolithic entity within the media, is a diverse group of Far-Right reactionaries, ranging from 
fascists to libertarians. Despite the diversity in right-wing groups, the movement can be broadly 
understood within two competing and co-dependent ideological entities, the elitist Alternative 
Right and the populist Alternative Right. The elitist Alternative Right emerged out of the 
libertarian movement and the radicalization of the Grey tribe from self-positioned apolitical figures 
and the techno-libertarians and futurists coming out of online communities. The populist tradition 
comes from a much older tradition of the Far-Right within American politics and the European 
New-Right. Each movement relies on the other as a familiar ally, despite the occasionally 
disagreements over questions of anti-Semitism and capitalist development. Despite these two 
entities competing over the movement, they should be understood within a spectrum with some 
groups having more pull over the direction of the movement than others. 
The literature comes from shared traditions with semi-unified bodies of literature which 
share the same readership, even if geographically separated from each other. Both Curtis Yarvin 
and Samuel Francis for example rely on the work of James Burnham to justify their economic 
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theories, even though neither directly engage with each other.791 The development of Right-Wing 
publishing houses like Arktos or Counter-Currents have directly tapped into this shared readership 
providing members of the Alternative Right easy access to these reactionary texts.  
Ideologically the Alternative Right is relatively interconnected with a shared political 
project. While there are significant differences between the different traditions of the Alternative 
Right, which should be examined in further detail by more concentrated scholarship, the broad 
outline of the movement that this text presents has demonstrated that the movement is in theory 
connected, even if in practice oppositional. For example, as demonstrated earlier within this text 
American White Nationalists like Jared Taylor or Richard Spencer, draw upon the thinkers of the 
European New Right,792 like Alain de Benoist and Alexander Dugin, who were in turn partially 
influenced by Francis Yockey, an American Neo-Nazi.793 The movement, despite the geographic 
and temporal separation is interconnected. The emergence of the Alternative Right into a political 
entity is likely, though it may abandon some elements of the ideology for strategic purposes. The 
advent of new political parties or the take over of existing parties to represent this ideology is very 
likely, even though these parties may be marginal in popular support. 
Break from American Liberalism and the Loyal Opposition 
Internationally the Alternative Right represents a break from American hegemony and the 
possibility for post-liberal world order. While the European Far-Right is the most indicative of this 
position, with continuously articulated positions of anti-Americanism,794 they are not the sole 
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proponents of this platform. The Grey Tribe’s quasi-isolationism in the form of Peter Thiel’s 
seasteading795 or the NeoReactionary position of escape shares these rejections of an ever 
integrating liberal order.796 None of the thinkers within this text argue for an international world 
of global free trade or the Washington Consensus, and therefore should not be considered 
neoliberal. Some right-wing neoliberals and neoconservatives may find temporary or strategic 
alliance with the Alternative Right, but they will never see eye to eye on free trade or globalization. 
Domestically, at least within the United States, the ideas of the Alternative Right are a 
rejection of the enlightenment project and the liberal democracies that emerged out of the liberal 
tradition. If the mission of the National Review in 1955 was to “stand athwart history, yelling 
Stop!”797 then the mission of the Alternative Right is to tear history asunder forcing it to both return 
to a traditionalist past and to hurl it into the distant future after the collapse of modernity. There is 
nothing liberal or modern about the ideological project of the Alternative Right, even the most 
fundamental political claim, that the legitimacy of the state comes from its people, is at question. 
The Alternative Right rejects democracy, either by suggesting a monarchical system as the 
NeoReactionaries do,798 or a rejection of the right to citizenship and participation by minorities as 
is the case with the White Nationalists.799 Fundamentally the project of the Alternative Right is to 
end liberalism and establish a postliberal order, which requires a drastic restructuring of the 
American state. 
The other significant break from the American tradition of a loyal opposition has been the 
rise of extremist terrorist attacks by the Alternative Right. This new Far Right is defined by the 
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rejection of the legitimacy of the established political system.800 Unlike the conservative 
opposition to FDR or the neoliberal take over in the 1970s and 1980s, this new right-wing 
movement will not be satisfied sitting in the wings as an opposition. The Alternative Right, unlike 
the Tea-Party, is not loyal to the American state. They will abandon the principles and norms of 
democratic governance and adopt more violent means of politics. As domestic terrorism rises due 
to the increasing number of white nationalists and far-right extremists, the Alternative Right will 
become a far more radical group, one which will be addressed by likely limited anti-extremist 
legislation or corporate no-platforming.801  
While the smaller group of the core Alt-Right avoids explicit assassinations of public 
officials, it is unlikely that the Alternative Right will ignore this possibility.802 The terror attacks 
by right-wing extremists are not only significant but growing. However, this recognition of the 
Alternative Right as a violent extremist group is not without its critics; with academics, such as 
George Hawley, who present the Alt-Right as a relatively non-violent body, saying: “the Alt-
Right at present cannot be classified as a violent movement.” which he put on par with counter-
protesting Antifa groups.803 This rhetorical both-sideism is a manipulation of the facts to 
discount the political violence by Alternative Right affiliates that are violent hate crimes and 
should be considered acts of terrorism. The terrorist attacks by Dylann Roof,804 or the increasing 
anti-Semitic hate crimes occurring in North America, are linked with lone shooters and other 
figures who are labelled mentally ill rather than members of a more significant political 
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movement.805 The incel van attack in Toronto during 2018 is a perfect example of this,806 a 
politically motivated attack that would have resulted in anti-Muslim/immigrant policing if it was 
connected to an Islamic group, but in the aftermath of the attack, little was established to prevent 
further acts of terrorism.  
Theory for Radicalization 
While the two major trends: the shared reactionary values and break from American 
liberalism are the most demonstrative of a break in political theory. The literature of the Alternative 
Right is fundamentally a theory for radicalization. The goal of most Alternative Right literature 
examined throughout this text has been to either provide a critique of liberalism or to radicalize 
(young, white) men into a reactionary position. Whether it be Curtis Yarvin’s “Gentle 
Introduction” or “Open Letter”,807 the manifestos by Guillaume Faye,808 or the racial tracts by 
Samuel Francis809 and Jared Taylor,810 the goal of the movement’s literature has been one of 
radicalization from a position of moderate or closeted belief. The texts are also fundamentally 
written for a public rather than an academic audience. This has allowed them to reach a much 
broader readership, even those articles published with White Nationalist journals such as Radix or 
American Renaissance are easy to access. Even the denser political theory of the NeoReactionaries 
like Nick Land is still written in a mixture of cyberpunk Ergot and academic jargon to separate it 
from traditional academic texts.811 The other major theme of the Alternative Right Literature has 
been the fixation of always writing to motivate racial and reactionary consciousness. The 
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Alternative Right, like Alec Baldwin in Glengarry Glen Ross, is A – Always, B – Be, C – Closing 
(the gap between moderates and White Nationalism).812 The Alternative Right will not be satisfied 
intellectually or politically until they have established a racial or reactionary consciousness within 
the White population around the globe. 
The American Far-Right during the Cold War era was smothered by the Republican party’s 
simultaneous Southern Strategy and opposition to explicit racism; the anti-Semitic and White 
Nationalist movements within the American Far-Right were marginalized from mainstream 
American politics into the early twenty-first century.813 The energies of the Far-Right movements 
within the United States, such as the John Birch Society, were directed towards the Soviet Union 
with the support of anti-communist figures within the liberal-conservativism establishment rather 
than against the existing political establishment.814 For much of the Cold War the radicalization of 
the Far-Right was constantly kept in check by the emergent mainstream conservative movement 
lead by the National Review and William F. Buckley. In contrast the decline of Western Europe 
within global politics during the post-war period, provided a space for a new third-position for the 
European New Right to oppose both American-Liberal Capitalism and Soviet-Communism.815 
Those who wished to maintain a nationalistic project in Europe did so in opposition to the 
American economic and cultural hegemonic pressures of the Cold War era. The European Far-
Right was able to establish an ideology independent of liberal-capitalism which was impossible in 
the United States. This allowed for the European thinkers to create a right-wing anti-materialist 
ideology, which would germinate in think tanks within Europe before finding its way into the 
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hands of American anti-establishment politicians and theorists. In turn this allowed for a coherent 
reactionary ideology to enter American conservative thought in the 1990s, which lead to the 
radicalization of racial thought, which was compounded by the re-emergence of race science 
literature within mainstream American discourse with the publishing of the Bell Curve.816 
American figures like Richard Spencer or Steve Bannon were hesitant to embrace many of the 
more materially and ecologically progressive elements of the European New Right such as a 
progressive climate change policy,817 but the metapolitical focus on culture and the right to 
difference have become pillars of the Alternative Right and have begun to influence the Republican 
party’s platform under Trump.818  
In contrast to the older tradition of the Identitarian and White Nationalist communities, the 
right-wing radicalization of the Grey Tribe only started in the mid-2000s as the US government 
failed to allow for either creative destruction or social-democratic Keynesian economic policy in 
the face of the subprime mortgage crisis.819 The internet’s hands off environment allowed for 
hyper-individualism and technological disruption, akin to the libertarian fantasies of radical 
individualism and Austrian economics.820 While initial libertarian and anarchist movements 
focused on targeting oppressive institutions and public figures with broad consensus, the 
movement started to shift further to the right adopting more radical anti-democratic positions and 
a techno-futuristic fixation on eugenics and technological utopianism.821 The core of the movement 
and its online institutions have shifted to the right. The American Grey Tribe, which was once 
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apolitical and split between Democrats and libertarians, has become radicalized and toxic, 
providing a safe harbour for misogynistic and extremist communities. 
The Alternative Right is a Politics of Rebirth and Political Awakening 
The reactionary state of mind which dominates the Alternative Right is not one of 
conservatism or preservation of the status quo. Instead, as has been demonstrated throughout this 
text, it has been one of reaction. For the Alternative Right, the politics of conservatism has been 
one of stagnation and decline, only a return to the past will allow the movement to claim a place 
for the white race in the future. In the mind of a reactionary the continued progress of modernity 
will result in the destruction of the Western Civilization. The goal of the Alternative Right is, 
perhaps literally, to go back to go to the future. The politics of the Alternative Right is one of 
retreat and exit, harkening back to a romanticized utopian past or predicting a new idealistic future 
in which they somehow beat back the progressive forces of modernity.  
The Alternative Right represents the rebirth of reactionary ideology within the English-
speaking world. While not the state-centric fascism of the 1920s or 1930s, it is a fascistic ideology, 
as Roger Griffin’s definition of Fascism implies: “Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose 
mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism.”822 As 
addressed earlier in this text, the Alternative Right is a populist and reactionary project of rebirth. 
The core mission of the Alternative Right, from the Grey Tribe to the White Nationalists is the 
rebirth of reactionary consciousness in the face of postmodernity and globalization. This 
reactionary project, which was initially elitist and decentralized, has subsequently embraced 
populism.823 Rather than the elitist project of riding the tiger of modernity until it exhausts itself, 
 
822 Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, 117. 
823 Anissimov, “Why the Replacement of Neoreaction with the Alt Right Was a Good Thing.” 
280 
 
the contemporary reactionaries draw upon the idea of rebirth to lead the people out of the existing 
morally and political corrupt society.824 The question of the earlier elitist reactionaries was how to 
weather the storm of modernity, the question of the populist Alternative Right is how to thrive 
during the collapse of modernity. The Alternative Right promises a new beginning for its 
followers, one which places white men back at the top of the social hierarchy without opposition 
or competition from non-white men or women.  
Alternative Right texts are apocalyptic and dystopian, the future, unless freed from 
modernity will be one of decadence and Kali Yuga, the Hindu word for the final stage of the world 
that occupies much of Bannon and Evola’s traditionalist theories.825  Evola,826 Dugin,827 
Bannon,828 and Faye829 all stress the current or emergent dark periods of the “end times” which 
will come about as the liberal system collapses. The only way out of this darkness is for a new 
renaissance for western civilization, a metaphorical rebirth out of the dying body of modernity. 
This shared idea of rebirth after a coming collapse can be found across the Alternative Right, it is 
both the literal name for the White Nationalist journal American Renaissance, and the motivation 
for labelling the NeoReactionary movement a Dark Enlightenment.830 Just as the first Renaissance 
emerged between the end of the feudal middle ages and the early modern period in Europe, this 
current Renaissance is a solution to the end of liberal modernity and whatever emerges within a 
postliberal world order. For a reactionary renaissance to occur the public must first be radicalized 
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and possess a white racial consciousness; it is therefore an ideology of counter-revolution lead by 
a vanguard of reactionary intellectual elites.  
Conclusion 
 Returning to the Alternative Right’s three axioms, ones see that the right to difference is 
the right to exit and segregate oneself from the global order. For the Alternative Right, cooperation 
and integration are not only unpopular but impossible. As the pressures of an integrated world 
increase, it is likely that the Alternative Right and its followers will take more violent and extreme 
positions to maintain their current political positions. White Nationalism will be justified under 
the Identitarian framework of cultural preservation, while the universal human rights under a 
liberal framework will be undermined. As the Alternative Right is fixated on cultural metapolitics, 
they can leverage their small but dedicated political base of support through social media. The 
Alternative Right will do whatever it can to normalize reactionary cultural values and make it as 
difficult as possible for progressive, feminist and multi-cultural views to be shared in public 
through extensive trolling and harassment campaigns. Those within the Alt-Lite opposed to the 
Alt-Right will be able to express their views more effectively without as much censorship as the 
entire Alternative Right spectrum is normalized. The more substantial gains for the movement, 
especially since the failures of Charlottesville’s Unite the Right Rally, will be the normalization 
of Alternative Right views into Right-Wing rather than unspeakable Radical Far-Right views. As 
the ideology is predicated on individualism based on a hierarchical social system, the movement 
and its ideas may find homes within libertarian and liberal communities so long as its racism is 
kept in check. Under the guise of scientific research, the ideas of eugenics and biological 
determinism will become normalized rather than taboo.  
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 The Alternative Right will likely see increasing radicalization, especially as the ideology 
becomes more definitive. Unless the Alternative Right gains a normalized political party in the 
Anglosphere, they will resort to violence to express their views. In which case counter-extremism 
could be funded to address these groups though it is unlikely that significant funding or pressure 
will be applied to these groups by political parties which have significant support from white 
supremacists or liberals who value Free Speech more than Hate Speech legislation. If the 
Alternative Right establishes or takes control of a major right-wing party, perhaps the Republican 
party in the United States or Brexit party in the UK, it will be all but impossible to de-platform or 
suppress the extremists within the movement. Politically it would be untenable to ban these parties 
from the public sphere when opposition parties take control of government. Unlike the fringe 
extremist movements of the 1980s and 1990s the Alternative Right appears to have significantly 
more cohesion and public support. Already the act of de-platforming or censoring the Alternative 
Right’s hate speech is viewed as a touchy subject by media corporations and governments, and as 
the movement is normalized it will be impossible. Ultimately the Alternative Right must be 
understood as a reactionary counter-revolutionary movement against post-Cold War liberal 
modernity. It poses an existential threat to anglophone liberal democracies as it erases and 
marginalizes minority voices. While it is still a relatively small movement, the existing political 
strategies of deplatforming and counter-protesting to counter or suppress the movement will be 
ineffective if the movement becomes normalized. 
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